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History of Contemporary Social Policy:
Introduction
RICHARD K. CAPUTO
Yeshiva University - Wilf Campus
Wurzweiler Scho6l of Social Work
Guest Editor
As the contributions to this special issue of ]SSW attest,
much can be said about the nature of social welfare policies and
programs over the past quarter century. Some changes are allegedly beneficial, some not, in regard to the welfare of the nation
in general and to economically needy people in particular. The
welfare program in the form of cash assistance primarily to lowincome mothers and their children as we had understood and
implemented it since 1935 ended. Work effort became the sine
qua non of cash assistance for all low-income families. Further,
the very notion of the welfare state in general was subjected to
a sustained ideological onslaught. Alternatives such as partially privatizing the welfare state's bedrock program, Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) still commonly
referred to as Social Security, were advanced by Democratic
and Republican administrations alike. Privatization of Social
Security, in part or in whole, may be a non-starter as G. W.
Bush enters his last presidential year (Caputo, in press), but as
contributions to this special issue suggest, reliance on market
forces as the final arbiter of many social problems may have
firmly eclipsed that of the Federal Government.
Space and time limited the scope of social welfare policies
that found their way into this special issue of JSSW. Before introducing the in-depth, thoughtful, and perceptive articles that
Journal of Sociology & Social Velfare, March 2008, Volume XXXV, Number 1
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did make it, I would like to address briefly one topic that had
no contributors per se, but that has preoccupied my scholarship since pursuing doctoral work in the mid 1980s, namely
changes in federal responses to people in need, particularly
those in poverty (Caputo, 1991 & 1994).
In several of my earlier preoccupations and studies regarding economic and social policies over the past quarter century,
I basically concluded that the nature and extent of change
depends on what one examines (Caputo, 2004, 2005). One of
the more notable and pronounced changes in social policy
over the past quarter century or so is reflected in the amount
of Federal and State expenditures on programs for poor individuals and their families. Excluding Social Security payments
which lift many low-income persons and their families above
poverty thresholds, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) was the predominant means through which Federal
and State governments distributed income to poor persons and
their families from 1976 to 1992. During the 1990s, there was
a wholesale shift in the benefits for poor persons to a work incentive system, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), as AFDC
and its 1996 replacement program, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), decreased in importance.
By 2004 expenditures for the EITC program (approximately
$38 billion in 2000 dollars) eclipsed TANF (approximately $18
billion), Food Stamps (approximately $20 billion), and Federal
and State Supplemental Security Income (SSI, $35 billion)
(Dowd, 2005). Further, as I have reported in an earlier issue of
]SSW (Caputo, 2006), the anti-poverty effects of work incentive programs like the EITC, which had been launched in 1975
during the Ford administration but greatly expanded during
the Clinton administration in the 1990s, were as equally dramatic. In 2002 for example, the EITC and Federal taxes removed
roughly the same percentage of persons from poverty as Social
Insurance (10.9% vs. 11.7% respectively) and higher percentages than means-tested non-cash programs (3.5%). These percentages were a striking contrast to the 1979 figures of 15.3
percent for means-tested non-cash programs, 10.9 percent for
Social Insurance, 7.7 percent for means-tested cash programs,
and -1.6 percent for EITC and Federal taxes (the last due in part
to the regressive nature of the Social Security payroll tax which
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the EITC did not fully offset in the aggregate until 1993).
While discussing a variety of policy changes over the
past quarter century, the contributors to this volume chronicle and analyze the historical, ideological, and structural
contexts within which the EITC came to such prominence as
an anti-poverty strategy. They do so from a number of different vantage points, precluding any straightforward classification of the individual contributions. Nonetheless, Gilbert and
Terrell (2005) identify three analytic perspectives on the study
of social welfare policy that offer a fruitful framework to organize the contributions to this issue: process, product, and
performance.
The first six contributions focus on processes associated
with policy change, the lead concerning faith-based services,
three others welfare reform, one Social Security (OASDI), and
one Medicare. The seventh and eighth contributions focus on
policy as product, the former describing changes in housing
policy and the latter examining factors contributing to the
likelihood of broadly defined welfare use and exit. Finally, the
ninth and tenth contributions respectively focus on policy as
performance in regard to how changes in welfare affected individuals with drug- or alcohol-related disabilities and how
changes in Medicare affected utilization of the home care
benefit, mainly in the fee-for-service program.
In the first process-oriented contribution to this issue,
Robert J. Wineburg, Brian Coleman, Stephanie C. Boddie, and
Ram A. Cnaan provide the most historically straightforward
narrative of changes in the U.S. welfare state. They focus on
the emergence of faith-based services. Wineburg et al. demonstrate how the seeds for recruiting faith-based groups were
planted before and during the Reagan years, and how two
waves of devolution chipped away at the national commitment to welfare. They contend that the first two waves of devolution provided both the ideological and practical means for
faith-based social service delivery, which they characterize as
the third wave of devolution. Wineburg et al. also review the
incorporation of religion in social services as part of the neofederalist trend of the Reagan legacy.
The second and third process-related contributions of
Catherine McDonald and Michael Reisch and of Judie Svihula
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and Carroll L. Estes respectively are theoretically driven examinations of different aspects of social welfare state functioning.
Both articles approach their subject matter from a broad institutional context of the welfare state, the former using welfare
reform as its backdrop or case study and the later examining
social security reform. Both articles also provide guidance for
social welfare activists who see a viable role for government to
tame the vicissitudes of market functioning.
McDonald and Reisch use neo-institutional theory and empirical research to analyze the transition from welfare to workfare state functioning in Australia and the United States. Their
comparative analysis of neo-liberal workfare regimes leads them
to contend that the logic of workfare as an institution has taken
on a hegemonic status, that is, workfare now has a degree of
cognitive legitimacy as to be taken for granted. McDonald and
Reisch show how processes of legitimization have evolved over
the past quarter century, how the profession of social work has
been affected by it, and how the profession can contribute to
processes of institutional change.
Svihula and Estes draw on mobilization or social movement theory to guide their historical and legislative analyses of
efforts to "privatize" Social Security. Their study details the ideological shift toward market rationalism within international
and national organizations. Their study demonstrates how the
propensity for private over public pensions gained ideological
ascendency not only in the United States, but globally, as free
market theorists such as Milton Friedman influenced Chilean
authorities to fully privatize their public pension scheme. On
the basis of their study, Svihula and Estes suggest that our
ability to predict the direction of ideological social movements
and thereby contribute to fields such as the politics of aging,
policy analysis, political sociology and political science would
be enhanced by an historical exegesis of the refraining, or
"keying," associated with the terminology for reform. This approach could signal ideological alignments and provide a longitudinal network analysis of the actors, their ideologies and
resources. Clarity would be gained in regard to how dominant
interests in any particular policy domain are able to use their
power and relationships to influence policy options.
In the fourth process-related article, Luisa S. Deprez shows
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how Congressional and media debates that culminated in
passage of the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) signified
the triumph of individualistic approaches to framing and
understanding poverty, the politics of policy-making, and the
power of political rhetoric. She relies on the files of Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, the late Democratic Senator from New York.
Deprez contends that the compromise between conservatives
and liberals that emerged throughout the 1980s amounted to a
tinkering with the welfare system as we then knew it, with no
substantive attention paid to the adequacy of paying jobs, day
care, and health care benefits and with insufficient attention
directed to issues of race, gender and class. As Deprez notes,
however, FSA nonetheless laid a structural and ideological
basis for the 1996 legislation that cemented FSA's provisions
for increasing work incentives, reducing the fiscal burden of
states for welfare, and compelling people to work as a condition of eligibility.
In the fifth process-related article, Jennifer L. Christian
relies on theories about partisan preferences and on General
Social Survey (GSS) data to examine the relationship between
public opinion and policy change. Her study sheds additional
light on how it came to be that welfare reform was more radical
in 1996 with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) than it was
in 1988 with FSA. Christian attributes this to the greater degree
of partisanship during the Clinton administration about social
welfare spending in general and about public cash assistance
programs in particular. She contends that welfare reform was
an attempt by the Clinton administration to reach out and
garner support from Republican and swing voters who had
become increasingly less supportive of social welfare spending
over the preceding quarter century.
In the sixth process-related article, Svihula relies on political and moral economy to examine the dominant values and
actors in the legislative process of the Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003. Witnesses from government agencies, Congress,
and think tanks had almost equal presence at the hearings.
Her content analysis of federal hearings revealed that witnesses who were invited by Congress to testify expressed
twice as much support for private interests than for the
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general Medicare population or low-income beneficiaries. Few
expressed concern for the uninsured population. Witnesses
offered almost four times as many expressions of support for
market rationalism than social insurance and three times as
many than for improving Medicare's solvency/sustainability.
With the 2008 presidential candidates split between support for
social insurance and support for the private market, Svihula
admonishes that Medicare advocates will need to devote extraordinary efforts to significantly counterweigh the strength
and influence of market rationalists.
In the first of two policy-as-product contributions to this
issue, Sondra J. Fogel, Marc T. Smith, and Anne R. Williamson
trace the development of housing policy as a national goal
prior to the Reagan administration, then focus more specifically on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which created the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. They note that
LIHTC shifted the trend of federal low income housing policy
from what had been direct (or "demand side") subsidies to
tenants (i.e. Section 8 vouchers and certificates) to indirect tax
credits to investors (i.e., "supply side" subsidies). The LIHTC
program does not meet the needs of the households with the
greatest housing needs-those with incomes below 30 percent
of area median income. Also examined in this article are the
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act passed in 1987
and the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez Affordable Housing Act. In
addition, much attention is given to the pluses and minuses
of the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE
IV) program which provided for the revitalization of federally
backed public housing in partnership with private and local
government entities.
In the second policy-as-product contribution to this issue,
Michele Lee Kozimor-King examines characteristics associated
with public assistance use and exit, paying particular attention
to the role of self-efficacy. Although this study reaffirms that
human capital and family background characteristics have the
strongest effects on the welfare use and exit within five years,
it nonetheless provides some evidence, albeit fragile, that
occupational self-efficacy affects the likelihood of exiting
public assistance. The combination of work and marriage was
found to be the most common route off welfare as compared

Introduction to the Special Issue

15

to marriage or work alone. Not only was the work/marriage
combination the most common route off welfare, but those
who were off welfare, working, and married five years after
initial exposure were the most likely to have been off welfare
the longest during the four year interval. In light of TANF
time-limits, findings suggest the difficulty of achieving selfsufficiency through work alone and the need for more research
acknowledging the intersections of social institutions such as
marriage and family.
In the first of two policy-as-performance contributions to
this issue, Sean R Hogan, George J. Unick, Richard Speiglman,
and Jean C. Norris examine the impact of the 1996 welfare
reform legislation on individuals with drug- or alcohol-related
(DA&A) disabilities. They note that before January 1, 1997,
individuals with drug- or alcohol-related disabilities could
qualify for federal public assistance through the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program. Welfare reform changed that
policy, resulting, as their study shows, in lost income and
health care benefits for many low-income substance abusers.
Proponents of the policy change had estimated that 75% of
former SSI DA&A beneficiaries would still qualify for SSI benefits under another disability category. Only 35% did. Hogan
et al. contended that policymakers should have realized
that the social welfare of some of our society's most vulnerable members had been compromised, a result antithetical to
the goals and objectives of a progressive welfare state and a
healthy society.
In the second policy-as-performance contribution to
this issue, Joan K. Davitt and Sunha Choi analyze the major
policy changes in Medicare and their impact on utilization of
the home care benefit, mainly in the fee-for-service program.
They summarize policy debates and changes in the 1970s to
set the stage for dramatic changes which occurred in the 1980s
and 1990s. Davitt and Choi highlight changes in program use
measured by actual figures such as costs, users, and visits, as
well as growth in use over time. They note that actual use and
program growth are related to the assumptions made by analysts at various historical points and that growth rates are appealed to in order to argue for program cuts. Finally, Davitt
and Choi offer a critical analysis of the policy incentives, their
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impact on agency practice and on benefit use.
I would like to extend my deep appreciation and thanks
to Robert Leighninger and ]SSW editorial board members
for endorsing this special issue and to the reviewers for their
thoughtful and thorough comments: Aaron Beckerman, Ram
Cnaan, Sheldon Gelman, Paul Hirschfield, Lou Levitt, Joanna
Mellor, Stephen Pimpare, Michael Reisch, Gary Stein, and Jay
Sweifach. Finally, thanks to Melinda McCormick for the focus
on timeliness and page limits and for typesetting each of the
contributions.

References
Caputo, R. K. (1991). Welfare andfreedom American style: The role of the
federal government, 1900-1940. Lanham, MD: University Press of

America.
Caputo, R. K. (1994). Welfare and freedom American style II: The role of
thefederal government, 1941-1980. Lanham, MD: University Press

of America.
Caputo, R. K. (2004). Presidents, profits, productivity, & poverty:

A great divide between the pre- & post-Reagan U.S. economy?
Journalof Sociology & Social Welfare, 31(3), 5-30.
Caputo, R. K. (2005). Distribution of the federal tax burden, share
of after-tax income, and after-tax income by presidential
administration and household type, 1981-2000. Journalof Sociology
& Social Welfare, 32(2), 3-18.
Caputo, R. K. (2006). The earned income tax credit: A study of eligible
participants vs. non-participants. Journal of Sociology & Social
Welfare, 33(1), 9-29.
Caputo, R. K. (in press). Personal retirement accounts & the American
welfare state: A study of income volatility and poverty as
correlates of PRA support. Journal of Poverty.
Dowd, T. (2005). Distinguishing between short-term and long-term
recipients of the earned income tax credit. National Tax journal,
58, 807-828.
Gilbert, N., & Terrell, P. (2005). Dimensions of social welfare policy (6 th
ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Leveling the Playing Field:
Epitomizing Devolution through
Faith-Based Organizations
ROBERT J. WINEBURG
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Washington University

RAM A. CNAAN
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The original New-Federalism agenda that emerged with the
Reagan administrationweakened federal programs and transferred
power to states and localities. While Ronald Reagan and George
Herbert Walker Bush's years were characterized by block grants
and dismantling public assistance, the Clinton years will be remembered for the dismantling of AFDC. Recruiting faith-based
organizations to provide social services epitomized the second
Bush presidency. In this article, we demonstrate how the seeds for
recruitingfaith-based groups were planted before and during the
Reagan years, and how two waves of devolution chipped away at
our national commitment to welfare. These first two waves provided both the ideological and practical means for faith-based
social service delivery, which epitomizes the third wave of devolution. We also briefly review the incorporationof religion in social
services as part of the neo-federalist trend of the Reagan legacy.
Keywords: faith-based organizations,devolution, welfare, social
service delivery, New Federalism
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Philosophical and Historical Background
One has to go back to the pre-New Deal era to fully understand how the American welfare system changed from Ronald
Reagan's presidency to the present. Before the New Deal, any
government welfare program was perceived as an unwanted intervention in the market and detrimental to its smooth
functioning. Four strong forces kept the type of welfare state
growth seen in Europe from capturing the American social
imagination. A strong Lockean sentiment of distrust for government,and a pervasive capitalist ideology, kept government
limited and weak compared with other modern democracies.
The American distaste for government assistance was held
in the national palate by the ideology of working one's way
up by his/her bootstraps and was buttressed by the fears and
disdain cast at each new wave of immigrants by former immigrants who objected to the new arrivals receiving government
aid while they often had to suffer hardship on their way to
the "American Dream." Assistance for the downtrodden was
supposed to come from family, community, and the church.
Success through individual sacrifice and struggle, with garnishes of suffering, were the keys in American conservative
thought, to both character development and economic success.
The result of these social forces was that the desired federal
government's role in individual lives was deemed as limited
to nonexistent. It took conservatives 72 years from the passage
of the New Deal legislation but they persisted, and today's
American welfare is a modern version of that which existed in
the pre-New Deal era.
Only the threat of capitalism's collapse in the Great
Depression brought the federal government, albeit reluctantly,
into assuming welfare responsibilities. The American version
of the welfare state began in earnest in 1935 with the passage
of the Social Security Act (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1991). From
1935 through the 1970s, government expanded social services
and provided general welfare dollars to the young, old, disabled, mothers with young children, ethnic minorities, and unemployed. However, this era of welfare expansion was small
in scope compared to European countries; and it was short
lived.
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Three processes, driven by the same conservative forces
that kept government out of social assistance prior to the Great
Depression, reemerged in new forms to undercut and minimize
welfare in America. The New Federalism showed its head in
the Nixon years with revenue sharing, a plan to send federal
tax revenue back to the states so states would have more discretionary money to address social concerns. The concept took
the shape and the form it has today with Reagan's presidency,
as did New Federalism's partner, devolution of service responsibility. If the first wave was to move responsibility and execution from the federal to the state and local government, the
second wave called upon the use of numerous local nonprofit
as well as for-profit providers. Almost as a natural by-product
of local responsibility, came the privatization of social services, or what has been called government by proxy-a process
where government buys mandated services from private nonprofit and for profit providers (Kettl, 2000).
New Federalism
Reagan's New Federalism put conservative philosophical
principles into action. Federalism implies that states, not the
federal government (and then counties and cities, and not the
state) ought to provide for specific welfare services not spelled
out in the U.S. Constitution. Since states and counties, not the
federal government, establish their own school systems, have
their own police forces, their own national guards, and their
own laws regarding daily life (ranging from insurance regulation to licensing marriage); the states and counties, in Reagan's
policy approach, would be the entities to develop and administer domestic programs at their own discretion. They were
viewed as close to the needy and able to tailor services to meet
their specific and often idiosyncratic needs. As such, programs
were supposed to be more effective and less costly. Today, for
example, federal health policies are implemented differently
from state to state (Holahan, Weil, & Wiener, 2003).
Reagan's New Federalism folded over 150 federal grant
programs into 11 block grant programs, cut the administrative
revenue used to administer the programs from Washington,
and returned the remaining money to the states with few
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strings attached. The term "block" simply meant that each
portion of money returned to the states could be spent on services within the loose parameters of the mandated allocation.
Maternal and Child Health Block Grant allocations could not
be spent for transporting the elderly to meal sites. The block
grant is for children. Yet, in keeping with the spirit of limited
federal involvement, there has been restricted federal oversight
constraining what states could do with the money to address
different social concerns in or across block grants.
The 1 2 h block grant, in existence since 1975, was the twentieth amendment to the Social Security Act of 1935; it was
referred to as Title XX before Reagan's changes and today is
known as the Social Services Block Grant. States had the discretion to do much more with the money after Reagan's election
than they ever had in the pre-Reagan years, when spending
was strictly directed from Washington. Realistically however,
the 2.5 billion dollars allocated in 1975 is just above four billion
dollars today. To fully understand the trend, in 1975 2.5 billion
dollars had the purchasing power that 9.36 billion dollars has
today.
Reagan revived the ideology of the limited role of federal
government in solving local problems. His 1980 campaign
promise was to cut taxes, increase the size of the military, and
balance the budget by 1984. These policy themes would evolve
in a strong way and dominate the discourse and policy actions
of George W. Bush's presidency 20 years later. In conservative
discourse, causes of social problems were simply reduced to
personal responsibilities, while solutions were ultimately state
and local matters; not national responsibilities. The central
government would not interfere with local issues, nor would it
promote policies, like minimum wage increases, because they
constrained state initiatives and interfered with local businesses (Ferejohn & Weingast, 1998; Walker, 2000). The renewed
emphasis on federalism is the focus of the new right and long
time conservatives in the Republican Party. Devolution is a key
practice of the New Federalism in the welfare arena.
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The Changing Political Arena:
The Reagan Years and Cultural Shift
The history of devolution in the United States as a viable
policy option originated in 1964 and was first practiced in the
early 1980s. Democratic president John E Kennedy's "New
Frontier" domestic plans were highlighted by his community
mental health agenda. His agenda was expanded on greatly
by Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" and "War on Poverty"
programs, the most commonly known being Medicare and
Medicaid.
Barry Goldwater's 1964 Republican bid for the presidency
was built on a strong military platform, as America, during
that time, was in a nuclear arms race with the former Soviet
Union. While the Senator from Arizona lost badly to Johnson,
his campaign focused on the evil "omnipotent government"
and the need to lower taxes, shrink the central government,
and allow local organizations to run local affairs.
A newcomer on the American political scene at the time
was a former actor from California, who, at the 1964 Republican
convention, gave what today is simply know as "The Speech."
Reagan not only burst onto the Republican stage with his
speech, he also laid out the tenets of the conservative agenda
for the foreseeable future.
The quote that follows shortly captures many of the themes
that wove their way through both public discourse and policy
processes during the last three decades. Social policy is hardly
ever a straight course from an idea to implementation, but if
one were to pick out the major welfare policy initiatives from
the end of Lyndon Johnson's presidency, but more importantly from Reagan's presidency to George W. Bush's Faith-Based
Initiative and his attempt to privatize Social Security, it would
be difficult to miss the footprints left by "The Speech" in 1964.
Nixon not only implemented revenues sharing, but he also
attempted to shift federal social service responsibility to the
states in a failed attempt to consolidate grant programs into
six block grants. Gerald Ford's administration implemented
Title XX, and Jimmy Carter's last welfare budget in 1979, actually reduced the growth expenditure from the previous year's
budget. While Carter had to combat economic stagflation, for
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Reagan, cutting welfare was an ideological mission.
By 1980, the country was relatively receptive to Reagan's
budget cuts and block grants due to years of shaping discussion on welfare and incremental shifts toward federalist programs that gave states slow but increasing responsibility for
service development. The country was shaken by high inflation and the impacts of the oil embargo of 1973 and was ready
for "tough measures." In this small clip it's fairly easy to see
the embodiment of the conservative ideology that formed the
framework for today's devolution.
The President [Johnson] tells us he is now going to start
building public housing units in the thousands where
heretofore we have only built them in the hundreds.
But FHA [Federal Housing Administration] and the
Veterans Administration tell us that they have 120,000
housing units they've taken back through mortgage
foreclosures. For three decades, we have sought to solve
the problems of unemployment through government
planning, and the more the plans fail, the more the
planners plan (Reagan, 1964).
Reagan's eight years of moving programs to the states was
also sprinkled with attempts to involve the religious community in more service provision, a strategy of devolution that
would almost seem natural by January 29, 2001 when George
W. Bush launched his White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives. Two important articles appeared
in The Washington Post within less than three weeks of each
other in March and April of 1982. From the start, what seemed
just below the surface of the articles was an emerging policy
agenda designed to reshape the welfare state in such a way
as to cut programs, change the discourse from a language of
"entitlement" that characterized the New Deal, and sharpen a
moral language of "personal responsibility." The new agenda
would then be grounded in the notion that social ills were the
results of a fall from grace. Such rhetoric made it easier to push
congregations of all stripes into service.
The two news stories in The Washington Post may have
also kicked off what we now know as the Faith-Based
Initiative. On March 26, 1982 the headline of the first article
read: "Reagan Is Host to Black Ministers; Reagan Defends His
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Policies to Black Ministers" (Wynter, 1982). The article said
that President Reagan played host to 75 friendly Black ministers from across the country, including a dozen recent "converts" to the Republican Party from Prince George's County,
MD. Reagan defended charges that his administration did not
care about minorities and the poor. Reagan also used the occasion to welcome the newcomers to the GOP. White House
press spokesman Larry Speakes said, in what has become fashionable political doublespeak, that there was no connection
between the invitation of the Prince George's ministers and
hopes of the party for increasing its showing arnong Blacks
in the Fall 1982 elections. "Idon't link it to a strategy for the
elections," Speakes said. "Certainly we welcome Republicans
from wherever they come-and we'll welcome their votes in
the fall" (Wynter 19,82, p. BI).
Less than three weeks later, in an article titled "Reagan
Urges More Church Aid for Needy" (Denton, 1982 p. A3),
President Reagan, speaking to a group of more than 100 mainly
white religious leaders, further crafted the discussion now so
central to current social policy. He said "churches and voluntary groups should accept more responsibility for the needy
rather than leaving it to the bureaucracy" (Denton, 1982 p. A3).
He also told his version of the story of the Good Samaritan. His
vignette provided a caricature of what was later to become the
not-so-veiled subtext that sits right below the surface of the
language that shaped the discourse of faith-based policy, that
voluntarism and religious self-help are Godly and government
social services are demon-like.
The story of the Good Samaritan has always illustrated
to me what God's challenge really is. He crossed the
road, knelt down, bound up the wounds of the beaten
traveler, the pilgrim and carried him to the nearest
town. He didn't go running into town and look for a
caseworker to tell him that there was a fellow out there
that needed help. He took it upon himself (Denton,
1982, Reagan Presidential Library, 2006).'
Thus, while Reagan championed his New Federalism he
was also planting the seeds for a system of devolved service
provision that would see congregations, through national
policy initiatives of George W. Bush, play greater service roles.
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In the seventeen years between the time of "The Speech,"
and when he became president in 1981, the other administrations noted above softened the environment that gave Ronald
Reagan the wedge to implement the system of block grants and
start to bring congregations to the policy table. George H. W.
Bush and Bill Clinton followed the Reagan agenda with their
own rhetoric and policy initiatives. George H. W. Bush's campaign rhetorical strategy on the social front was to separate
himself from Reagan's draconian-like rhetoric and programs
that filled the atmosphere with overblown stories of welfare
queens and cheats and saw the streets littered with a sudden
rise in homeless people. He promised a "kinder, gentler" nation
while promising to enlist volunteers to solve social problems
in the form of a "thousand points of light"-a conservative
euphemism for voluntary action that took the policy form of
shifting even more government money to the private nonprofit
sector and thus expanding government by proxy at the state
and local level (O'Connell, 1989). Clinton, on the other hand,
seized on the conservative momentum and borrowed its rhetoric and policy initiative by signing welfare reform legislation
in 1996 to "end welfare as we know it" by returning the design
and delivery of welfare programs in the "centralized" Social
Security legislation, Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
back to the states and localities.
Devolution
By the time the second George Bush won the 2000 presidential election, devolution had become central to the federal
system of government. As previously discussed, the sovereign
federal government delegated power to state and local governments and the execution of welfare was delegated to nonprofit
organizations. It is this type of administrative decentralization
that underlies most political decentralization (Conlan, 1998;
Liebmann, 2000).
Overall, the Reagan, George Herbert Walker Bush and
Clinton administrations managed to institutionalize the new
federalism into first and second waves of devolution that decentralized service provision, while the administrative authority was handed down to lower tiers of government, outsourced
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nonprofits, or even for-profit providers. What seemed like a
bold step in the revenue sharing principles of the Nixon years
became a blip by the end of the Clinton years, when we saw
the Federal government only maintaining a supervisory function regarding the production of public goods (Fryklund, 1994;
Moore, 2003; Nightingale & Pindus, 1997; Smith & Lipsky, 1993;
Wineburg, 2001). The door was left wide open for the third
wave of devolution, church-based social service provision.
The Third Wave of Devolution:
The Armies of Faith
Little known precursors to the broad Faith-Based Initiatives
of George WV.
Bush's presidency were the large expansion of
faith-based nonprofits like Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social
Services, Salvation Army and Jewish Family Services receiving substantial portions of their budgets from federal and state
sources. By 1981, 47 percent of private social service expenditures were associated with religiously affiliated organizations (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1981). This large percentage
of expenditure represents entirely privately raised money earmarked for social services. The 1980s also saw the expansion
of community development corporations, most of which were
spun off from Black churches, receiving considerable federal
assistance to solve local problems. We provide this data as a
means to show that religious organizations have a rich history
of social services provision in the United States. During the
Clinton presidency, Henry Cisneros even opened a small faithbased unit in the Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
office (Wineburg, 2001).
It is not surprising that, in a country where about half the
population attends places of worship regularly and more than
80 percent of residents believe in God (The Barna Research
Group, 2000; Gallup, 2001), religion would be considered the
next frontier for helping those in need. After the first two waves
of devolution, public goods (from prison administration to vocational training) have gone private. Through the election of
George W. Bush in 2000, the stage had been set for implementing the next phase of the framework laid out in "The Speech,"
the third wave of devolution. A new set of private players had
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to be harnessed to provide public goods at a lower cost without
stirring up public outcry.
This wave of devolution has two critical junctions; each
merits special attention. The first is the introduction and legislation of "Charitable Choice" in 1996 and the latter the establishment of the White House's Office of "Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives" in early 2001.
Charitable Choice
Bill Clinton's "ending welfare as we know it" took legislative form through the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). The
door to fund churches and thus broaden the third stage of devolution came in the shape of a small provision in the thousand plus pages in welfare legislation, section 104, commonly
referred to as the Charitable Choice provision. The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) brought about numerous changes in the American
welfare field and was the first dramatic cut in the Social
Security legislation of 1935. Its sharpest impact was ending the
entitlement of permanent support for single mothers and reducing it to 60 months of federally supported assistance, with
24 months of maximum continuous benefits. The emphasis on
women moving from welfare-to-work was as dramatic in the
change of language as it was in its shift from a federally directed to a state directed program.
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) replaced
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, with the emphasis
squarely on "temporary." Weil and Finegold, (2002) analyzed
six years of TANF and concluded that among its key characteristics were work requirements and the end of unconditional
welfare support; marriage promotion and discouragement of
out-of-wedlock childbirth; variability between counties as to
how TANF is implemented; welfare caseload changes; and
state budget choices. They also noted that the faith-based community was introduced as a means of delivering support for the
public good. Job training and especially job retention were left
up to states, localities, employers, and any other mechanism
of private support that could be mustered (Weil & Finegold,
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2002).
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
(PRWORA) thus contained a less trumpeted but equally
important aspect in section 104 Charitable Choice, which
opened the door for a new wave of devolution and privatization through increasing reliance on faith-based providers. By
downsizing the federal government's role in delivering subsidiary welfare services like job training, child care, transportation, medical and housing support, there was increased opportunity for private sector social service providers. With few
other resources and little discretionary money, states and localities were encouraged to rely on the one set of institutions at
the local level that had discretionary human capital to provide
that support-faith-based organizations. This expanded role
of faith-based organizations, while reminiscent of the dominant role religious organizations played in social services from
the mid-colonial era (1850s) to the Progressive era (1920s), was
a major departure from 50 years of post New Deal era (1930s1980s) government social programs and entitlements (Cnaan,
Boodie, Handy, Yancey, & Schneider, 2002; Cnaan, Boddie, &
Wineburg, 1999; Holifield, 1994).
Charitable Choice, as this section is now known, was introduced by the then Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO). He proposed
the Charitable Choice provision to enlist the aid of religious institutions in the war on poverty. The idea was to introduce faith
as a means to transform needy people into productive members
of society. Ashcroft was influenced by Marvin Olasky's (1992)
book, The Tragedy of American Compassion. Reared in the
Assemblies of God faith (Haddock, 2002), a Pentecostal religion, Ashcroft used the lenses of his own faith to seek a less
costly and, according to his beliefs, a more consistent method
of eradicating need and poverty. Olasky's book resonated with
conservatives who favored private interventions over big government. Charles Murray, an anti-welfare state policy pundit
who gained prominence in conservative circles in the Reagan
era, wrote the preface to Olasky's (1995) paperback edition of
The Tragedy of American Compassion and captures the spirit of
the conservative movement's belief that government services
should ultimately be replaced through private and religious
efforts:

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

What is required is no more complicated, and no less
revolutionary, than recognizing first, that energy and
effective compassion that went into solving the problems
of the needy in 1900, deployed in the context of today's
national wealth, can work wonders: and secondly, that
such energy and such compassion cannot be mobilized
in a modern welfare state. The modern welfare state
must be dismantled (Murray, 1995; p. XVI).
Against that backdrop, Olasky emphasized the importance
of affiliation, bonding, discernment, employment, freedom,
and belief in God as keys to successful anti-poverty programs.
Olasky also argued for putting compassion into practice:
[glovernmental welfare programs need to be fought
not because they are too expensive-although; clearly
much money is wasted-but because they are inevitably
too stingy in what is really important, treating people
as people and not as animals. At the same time, the
crisis of the modern welfare state is not just a crisis of
government. Too many private charities dispense aid
indiscriminately and thus provide, instead of points of
light, alternative shades of darkness. The century old
question-Does any given "scheme of help.. .make
great demands on men to give themselves to their
brethren?"-is still the right one to ask.... Most of our
twentieth century schemes, based on having someone
else take action, are proven failures (1992; p. 132-233).
Charitable Choice is federal legislation that encourages
public/private arrangements with nonprofit organizations
without discrimination against, or even with preference to,
pervasively sectarian or explicitly religious organizations. This
legislation removes the barriers that prevent congregations
and other pervasively religious organizations that are capable
of providing social services from competing for government
contracts. While religious organizations have a history of cooperation and collaboration with the government, that was
not the case for congregations and explicitly religious organizations (Cnaan et al., 2002). This section of PROWRA primarily exists to: (1) encourage states and counties to increase the
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participation of religious nonprofit organizations in the provision of federally-funded welfare programs, with specific
mention of faith-based organizations; (2) establish eligibility
for faith-based organizations as contractors for service on the
same basis as other organizations; (3) protect the religious character and employment exemption status of participating faithbased organizations; and (4) safeguard the religious freedom
of participants (Kuzma, 2000). Ultimately, the goal is to level
the playing field to include all social service providers that can
achieve the expected programmatic outcome measures and
fulfill the fiscal accountability requirements set by the government regardless of the religious affiliations of the organization
competing for the social service public grant. Notwithstanding
among the powers that pushed for this legislation were Christcentered groups that hoped to transition welfare into a deep
Christian enterprise and stretch the boundaries between
church and state (Kuo, 2006; White House, 2001a).
Before the 1996 legislation, the prevailing normative conditions for contracting with the government were that a faithbased organization had to suppress its religious character by
removing all religious symbols from the room where service
was provided; foregoing any religious practices or rituals (such
as prayers at meals); accepting all clients, even those opposed
to the beliefs of the providers; hiring staff that reflected society
at large and not the organization's spirit and belief system;
adhering to government contract regulations that restrict the
organization's religious expression; and incorporating separately as a 501(c)(3) designated nonprofit organization (Esbeck,
1996). These stipulations were perceived as barriers for some
religious organizations interested in greater involvement in
social service provision. Some religious organizations were reluctant to contract with the government because they feared
losing their religious character and independence (Esbeck,
1996; Monsma, 1996). As such, a strong discourse was created
so that it was assumed in the public's mind that faith-based organizations could only apply for public funds for social service
delivery if they were willing to minimize the appearance of
faith and mimic the organizational behavior of secular providers. Alternatively, the discourse made it clear that the faith
spirit could be preserved and celebrated if social services were
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exclusively financed from private sources, presumably from
members of their faith group.
The Charitable Choice provision, along with Bush's White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, is
an organized attempt to remove the barriers that previously
excluded some faith-based organizations from contracting
with the government. Like most large scale policy initiatives
that shift responsibility to local levels, the idea of Charitable
Choice is burdened by implementation problems, especially
around matters of compliance with state, county and municipal accountability requirements. Not nearly the number of
small churches became involved as architects had hoped for,
even though many more new church agencies received federal
money. Instead, the larger and mostly Christian organizations
with the organizational capacity to handle reporting and evaluation requirements enrolled. Organizations like Reverend Pat
Robertson's Operation Blessing are welcome to apply for and
receive government grants. Operation Blessing is a religious
organization run by one of America best-known evangelical
clergy and is providing food and necessary goods to poor and
hungry people worldwide, while spreading their beliefs as
well. Prior to 1996, the government could not have practically
subsidized the work of Operation Blessing. Under this law, the
government cannot curtail the religious expression or practice
of a faith-based service provider by requiring them to change
their internal governance or remove from their property any
"religious art, icons, scripture, or other symbols" [subsection
(d)(2)]. This legislation specifically states:
A religious organization with a contract described
in subsection (a)(1)(A), or which accepts certificates,
vouchers, or other forms of disbursement under
subsection (a)(1)(B), shall retain its independence
from Federal, State, and local governments, including
such organization's control over the definition,
development, practice, and expression of its religious
beliefs [subsection (d)(1)].
Faith-based organizations are also allowed discretion in
hiring only those people that share their religious beliefs or
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traditions and to terminate employees that do not exhibit behavior consistent with the religious practices of the organization. The exemption from compliance with employment policies mandated by section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has
also been preserved for congregations and faith-based organizations under this provision [subsection (a)(2)]. These provisions have been and continue to be challenged in the courts,
though they have easily withstood most legal challenges thus
far.
Faith-based organizations contracting with the government to provide services are no longer required to establish
a separate 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. While creating a
separate 501(c)(3) may be prudent to protect the primary faithbased organization from legal and financial liabilities, it is now
acceptable for service providers to simply maintain a separate
accounting system for contracted services. Faith-based organizations are fiscally accountable for using government funds
for the intended social service purpose and not for religious
worship, instruction, or proselytization [subsection (h) (1-2);
subsection (j)]. Faith-based organizations that offer religious
activities with social services must cover the cost of these activities from nongovernmental funding. By mandating that
the funds be used solely for contracted social services, this
law seeks to maintain the separation of church and state but
also provides the opportunity for further blurring the lines
simply because the further federal dollars move into the pipelines of local community funding streams, the more difficult
it becomes to determine who is and who isn't playing by the
rules. Eliminating the need to establish a separate 501(c)(3) and
allowing faith-based organizations to maintain their religious
character broadened the opportunity for congregations and
other explicitly religious organizations to increase the number
of faith-based organizations providing publicly supported services (Kuzma, 2000). However, the much hoped for groundswell of religious solicitation and the consequent mass reduction of welfare state programs have been elusive.
The Charitable Choice provision enacted in 1996 applies
to services contracted under Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) as well as food stamps, Medicaid,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and a wide array of other
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services to assist recipients of TANF to become self-sufficient.
The range of services that faith-based organizations can contract with states or counties to provide includes: food programs
(e.g. subsidized meals, food pantry, nutrition education, food
budgeting counseling, or soup kitchen); work programs (e.g.
job search, job-skills training, job readiness training, vocational
education, GED preparation, and ESL programs); community
service positions; domestic violence counseling; medical and
health services (e.g. abstinence education, drug-and-alcohol
treatment centers, health clinics, wellness centers, and immunization programs), and maternity homes (e.g. residential care,
second-chance homes, and supervised community housing)
(Wineburg, 2007). Government funded programs, once offered
by secular nonprofits or secularized religious organizations,
can now be offered by pervasively religious organizations. By
encouraging faith-based organizations to partner with the government to provide social services, the type of private sector
service involvement has expanded to include those services
that incorporate some aspect of the religious character of the
organization.
Since 1996, Charitable Choice has been included in other
federal legislation. In 1998, the scope of Charitable Choice was
expanded to include the Community Services Block Grant to
establish individual development account (IDA) demonstration projects for individuals and families with limited means
to accumulate assets through a savings program (Community
Services Block Grant: Department of Health and Human
Services). At least ten other bills have been introduced to the
U.S. Congress in an effort to expand Charitable Choice to
include programs such as: mental health and substance abuse,
literacy, adoption, children's health, juvenile delinquency services, drugs and violence prevention, marriage promotion,
parenting and fatherhood, housing programs, child support,
and community renewal (Boddie & Cnaan, 2007).
In 2001, the Charitable Choice Expansion Bill (S.1113) was
also introduced to expand coverage of Charitable Choice to all
federally-funded social, health, and community development
programs (Wineburg, 2007). In the wake of the September
2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the momentum behind
this provocative legislation withered and it became evident
that this bill would not pass. This resulted in the December
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2002 presidential executive order that expanded the scope of
charitable choice to the entire federal funding system (White
House, 2002). Using the administrative rule changing process,
President George W. Bush bypassed Congress and opened for
public bidding all federal government units to all faith-based
organizations.
White House Office of Community
and Faith-based Initiatives
The second George Bush entered office after a period of
public uncertainty about the results of the presidential election.
His time to prepare his administration was cut in half because
it took Supreme Court intervention to finally decide that Bush
was to be president. The second George Bush is both a deeply
religious person and a strong proponent of devolution and the
free market system. As such, he found Charitable Choice in
congruence with his political and religious philosophy and
embraced it. In his second week in office, long before most
appointments were made, he announced the creation of the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.
An added benefit to shaping the discussion about poverty in
religious terms was the opportunity to implement the strategy
to get more Blacks under the Republican umbrella through a
courtship of Black ministers set in motion in the Reagan years
(Wineburg, 2007).
President Bush established a means to implement the
Charitable Choice legislation enacted under the Clinton administration by signing executive orders that established the
White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives
(OFBCI) and five corresponding units in the Departments of
Labor, Justice, Housing and Urban Development, Education,
and Health and Human Services (White House, 2001b). A
faith-based task force was also created at the Corporation for
National and Community Service, the office that administers
AmeriCorps, VISTA, and the Peace Corps. Executive Orders
issued in 2002 have established centers in the Departments of
Agriculture and Commerce and in the Agency for International
Development. The key purpose of this new administrative
unit was twvofold: To use civil rights language embodied
in the phrase "level the playing field," to justify the shift of
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money to sectarian organizations, and to further the agenda
of welfare state reductions by bringing in publicly accepted
service providers and holding them responsible for the country's neediest.
The creation of OFBCI and its extension was a means to
ensure that all government organizations using federal funds
to contract out for services are open and hospitable to faithbased organizations. Furthermore, it was created to increase
the number of public contracts awarded to faith-based organizations. While no one can be sure as to the efficiency and
cost-effectiveness of faith-based organizations, they are an essential ingredient in the complex partnerships that make up
social service delivery in every community; this partnership
has been strengthened as a result of a concerted effort by the
Bush administration (Boddie & Cnaan, 2007).
A different question is how prevalent is the implementation of the faith-based initiative and charitable choice? Some
new policies are slowly or never actually implemented while
others are faster to be adopted. Religious organizations are
now legitimate actors in our nation's public welfare system.
There are a few studies that assess the rate of implementation
of charitable choice and they are summarized by Lupu and
Tuttle (2003), who found the preferred treatment of Charitable
Choice by the Bush administration sped up its implementation
by more than a decade. Most new laws are gradually incorporated and decision makers, as well as front line administrators,
need time to absorb them and reorient them to modern accounting and evaluation practices that ensure accountability.
In this instance, the inspectors from the White House Office of
Community and Faith-based Initiatives ensured that all levels
of government were aware of the laws, and applicants have
been encouraged to report lack of compliance. However, this
has been done in the same spirit that a chamber of commerce
might encourage fair business practices-leaving the actual
implementation to self-policing by locals. Being both at the core
of devolution and putting the blame on the broken spirit of
the client, something only faith can mend in this policy framework, is exactly where the administration wanted to be and
was a fulfillment of the Reagan agenda. Interestingly, on May
19, 2007, in an interview with the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette,
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former president Jimmy Carter, who doubles as a preacher and
Bible teacher, blasted the Bush administration and offered a
harsh assessment for the White House's Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives, which helped religious charities
receive $2.15 billion in federal grants in fiscal year 2005 alone.
He also accused Bush of eliminating the line between church
and state and of abandoning "America's basic values."
Devolution and Evolution in
Religious Lobbying in the Post-Reagan Era
In the post-Reagan era, we have seen a broadening of
opportunity for faith-based organizations to pursue federal
funds. At each stage of devolution, the opportunity for securing financial support for faith-based initiatives has increased.
As previously stated, the most dramatic changes in opportunity to secure funds for faith-based organizations occurred in
the third, and most recent, wave of devolution.
Through the process of devolution, and the resultant increased access of faith-based organizations to federal funds,
structural change has occurred that allows faith-based organizations to pursue funds not only for the provision of social
services but for a variety of purposes. The traditional view
of the role of faith-based organizations in the nation's capital
is one of attempting to influence policy to ensure consistency with certain organizational objectives, be they moral or
social (Hofrenning, 1995). This influence has historically been
achieved through the use of religious lobbyists.
Historically, these lobbyists have taken a grassroots bottomup approach. Most religious lobbies in Washington have typically valued the articulation of their faith-based message as
more important than achieving any given political outcome
(Hertzke, 1988). Hence, if any conflict occurred between the
message and the desired objective, it was of paramount importance that the ideas supported by faith-based organizations not be compromised in efforts to achieve an objective. To
maintain the purity of their messages, many religious organizations have taken an outsider approach and have traditionally
relied upon persons of faith, rather than the insiders, to lobby
for their sacred causes (Hertzke, 1988; Hofrenning, 1995).
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A recent New York Times article entitled "Religious Groups
Reap Federal Aid for Pet Projects" (Henriques & Lehren, 2007)
noted the relatively recent dramatic increase in federal funds
earmarked for religious organizations. Funds secured through
earmarks may be used to provide social services but they may
also be used for explicitly non-service based activity. Earmarks
are used by parties for specific projects and these funds are
approved without going through the normal appropriations
process (Henriques & Lehren, 2007). With the aid of lobbyists,
these requests are added to bills put before congress. These lobbyists are decidedly different from those used by faith-based
organizations in earlier times.
While many religious lobbies in Washington continue to
concentrate on influencing policy and public opinion, an increasing number are more focused on securing specific financial
objectives and less on influencing policy. The New York Times
article noted that "as the number of faith-based earmarks grew,
the period from 1998 to 2005 saw a tripling in the number of religious organizations listed as clients of Washington lobbying
firms and a doubling in the amount they paid for services..."
(Henriques & Lehren, 2007, pp. Al).
Whereas many congregations and faith-based organizations have traditionally been reticent about accepting government funds to serve the needy, changes in the recent Bush administration have shifted religious organizational members'
attitudes about not only pursuing federal funds but doing so
aggressively.
This unprecedented shift in lobbying, both style and objective wise, on the part of faith-based organizations is a result of
changes in policies over the past few decades. Reagan set the
stage for the greater integration of religious organizations into
the public sphere. Clinton supported and signed Charitable
Choice into law and George W. Bush established the White
House Office of Community and Faith-Based Initiatives. The
opportunities which have emerged as the result of Reagan and
his successors' policies have truly allowed congregations to
assume greater responsibility in serving the needy.
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Summary
Under Reagan's administration and onward, the federal
government's roles in the design, funding, and monitoring of
public services shifted to setting policy agendas and monitoring the services of private sector social service organizations
(Wineburg, 2001). Devolution in the United States set a course
for reforming welfare from government guaranteed programs
and entitlements based on need, to limited benefits that emphasize instilling virtues and improving the character of the
client.
In 1980, when Reagan won the presidential election, the
political scene had been set by his predecessors for the dismantling of federal service provision. Reagan's New Federalism
provided the ideological push needed to buttress the idea of
devolution among the undecided. This course of action appeared to be a job for which Reagan was ideally suited, given
the tenacity with which he pursued this objective. Over 150
federal programs were condensed into 11 block grants, thereby
creating savings in the administrative cost associated with the
provision of these programs. Reagan brought back a language
more in tune with conservative principles that dominated the
American scene before the New Deal. While "first-order devolution," with the transfer of public services from federal to state
government began before Reagan's election, it was President
Reagan's discourse and actions that solidified the base for an
escalation in the dismantling of federal service provision.
When George H. W. Bush came to the presidency in 1989,
he, too, showed an interest in the New Federalist agenda of
decentralizing public services from the federal government to
states. His focus upon the "thousand points of light" emphasized a community actively engaged in voluntary activity or
the provision of social services. George H. W. Bush also accelerated first-order devolution through encouraging states to
apply for AFDC waivers.
President Bill Clinton's (1993-2001) approach sought to
create a service and cost efficient system for U.S. taxpayers.
Under Clinton's administration, welfare reform law allocated block grants from the federal government and allowed
states to have the discretion to disburse funding through cost
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reimbursement contracts, performance-based contracts, and
vouchers (Etindi, 1999; Sherman, 2000). This "second-order
devolution" grants states and counties the authority and
funding to develop programs in accord with local culture and
constraints. Much of the success in reducing welfare rolls and
assisting people in their shift from welfare-to-work can be attributed to a strong economy, coupled with the discretionary
power given at the local level (Nathan & Gais, 1999, Wineburg,
2001). The formation of multiple welfare regimes in each state
and often across counties dismantled the principle of legal eligibility for service. A successful legal challenge of a welfare
rights violation no longer carried any impact outside the small
jurisdiction in which it was filed. Hence, social services lost
their ability for national unity and collective political influence. Clinton's PROWRA aimed at instilling work values and
family values among welfare recipients, most of whom where
unmarried mothers.
The outsourcing of public services by the state government to private sector organizations is second-order devolution. At this stage, devolution fosters the creation of numerous models of welfare systems and a variety of public-private
partnerships that include secular nonprofit organizations, forprofit organizations, coalitions, religious organizations, and
congregations. The second-order devolution spanned from the
Reagan years to the current administration. In 1996, Clinton
signed into legislation the Charitable Choice provision, which
further encourages faith-based social service providers to
play a key role, through federal and state grants, in providing the community-based services necessary for recipients of
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) to transition
from welfare to work. This paved the way for the "third-order
devolution," the massive use of faith-based organizations for
social welfare provision.
With conservative George W. Bush at the helm of government after his election to the presidency in 2000 and the
Reagan framework firmly in place, the faith-based sector
became a desired partner for both practical service delivery and
political patronage. As such, a sector that was largely decentralized, independent, informal, and voluntary is now encouraged to participate in public-private partnerships that
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extend the reach of government services (Lynn, 2002). Under
this new public policy, faith-based partners are being sought
to provide the moral influence and holistic services that not
only promote behavioral changes but personal transformation
that leads to self-sufficiency. Personal transformation is a term
that means making a change in one's life; yet to those on the
religious right-which supports Bush's welfare changes and
other moral issues like the marriage initiative, abstinence, and
religious-based prison programs among others-it means accepting Jesus Christ as a prerequisite to making that personal
change. The Charitable Choice provision marks the federal
government's support of a distinctively religious approach in
the privatization of public social services. This support became
fully manifest in 2001 when the White House's Office of FaithBased and Community Initiatives was created. This office was
created to ensure that all faith-based organizations would be
able to apply for federal funds funneled through organizations
and state governments that contract out for service provision.
These devolutionary trends have been supported as a part
of the national agenda to reduce public spending for social
services by shifting to private sector solutions and redefining
social problems as a product of an individual's choices and
behavior. Ultimately, it is hoped that Charitable Choice and
support for the faith sector increases local civic participation
and strengthens civil society (Dionne & Chen, 2001). Given
recent trends, it is likely that civic participation through the
provision of services rendered by faith-based organizations
will indeed be strengthened. The question remains, however,
as to whether the current escalation of support for religiousbased services will ultimately usher in a fourth wave of devolution, which will provide yet again new opportunities for
faith-based organizations to address the huge social problems
faced by the people of this country.
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Endnotes
'We cited two references here because in the Denton's 1982, Washington Post piece,
he quoted only part of Reagan's Good Samaritan Speech: "The Story of the Good
Samaritan has always illustrated to me what God's challenge really is ...He didn't
go running into town and look for a caseworker to tell him that there was fellow
out there that needed help. He took it upon himself.' We took the liberty to cite the
remaining portion of the speech as we presume it was delivered and not put into the
Washington Post article, as President Reagan gave the same Good Samaritan speech at
the Annual National Prayer Breakfast two months earlier, on February 14, 1982.
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Introduction

Esping-Anderson (1990) characterized the United States
and Australia as liberal welfare states, with the emphasis on
liberal. As such, each was committed to the freedom of its citizens who, as rational actors, sought to advance their own wellbeing within an institutional framework which supported and
promoted those aspirations. The liberal states were committed
economically to the extension and promotion of market forces
in society. Politically, they were committed to a constitutional state with limited powers of intervention in the economy
and society and an associated commitment to maximizing the
formal freedom of legally recognized actors. Both provided
broadly similar but, as we shall demonstrate, somewhat different contexts for the development of welfare and the practice of
modern social work.
The contemporary neo-liberal workfare regime, currently
evident in both countries (but again, with a different degree
of emphasis) is both a continuance and more importantly,
an intensification of liberalism. This new mode of liberalism
is a form of what Beck (2000) calls "high politics," in that it
presents itself as entirely non-political, having attained hegemonic stature in public debates and the popular imagination
which weakens awareness of it as a set of political ideas for
which there are credible alternatives. For social theorists such
as Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001), neo-liberalism is the new
planetary vulgate for the contemporary era, its ideas crisscrossing the globe like transcontinental traffic. And, as Beck (2000)
noted, it is a thought virus, virulently contagious in the liberal
welfare states, but nevertheless quite infectious in the others.
This new form of welfare, or more accurately, workfare regime
(Jessop, 1999) promotes the development of a qualitatively different institutional context of welfare. In turn, this transformation of the institutional context has profound implications for
the substance and goals of social policies and for the practice of
social work. It is this shift and its implications for social work
which forms the substance of our deliberations.
Our argument proceeds in the following manner: First,
we describe the modern welfare states of both countries and
the more recent developments which have transformed them.
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Second, we discuss the role and position of social work within
each country in terms of both the welfare and the workfare
state. Third, we draw on a body of sociological theory (neoinstitutional theory) which provides an analytical template
for thinking about the likely consequences of the neo-liberal
workfare regime. We review two empirical studies of institutional change in cognate areas, drawing out the implications
for social work. Our conclusion, presented as a proposition
calling for scrutiny, is that engagement by social workers in
the institutional contexts of neo-liberalism has the capacity to
transform it in significant ways. It is a conclusion, we suggest,
which commands consideration by the profession globally.
From Welfare States to Workfare Regimes
The notion of the neo-liberal workfare regime as a successor
to the (Keynesian) welfare state has been firmly established theoretically in the genre of post-Fordist political economy (Jessop,
1999). That body of work acknowledges the role played by
social, political and cultural institutions in attempts to regulate
the instabilities of advanced economies (Peck & Tickell, 2004).
Post-Fordists particularly stress the role of the institution of
welfare, recognizing that patterns of accumulation and growth
in advanced economies are secured as much by social regulation as by economic regulation. More recently, post-Fordists
argue that the Keynesian-inspired welfare state has been supplanted by a new institutional form-the workfare regime-as
a result of which the definitions of welfare have changed, the
institutions and institutional arrangements responsible for its
delivery have changed, and the practices in and through which
welfare is delivered have changed. Policy scholars increasingly
accept this premise (Gilbert, 2002). Contemporary social policy
is now focused on transforming the "identities, interests, capacities, rights and responsibilities" of its citizens so that they
may become active agents in the pursuit of a competitive edge
in a global economy (Jessop, 1999, p. 353). It is for this reason
that welfare reform policies globally have manifested in the
subordination of the once more or less dominant objective of
social protection to that of activation. In both Australia and the
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U.S., for example, the coalition of interests that underpinned
the Keynesian welfare state with its commitments to social
protection has fragmented, and demands for a more differentiated form of economic and social policy have emerged (Blau,
2007; Ziguras, Dufty & Considine, 2003).
Unlike its predecessor, which emphasized a "maintenance"
function, the workfare regime is geared to promote permanent
innovation and flexibility in an open economy. It has abandoned full employment for full employability as it seeks to
promote structural and systemic competitiveness. Welfare services, once delivered as part of a parcel of citizenship rights,
however limited in the U.S. and Australia, are now pulled
apart and bundled together in new ways as additional means
to benefit business, demoting the needs of individual citizens
to second place in the dynamic (Katz, 2001). Finally, there has
been devolution of policy and its operations to sub-national
levels along with a transfer of delivery of services away from
the state to non-state sectors-although, due to political, social
and cultural variations, it is expressed differently in different
countries (McDonald, Harris & Winterstein, 2003; Abramovitz,
2005).
The U.S. Context
It is widely accepted that the U.S. welfare state evolved
quite differently from those of other industrialized countries
(Jansson, 2005; Katz, 2001). In its non-ideological, pragmatic
origins it looked more to state governments and the private
sector than did its European counterparts (Gilbert, 2002). It
had more limited goals and created neither a national network
of social services nor a fully integrated income maintenance
system. Americans have long tolerated wider income disparities than their counterparts in other industrialized nations,
mostly because of a persistent belief in individual responsibility and the relative absence of social movements and political
parties to advocate for egalitarian and collectivist solutions to
socio-economic problems (Reisch, 2005). Particularly since the
1
1 9 h century, U.S. welfare policies have reflected these values
and maintained prevailing social hierarchies (Patterson,
2001).
Since low-income groups lack power in U.S. society, they
have been compelled to absorb the bulk of the social costs of
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growth and change. In turn, the normative structure of the
U.S. welfare state supports policy preferences for work over
income maintenance and personal over social responsibility.
Americans largely prefer marketplace solutions and, particularly during the past several decades, have increasingly resisted or feared government intervention. These preferences
have been reflected in public opinion polls and rationalized
by moral and pseudo-scientific objections to public aid, particularly to low income persons, which have exalted an ethic
of private, personal charity instead of a publicly-funded social
wage (Katz, 2001).
This was not always the case. Between the 1930s and the
mid-1970s, most U.S. policymakers shared an integrated set of
assumptions about the relationship between the market, government, and welfare provision. They agreed that public policy
could serve as an instrument to ameliorate the consequences of
private enterprise by collectivizing its social costs and assumed
that state responsibility for welfare would gradually and continually expand with modest redistributive results (Katz, 2001;
Jansson, 2005). Social workers embraced the emerging welfare
state regime based on professional self-interest and cautious
optimism that government policies would strengthen political democracy and create a more egalitarian and open society
(Wenocur & Reisch, 1989).
As a result, by the early 1970s, the U.S. had begun to catch
up with European concepts of citizenship. Reformers argued
that citizenship involved more than the possession of mere
political rights; it "include[d] certain basic social and economic rights, such as the right to a secure income" (Patterson,
2000, p. 178). Even Republican leaders embraced this idea. For
example, during the Nixon administration, public assistance
to the low income elderly, disabled, and blind was federalized
in the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), Social
Security retirement benefits were indexed to the cost-of-living
and, through the addition of Title XX to the Social Security
Act, a range of social services became statutory entitlements
for both low- and middle-income individuals and families
(Reisch, 2008).
During the past quarter century, however, this expanded
conception of citizenship, particularly as it pertains to welfare
policy, was reversed-a phenomenon closely related to
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shifting views about the so-called "underclass." This produced
a redefinition of welfare recipients and social service clients as
consumers who are free to exercise choice in the selection of
program options and providers. Although such changes were
most notable in the health care and education fields, they influenced developments in income support and social service
policies as well (Katz, 2001).
Beginning with the Reagan administration, federal and
state policies have accelerated this retrenchment. They mandated workforce participation as a precondition of welfare
eligibility and granted states "waivers" to implement policies
that linked welfare receipt to behavioral norms. Stoesz (2000)
termed this development "bootstrap capitalism" and described
how its basic tenets-wage supplements, asset development,
and community capitalism-were accepted as replacements
for traditional liberal welfare provisions by Republican conservatives and Democratic centrists (Gilbert, 2002).
Proponents of traditional welfare provisions were placed
on the defensive and, in fact, increasingly accepted the linkage
between economic growth and human well-being (which
implied the acceptance of policies designed to promote "efficiency") and the preference for employment over welfare strategies (Danziger & Gottschalk, 2004). Although they continued to promote such liberal solutions as a national minimum
welfare benefit, human capital development programs, and a
reduction in the tax burden on the working poor, they increasingly came to adopt the language of self-sufficiency in place
of social responsibility (Bergman & Lundberg, 2006; Skocpol,
2000).
Consequently, by the 1990s, "the rights of citizens depended increasingly on their participation in the regular labor
market" (Katz, 2001, p. 297). Wage supplements through tax
credits for low-wage workers, such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), and for their employers, primarily through
the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit and the Work Opportunity Tax
Credit, replaced traditional income maintenance programs as
the primary means of alleviating poverty in the U.S. Although
popular among legislators in both major parties because they
promote work over welfare, analysts have identified major
problems in their implementation, such as widespread failure
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to take advantage of available benefits, recordkeeping difficulties, and limited impact on certain types of households (Cauthen
& Lu, 2003). These developments lay at the heart of a range
of anti-poverty strategies during the Clinton Administration,
particularly "welfare reform."
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) best exemplified this
institutional change through the symbolic and substantive
changes it produced in the U.S. welfare state. As the most
visible "wedge issue" of a frontal attack on the incomplete
U.S. welfare state, it represented the culmination of a generation-long process of devolving responsibility for public assistance to the states, eliminated the half-century old concept of
entitlement for low-income children and families, and brought
to fruition the longstanding preference of U.S. policymakers
for work, rather than welfare, as the primary means of income
support for the poor. By expanding and mandating the role
of the private sector and faith-based organizations in policy
implementation and service provision, it made the support of
such community-based organizations critical to the successful
transition of welfare recipients into the labor force and the economic survival of low-income families, particularly in urban
neighborhoods (Chow, Johnson & Austin, 2005; Andersson,
Holzer & Lane, 2005).
Researchers in numerous U.S. cities have found, however,
that the underlying assumptions of PRWORA-that the majority of welfare recipients would find employment within statutory time limits and that private organizations would have sufficient capacity to care for those needing additional supports
-have not been validated by the events of the past decade
(Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006; Mishel, Bernstein, & Allegretto,
2006). Welfare reform produced substantial changes in the
client populations agencies served: in their goals, objectives,
staffing, and program outcomes; in resource acquisition and
allocation strategies; and in the nature of inter-organizational
relationships. Agencies survived by implementing additional
or revised operating procedures, while struggling to retain
their traditional character and mission (Abramovitz, 2005;
Reisch & Sommerfeld, 2003; Fink & Widom, 2001; Alexander,
Nank, & Stivers, 1999).
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Post-9/11 developments have exacerbated these conditions. While the funding cuts PRWORA produced represent
only a small fraction of total U.S. welfare spending, its much
heralded "success" has justified the introduction of marketoriented discourse into political debates over the future of
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and even public education (Blank, 2002). As spending on domestic programs has
stagnated during the Bush administration, the median income
of American families has declined, while poverty rates, particularly among children, African Americans, Latinos, recent
immigrants, and female-headed households have remained
high (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006; Mishel, Bernstein, &
Allegretto, 2006, U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). These dramatic
policy shifts have further eroded the meaning of citizenship
in U.S. society and the fragile foundation of the U.S. welfare
state. These institutional changes have also begun to transform
social work practice and the role of the social work profession
in ways that would have been difficult to imagine just a few
decades ago.
In sum, in so-called post-Fordist economies, like the U.S.,
the principle function of the welfare state is no longer to maintain the integration and inclusion of the working class but,
rather, to engage in "the social management of the division of
society" (Schaarschuch, 1990, p. 157). This increasingly reflects
neo-conservative and neo-liberal views that prioritize cost containment over redistribution. Katz (2001) argues that PRWORA
reflected "a willingness to accept massive poverty and suffering ...
and a mean and truncated conception of social obligation and citizenship" (p. 359). Some feminist analysts of recent
welfare changes go further and argue that a combination of
welfare reform, economic restructuring, neo-conservative ideology, and marginalization in societal institutions have redefined and even eliminated women's rights as citizens (Caiazza,
Shaw, & Werschkul, 2004). Others have argued that during the
past decade similar restrictions on immigrants' rights have occurred (Capps, Fix, Ost, Reardon, Anderson & Passel, 2004;
Tumlin & Zimmerman, 2003; Borjas, 2002).
In effect, the concept of citizenship has been restored to
its pre-New Deal definition-participation in the market as
a producer and a consumer-and, more reluctantly, in the
50
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political system. Especially since 9/11, the racial dimensions
of citizenship have also resurfaced on a scale unseen for half
a century (Foner, 2002; Gordon, 2002). In other words, despite
the resurgent, if largely rhetorical, interest in promoting civic
responsibility, citizenship is now divorced from the economic and social contexts that give it substance and meaning. To
fulfill these participatory roles, workers are (once again) increasingly dependent on market forces, even in cases of unemployment, illness, and old age (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006;
Andersson, Holzer & Lane, 2005; Bowles, Gintis & Groves,
2005; Caizza, Shaw & Werschkul, 2004; Cauthen & Lu, 2003).
In the U.S., work status and income eligibility have become
the primary determinants of access to institutionally-provided
benefits, most of which accept the idea of consumption-aswell-being. Recent policy initiatives that promote asset accumulation among the poor, while limited in scope and, perhaps,
in effectiveness, constitute an exception (Sherraden, 2005). As
Katz (2001) points out:
The apotheosis of the marketplace not only commodifies
the meaning of citizenship, it narrows the meaning of
real work and reinforces the welfare state's gendered
inequities by excluding socially important jobsfor instance, child rearing-that offer great human
rewards. Some of the most satisfying and significant
work exists outside the regular labor market, relegated
disproportionately to women-taking care of old
people, promoting the arts, building civic institutions,
for example (p. 354).
Ironically, as U.S. welfare policies have increasingly emphasized self-sufficiency, research has revealed the growing significance of employment status as an indicator of economic wellbeing (Danziger & Gottschalk, 2004). A major factor appears
to be the shrinking percentage of families who participate in
post-PRWORA safety net programs (Urban Institute, 2006).
Now that poverty rates are once again on the rise, and economic inequality continues to increase, the gap between economic
need and policy response has taken on more serious implications (Holzer, Schanzenbach, Duncan & Ludwig, 2007).
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The Australian Context
In Australia, the post-World War II liberal welfare state
intensified trends established early in the 2 0th century which,
when compared to the trajectory of the U.S. welfare state,
reveal significant cultural differences. Reflecting an historic
compromise between labor and capital, the Australian version
of the welfare state, unlike the U.S., robustly upheld citizenship rights-although primarily as industrial rights (Wearing,
1994). In the interests of protecting the viability of a recently
industrialized economy, Australia developed a comprehensive
system of tariff protection and a legislatively founded and protected centralized wage fixing system. The latter became the
primary mode of redistribution and social protection (Castles,
1983), complemented by employer-funded sickness and other
entitlements (Smyth, 1994). Australian (male) wages were kept
artificially high, a system which both encouraged and allowed
families to meet their own needs. Other health, education and
social services developed incrementally, largely in response to
political mobilization of interest groups (Watts, 1987).
As the 2 0 1h century progressed, highly targeted and selective
income support funded through general Federal tax revenue
was established for people falling outside of the labor market.
As in the U.S., these were groups which the wage earners'
welfare state largely ignored-the aged, the disabled, orphans,
widows and supporting parents, and the unemployed. Health
services, education, and welfare were funded primarily by the
Federal government and were delivered through a complex
mixed economy of welfare, again, much like the U.S. (Lyons,
2001). Wage fixing aside (and in spite of other generous oddities such as the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme which provides heavily subsidized drugs to all Australians), the overall
orientation of the Australian welfare state was nevertheless
fairly reluctant, patchy, parsimonious and in the case of income
security, stigmatizing (Graycar & Jamrozik, 1989).
During the early 1970s, this essentially piecemeal approach was abruptly overhauled, and a period of extensive,
even eccentric, welfare state building began (McDonald &
Marston, 2002a). Over a heady three year period (1972-1975)
the Australian government created, for example, a universal health insurance system, free tertiary education, a publicly funded legal aid system, an extensive community health
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program, an ambitious urban regeneration program, and an
expansive regional employment program (Johnson, 1989).
Substantial efforts were made to overhaul the income security
system, decreasing its selectivity and opening it up to previously excluded groups such as single mothers. Similar to the
New Deal and the War on Poverty eras in the U.S., this was
an aberrant period in Australian welfare history, but it was
highly influential in that it swung the pendulum away from
Australia as a welfare laggard to a more comprehensive liberal
welfare state with some clear social democratic tendencies. In
post-Fordist terms, the Australian welfare state met the needs
of both labor and capital for a long period (for the first seven
decades of the 2 0 th century).
Unfortunately, the brief expansionary period coincided
with global economic processes which fundamentally re-wrote
that historic compromise and firmly squashed any nascent flirtation with social democratic ideals (Jamrozik, 2001).
Accordingly, during the last two decades of the 2 0 th century,
the 1970s social democratic turn in the Australian welfare state
was slowly and steadily overturned. As in the U.S., economic
globalization and the associated rise and eventual dominance
of neoclassical economics and neo-liberal politics played a key
role in de-stabilizing and eventually completely fragmenting the compromise between capital and labor (Smyth, 1994).
The central plank of the Australian system, centralized wage
fixing, was steadily dismantled rendering the wage earners'
welfare state an historical artifact. Further, the removal of the
tariff walls opened up the Australian economy to that complex
of global economic forces which, as happened in other industrialized nations, particularly the U.S., reconfigured industry
and the domestic labor market.
In addition, similar to the U.S., macroeconomic policy prioritized the reduction of inflation over employment generation. As a consequence, unemployment and underemployment
grew rapidly and the traditional reliance on full-time life-long
employment, upon which the original welfare model was
predicated, became redundant (McDonald & Marston, 2005).
Further, irrespective of political orientation, sustained Federal
government fixation with reducing budget deficits heralded
an unrelenting fiscal squeeze and associated widespread cuts
in funding for services.
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At the same time, Australian governments became increasingly disengaged from direct service delivery and more and
more services were devolved to the other sectors, including
the informal sector (McDonald & Marston, 2002b). In some
ways, the Australian experience resembles that of the U.S., but
there are significant differences. In the late 1980s, early 1990s,
and since 2001 there were massive Federal deficits in the U.S.,
created largely by a combination of tax cuts and increases in
military spending, which have severely constrained spending
on domestic policies, particularly welfare (Piven, 2002; Katz,
2001). In Australia, on the other hand, the reluctance to spend
on welfare resulted not so much from any real fiscal pressure but
from an ideological commitment to neo-liberalism (Jamrozik,
2001). Nevertheless, vigorous application of the nostrums of
New Public Management (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) ensured
that state control of the mixed economy of welfare escalated
through such mechanisms as the contract, audit, risk and the
quality agenda (Carroll & Steane, 2002).
In keeping with OECD recommendations, Australian
income security policy began to undo any pretense of social
citizenship rights, and fractured the dependent population
back into the categories of deserving and undeserving poor
(Ziguras et al., 2003). Unlike the U.S., with its focus on welfare
mothers, the primary target has been the long-term unemployed who have, since 1996, been drawn into an extensive
punitive and coercive workfare program emphasizing claimant obligations as opposed to rights (McDonald & Marston,
2005). Further, like the U.S, the new regime is largely delivered by the nonprofit and market sectors under the aegis of
the Federal government. In Australia, for example, the clearest
and most widespread example is the Job Network, a decadeold quasi-market system of employment services involving the
nonprofit and for-profit sectors under contract to the Federal
government (Considine, 2001).
As yet, the Australian system has not managed to embroil
state governments, and significant areas of service delivery
remain relatively unaffected by the rationalities of workfare.
However, recent Federal government policy initiatives have:
a) dismantled centralized wage fixing and replaced it with
contracts negotiated between individual employers and employees, and b) widened the pool of welfare recipients in the
54
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activation regime. Together, these developments destabilize the
remnants of the Australian welfare state and extend the workfare regime to people with disabilities and supporting parents.
In summary, the combination of reversing commitment to redistribution via wage de-regulation, the ongoing commitment
to containing inflation at the expense of employment, the reshaping of the labor market, fiscal parsimony, and the linking
of income security with employment policy have all lead to the
emergence of a nascent workfare regime in Australia.
Social Work, Welfare and Workfare
These dramatic policy developments have been spurred by
economic globalization, which has dramatically altered both
governments' ability to ameliorate the social costs of a basically unfettered market. In its current form, economic globalization is based on the assumption that capitalist institutions,
ideology and behaviors are universally accepted as normative
and that the expansion of welfare state provisions threatens
to disrupt the efficiencies of unimpeded markets (Bergman &
Lundberg, 2006; Ferrera, 2005; George & Wilding, 2002; EspingAnderson, 2002). In the U.S., which has been a world leader in
this regard, the effects of globalization have been compounded
by two distinct, yet inter-related shifts in institutional political
power. Southern and Western states with more conservative
welfare traditions have gained electoral ascendancy through
reapportionment, while within states, power shifted from
urban to suburban and rural areas, creating a form of "political apartheid" which resembles, in some ways, a return to preNew Deal political alignments.
In the arena of welfare policy, this reinforced the emergence
of the workfare regime and produced two notable changes.
The "success" of welfare reform was defined solely in terms of
caseload reduction; this reduction was to be achieved through
eliminating legislative entitlements to assistance, enhancing
and expanding long-established, coercive work requirements,
which had been initially implemented at the state level, and
relying increasingly on the private sector for service provision.
As a result, since the 1990s, the inter-sectoral relationships in
the U.S. welfare state most closely conform to Young's (1999)
"supplementary perspective," in which private organizations
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fill gaps in goods and services that government has reduced or
eliminated.
During the first few years of PRWORA, declining welfare
rolls and states' budget surpluses obscured this transition. More
recently, however, the decline in the real value of TANF grants,
coupled with burgeoning fiscal deficits, have substantially
reduced the public sector's contribution to income support and
social services (Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006; Urban Institute,
2006; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006). This raises
critical questions for scholars, policymakers, and social work
practitioners regarding the nature of social welfare institutions:
To what extent can the private sector replace the public sector
in terms of financing or direct service provision? And, what
are the consequences of this shift in the locus of social welfare
responsibility for service recipients, social workers, and the
private sector as a whole (Reisch & Sommerfeld, 2003)? While
differently articulated, similar questions face Australian social
workers, social welfare providers, and ultimately service recipients. In that country, sustained Federal government-inspired
fiscal stringency has put unprecedented pressure on statebased service delivery systems which, in turn, have flown on to
contracted, nonprofit agencies. Subsequent financial shortfalls
coupled with increased regulation stemming from the application of New Public Management-inspired contractual arrangements have increasingly re-shaped the manner in which social
welfare is delivered to vulnerable populations. As yet, the full
impact is unknown, but there are sufficient signs to suggest
that these developments coupled with the retrenchment of the
Australian version of the Keynesian welfare state are placing
and will continue to place hitherto unimagined pressure on
the institutions of social welfare, on vulnerable populations,
and on social workers (McDonald, 2006).
Recent scholarship from both countries has provided
largely pessimistic answers to the questions posed above.
Welfare policy changes have encouraged the spread of
market mechanisms in the nonprofit sector with deleterious
effects on agencies' missions, culture, values, and employment opportunities, and on the nature of inter-sectoral relationships (Abramovitz, 2005; McDonald & Marston, 2002a).
The combination of privatization and devolution has created
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unsustainable pressures on nonprofit agencies. These forces
have also produced an increasingly adversarial climate among
and within the agencies themselves, which, in turn, has negative
consequences for worker-client relationships, staff workloads,
and the effectiveness of traditional modes of intervention. It
has also produced new ethical dilemmas, particularly around
such issues as confidentiality, informed consent, self-determination, and divided professional loyalties (Abramovitz, 2005;
Reisch, 2003; McDonald & Chenoweth, 2007; Strom-Gottfried,
2007).
Clearly, the emergence of workfare regimes in both the U.S.
and Australia have had far reaching implications which draw
further salience from the realization that the type of change
-regime change-operates as a form of institutional change.
It promotes an alternative rationality or logic for why welfare
is delivered and for its role in liberal democracies (Townly,
2002). Social work, we suggest, is not immune, and it is to this
that we now turn. Before doing that, we first develop an appreciation of how American and Australian social work were
positioned within their respective welfare states. We do this
primarily to promote awareness and understanding of the
degree of change which has occurred in such areas as professional autonomy, worker-client relationships, the respective
roles of the public, private, and non-profit sectors, and the
emergence of new ethical dilemmas. (Reisch, 2005; McDonald,
Harris & Winterstein, 2003; Piven, Acker, Hallock & Morgen,
2002; Reisch & Gorin, 2001; Pugh & Gould, 2000).
Social Work in the U.S.
The political, economic, and ideological forces that shaped
the U.S. welfare state also influenced the nature of its professions and the purpose and character of American social work
(Wenocur & Reisch, 1989). U.S. social workers have struggled
with the contradictions between their self-proclaimed ethical
imperative to work for social justice and their need for elite
support to preserve their tenuous occupational status. This
tension has influenced how American social workers have
addressed issues of socio-economic inequality, the relationship of employment to individual well-being, family and
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community life, and the role of government in ameliorating the
consequences of the market (Jansson, 2005). More recently,
issues of race and gender have made the resolution of these
contradictions increasingly complicated (Reisch & Andrews,
2001).
Since the 1980s, the dominance of a conservative, anti-government ideology has dramatically altered the character of U.S.
social work. For the past generation, activist social workers in
the U.S. have spent most of their political energies defending
the nation's fragile safety net and legal protections for women
and persons of color. Many of their long-standing criticisms
of the nation's welfare system were used by conservatives to
justify the "reforms" included in PRWORA. Lacking a viable
alternative, U.S. social workers were thrust in the ironic position of defending the very system they had fiercely criticized
since the 1960s. Consequently, social workers had little impact
on the major policy debates over welfare reform that took place
during the 1990s (Piven, 2002).
PRWORA drew a wide range of social welfare services and
their clients into the political and ideological project of welfare
reform. A peculiar contradiction has emerged between the goal
of self-sufficiency and the power- and resource-dependent position in which TANF recipients and those who purport to help
them find themselves. Because of this fundamental dependency, individuals can appear to exercise initiative only if they
act in accordance with the values and goals of the dominant
workfare regime. The consequences are felt strongly by social
workers and clients (Strom-Gottfried, 2007).
Several illustrations can serve to illuminate the new environment in which social work is operating. One example of
institutional change under the emerging workfare regime is
the increasing use of "controlled analysis, in the form of demonstration projects and experiments, to test social policies"
before they are incorporated into national legislation. Brodkin
and Kaufman (2000) found that this approach tends to perpetuate rather than revise persistent beliefs about welfare recipients. Another is the diminution of states' freedom to create
individually tailored cash assistance programs because of legislative mandates that have "forced states to move recipients
into work activities at the end of two years, and established
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financial penalties for states [that fail to meet] federally defined
work participation rates" (Zedlewski, Holcomb, & Duke, 1998,
pp. 4 3- 4 4 ). In the late 1990s, even before caseloads increased
and fiscal pressures made state funds to support recipients
scarce, some states had moved closer toward policies that discouraged welfare participation and all states revised their policies toward a stronger focus on work (Blank, 2002; Borjas, 2002;
Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006).
At the level of individual organizations, these changes had
a more profound impact. Numerous studies have found that
increased inter-organizational competition privileged larger
organizations and caused organizations of all sizes "to alter
their traditional character" (Alexander, Nank, & Stivers, 1999,
p. 461; Abramovitz, 2005; Reisch & Bischoff, 2000; Twombly,
2001; Reisch & Sommerfeld, 2003). At the policy level, studies
on the impact of welfare reform suggest that its consequences
actually contradict the stated goal of devolution. PRWORA
has increased states' reliance on federal revenues and, in some
ways, diminished the discretion of social service agencies in
the design of program objectives and methods of intervention
(Rockefeller Institute, 2000). The client populations served by
these agencies have also changed dramatically. They are more
likely to be seeking emergency assistance and to come for
service for involuntary reasons. These effects have been particularly severe among organizations that serve a high proportion of racial minorities (Reisch & Sommerfeld, 2003).
As a result, the relationships between individuals and institutions in the welfare-workfare nexus are increasingly depersonalized. In contrast to the goal of empowerment in U.S.
social work, they are not based on human interactions to create
viable and meaningful social structures. Rather, they reflect the
growing power imbalance in U.S. society which privatization
has intensified (Piven, et al., 2002). The pressure of welfare
reform has also changed the nature of social work intervention
itself. There is now greater emphasis on short-term outcomes,
even as the number of involuntary clients with complicated,
multiple problems has increased (Abramovitz, 2005; Reisch &
Sommerfeld; McDonald, Harris & Winterstein, 2003).
In addition to the challenges described above, the growing
powerlessness of workers in the workfare state reflects the
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shrinking control they possess over strategic resources and
their inability to resolve environmental uncertainties (e.g.,
levels of adequate funding, changing administrative regulations). This is due to several factors. First, the resources
social workers require are increasingly under the monopoly
control of forces outside the span of control of their organizations, such as foundations, corporate funders, and legislatures
dominated by conservative politicians. These forces often
operate under fundamentally different ideological premises
about the purpose and nature of public welfare (Reisch, 2003;
Piven, 2002; Pugh & Gould, 2000). Second, social workers play
little or no role in decisions to resolve environmental uncertainties. Finally, social workers often cannot anticipate what
these decisions will be because the processes by which they
are made are ambiguous, unstated, shifting, or beyond their
reach (Penna, Paylor, & Washington, 2000). This situation of
powerlessness creates an inevitable paradox for those social
workers who seek to change prevailing policy or bureaucratic
imperatives-change can only occur through structural challenges to the workfare regime, yet those who promote change
must operate from an increasingly constrained and regulated
base which lacks the resources and power needed to sustain a
challenge to prevailing institutional hegemonies. Despite the
ethical imperative to promote social justice, social workers in
the U.S. are increasingly compelled to comply with the logic
of the new welfare regime and to accept its determinants of
success. Through its underlying challenge to the legitimacy
of the social welfare system, welfare reform also rationalized
the pursuit of new and vast resources of capital-the Social
Security trust funds-and an expanded role of the market in
health care provision (Katz, 2001; Reisch, 2003).
Social Work in Australia
Given the unusual pattern of welfare state development in
Australia (that is, redistribution via centralized wage fixing),
social work could never play more than a minor role in the
welfare regime. Nevertheless, as part of efforts to promote national reconstruction at the end of World War II, the Federal
government opened up a significant role for social workers
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in the federally-run income security system (Fitzgibbon &
Hargraves, 2001). Social workers managed to firmly establish
themselves in that context, and unlike their U.S. counterparts,
have retained a central role in public welfare. The nature of
the Australian income security system is such that social work,
by remaining centrally engaged in the system, rendered itself
quite important in the promotion of the Australian version
of (albeit limited) social citizenship rights. Australian social
workers were also quite successful in positioning the profession in the incrementally developed post-war arrangements
for social welfare and health services. In the 1950s, social work
developed in the Australian states, particularly in statutory
child welfare, health and disability, and to a lesser extent, corrections (Boasa & Crawley, 1976). Nevertheless, it remained a
small but distinct occupational group within a similarly small
social welfare labor market (Meagher & Healy, 2005). This parallels the early development of the social work profession in
the U.S. (Wenocur & Reisch, 1989).
Significant expansionary opportunities presented themselves in the 1970s when substantial growth in social welfare
services occurred. Despite the gradual cooling of political attitudes to the welfare state, growth has continued in social
welfare services for the aged, the disabled, the homeless, people
with substance abuse issues, victims of domestic violence and
so forth, often at the behest of the Federal government policy
initiatives, managed by the states and increasingly located in
the nonprofit sector (Martin, 1996). In essence, the 1970s, 1980s
and early 1990s were the highpoint of Australian social work
within the mature version of the Australian welfare state.
Furthermore (particularly for our purposes here), the values
and aspirations of Australian social work were largely congruent with those of the mature Australian welfare state.
Because of differences in funding arrangements, Australian
social work is not as implicated (at least in terms of percentage
engagement) in workfare-related programs as is U.S. social
work. However, that hiatus is temporary. Like their U.S. counterparts, a significant proportion of Australian social workers
are employed in state-based or state-contracted health and
welfare agencies (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). The state
agencies are funded through state revenue, itself mostly
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made up of untied Federal general revenue grants (grants for
which there are no compliance requirements). The impact of
Federally-generated neo-liberalism has, to date, been moderated by the individual states and by the activities of an upper
house which the government did not control. This situation
recently changed and it is expected that workfare will roll out
to substantial areas of state welfare activity. As yet, most social
work experience of neo-liberalism is not fully-fledged workfare, but is largely felt through the imposition of New Public
Management-inspired practices. Unlike the U.S., these organizational and management practices have not been quite as
aggressively promoted, as the imposition of the contracting
out and competition has been patchy and the states remain
involved in service provision (McDonald & Marston, 2002b).
Nevertheless, there are two primary sites where workfare is
the primary mode of operation. The first of these is Centrelink,
the Federal income security agency (in which, as noted earlier,
social workers have a significant presence). The second is the
Job Network-a network of over two hundred non-state organisations operating in over two thousand sites across the country
providing employment services on behalf of the Federal government. While it is not known how many social workers are
employed in the Network, we do know that they are there
(Marston & McDonald, 2003). Both of these service delivery
systems are exemplars of the workfare regime. Further, the
Federal government has clearly indicated its intent to roll out
welfare reform more broadly, and like the U.S., will in all likelihood ensure state compliance through the use of legislated financial incentives and the subsequent exploitation of resource
dependencies between the states and the Federal government,
and between funding bodies and service delivery agencies.
Rationalities of Welfare and Workfare
To promote appreciation of the likely impact on social
work of engagement with the workfare regime, we draw selectively on a set of concepts developed theoretically and
refined empirically within the corpus of what is known as
neo-institutional theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). We consider that welfare regimes function as institutions, in that they
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comprise a set of norms regulating the interaction of social
actors-groups, agencies and individuals-in the promotion
of 'welfare' (Bouma, 1998). The shift from the welfare state
to the workfare regime represents institutional change, the
effect of which is to disrupt pre-existing field-level consensus
about what constitutes 'welfare' by introducing new ideas
and practices (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002). Within
fields there are various groups-for example, organizations
and the professions-which differentially influence field-level
debates (Greenwood et al., 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Bouma, 1998;
Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood & Brown, 1996). In Australia, for
example, the introduction of workfare has meant that income
security entitlements are no longer linked to social citizenship
rights, and the operations of providing payments has shifted
dramatically from a traditional public bureaucracy model
to a flexible 'business' model (Vardon, 2003). In the U.S., the
focus has shifted away from service provision towards case
"management."
Recently theoretical attention has focused on institutional
change processes that emphasize field-level shifts in logics and
their associated rationalities(Aldrich, 1999; Scott, Reuf, Mendel
& Caronna, 2000). The rationalities of welfare reform promoted by the workfare regime, for example, reflect an institutional
logic-a common meaning system that represents an array of
material practices and symbolic constructs that constitute organizing principles guiding activity within a field (Galvin, 2002).
Institutional logics provide the rules of the game, and shape
what constitutes both 'problems' and 'solutions' (Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). Changes in the institutional logic of a field over
time lead to changes in the functioning and behavior of constituents (Galvin, 2002), for example, social workers.
The Weberian notion of value spheres (Friedland & Alford,
1991) operating within the institutional logic of a field is useful
for illustrating the scope of change. An institutional field can
be (and often is) pluralistic in that multiple sub-rationalities
can operate within it. Within both the welfare and workfare
field, social work is one value sphere with its own theoretical,
substantive and formal rationalities (Townley, 2002; Kalberg,
1980). These provide the foundations of both professional
identity and patterns of action that make up social work
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practice. As we illustrate in Table 1, social work rationalities
are largely congruent with those of the welfare state, and they
can be contrasted with the rationalities of the new institutional
logic of the workfare regime.
Table 1: Rationalities of Social Work and Workfare
Rationality,

Social Work

Workfare
Practice

Theoretical
Rationality

Promotes the masterx
of reality through
particular cognitive
constructions,
application of
specific concepts, and
processes of logical
deduction.

Social work practice
is informed and
directed by social
work practice
theory predicated
on professional
autonomy.

Workfare practice is
informed bx New
Public Management,
public choice and
agency theory
predicated on
accountability.

Substantive
Rationalitx

Orders action into
particular patterns
bx reference to an
identifiable cluster of
values.

Social work practice
is informed by
social work values,
congruent with
values of liberaldemocratic welfare
state.

Workfare practice
is informed by neoliberal notions of
obligation, mutual
responsibility,
individualism and
freedom.

Formal
Rationalitx

Orders action by
reference to rules,
laws or regulations
relating to the
economy and society.

Social work practice
is informed by policy
and bureaucratic
logics of the post-war
welfare state.

Practice is
informed by new
configurations of
states and markets,
and new forms and
spaces of service
delivery

These are drawn from Kalberg, 1980.

Specifying the rationalities of social work and workfarerelated practices in this way allows us to acknowledge the
nature and extent of the differences between welfare (and social
work) and workfare. What we need to do now is address the
implications of what happens when such different rationalities
are present in the same field. Neo-institutional theory would
suggest that in the context of the shift from the welfare state to
the workfare regime, the conditions for institutional change
clearly exist. Oliver (1992), for example, nominated the
antecedents of change: mounting performance crises, conflicting
internal interests, increasing pressures to innovate, changing
external dependencies, increasing technical specificity and
goal clarity,increasing competition for resources, and changing
institutional rules and values. There is sufficient evidence of all
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of these factors operating in both the U.S. and Australia over the
past twenty years. The supplanting of the logic of the welfare
state with that of the workfare regime can be explained as the
combination of an enabling pattern of resource dependencies
(in that those wanting change also control resources and those
resisting change are resource-dependent), plus the existence
of a credible alternative (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). That is
the case in both countries in that institutional change was and
is driven by Federal governments with almost total control
over resources pursuing the new logic with the blueprint
provided, for example, by influential right wing think tanks
and conservative scholars (Piven, 2002; Katz, 2001).
In the introduction, we suggested that the logic of workfare
as an institution has taken on a hegemonic status. Theoretically,
this can be understood as full institutionalization, wherein the
logic of workfare has such a degree of cognitive legitimacy so
as to become taken-for-granted (Greenwood et al., 2002). And,
as Tolbert and Zucker (1996) point out, fully institutionalized
rationalities can survive across generations, uncritically
accepted as the definitive way of conceptualizing issues and
behaving. Once an institutional logic such as workfare becomes
dominant, the subsequent attitudes, attention and behaviors
of influential actors (such as organizational managers and
executives) become isomorphic with it. Thorton and Ocasio
(1999), for example, demonstrate how the professional logic
of the higher education publishing industry was replaced by
an incoming and dominating market logic, largely through the
activities and orientations of executives.
Theoretically, as the welfare state becomes re-institutionalized as workfare, it will develop a different language
generating different interpretive frameworks (Meyer &
Rowan, 1991). In the U.S. state of Michigan, for example, the
Department of Human Services was renamed the "Family
Independence Agency" for over a decade. (It recently
switched back.) In using this language, participants 'create' the
institution, in that it accounts for and recursively legitimizes
actions and behaviors. Neo-institutional theory encourages us
to examine the role of agency (for example, of social workers)
in institutional processes-the various ways in which different
aspects of human agency enact institutional orders (Barley &
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Tolbert, 1997; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). Recent developments
focus attention on the recursive relationship between agency
and institution, suggesting that agents such as social workers
operate within a form of bounded rationality (Perrow, 2000),
in which they think up ways to 'go on' in the various contexts
where they engage. Barley and Tolbert (1997) also link action
and agency to the maintenance and change of social institutions. They propose a process wherein 'scripts' (ways of organizing and behaving) are encoded, enacted, replicated,
revised, externalized and objectified by, for example, social
workers. Theoretically, emergent scripts-in this case, patterns
of responses to the contextual demands of the workfare regime
-become a key means by which actors such as social workers
negotiate institutional change.
Our reference earlier to Thorton and Ocasio (1999) indicates that there are extant empirical applications of neo-institutional theory to situations of institutional change which can
inform our deliberations. We refer to two additional examples
in other nations with advanced social welfare systems. The
first of these looks at the impact of New Public Management
on professionals working in museums (Townley, 2002). In this
case, Townley presents findings from a longitudinal study of
the impact of the introduction of business planning and performance measures in a government body in Alberta, Canada
responsible for eighteen museums. She wanted to know how
conflicts between different rationalities (in this case between
the dictates of NPM and the professional rationalities of the
museum curators, historians, researchers, archivists and educators) were handled. She found that while publicly there was
formal acquiescence and compliance with the new systems,
privately, individuals challenged, attacked and dismissed the
initiatives. However, Townley also found that the degree of
compliance and resistance varied depending on the type of rationality challenged. She concluded that in any given context
there are hierarchies of rationalities which structure the degree
of compliance or resistance. Where, for example, the substantive rationality of incoming institutional order appeals to or is
congruent with broadly institutionalized values in the communit, there is little resistance. Accordingly, we suggest that the
culture of the U.S. (which led to "American exceptionalism"
in its welfare state) would render it more susceptible to the
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substantive rationality of workfare. Townley also notes that
there is a deeper underlying tendency for formal rationalities to undermine substantive rationalities over time. This
latter finding is, we suggest, significant for a profession whose
primary rationality is substantive-that is, value-driven.
The second study looks at the impact (paradoxically) of
social work students as volunteers on the institutional order
of a feminist human service organization (Zilber, 2002). In
this case, the context was a volunteer-run rape crisis center
in Israel. When founded in 1978, all of the participants were
affiliated with the feminist movement and they intentionally
strove to create a center reflective of their beliefs. In particular,
they promoted an understanding of rape in social and political terms. Further, the structure and management practices in
the center reflected feminist and collectivist modes of organizing. At the time of the study (over twenty years later) these
principles were still in evidence but had been considerably
weakened. Faced with a shortage of volunteers and a growing
demand for services, the center opened its doors to non-feminist members. Further, in order not to discourage potential
volunteers, the feminist orientation was downplayed. Zilber
(p. 244) says that "a novel type of volunteer was attracted to
the centre-students and novice practitioners of therapeutic
professions, especially psychology and social work, who were
seeking a supportive context in which to practice their newly
acquired professional skills."
Over time, a therapeutic rationality dominated the feminist
rationality, resulting in significant shifts in the orientation and
organization of the center. These student volunteers drew their
rationale and mode of operating from the professional knowledge imparted to them at University-a rationale that drew
heavily on psychology and on formal social work and counseling models of intervention. Importantly, the center developed
a degree of congruence with the rationalities of the broader
society, and its legitimacy with the external environment increased. Of interest here is not the seeming success of social
work, but the implication that the substantive and formal rationality of an organization can be overturned by a change in
the type of people involved. Second, supplanting an existing
rationality with one more congruent with the external environment increases an organization's legitimacy and, hence, its
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viability. What this demonstrates is that institutional change
in organizations and institutional fields can be promoted and
carried by shifts in the orientations of individuals working
within them.
Conclusion
We have developed a case and a framework for an indepth examination of the impact of the shift from welfare to
workfare on social work. In choosing Australia and the U.S.,
we focus our comments and aspirations on two clear and advanced examples of the neo-liberal project. Nevertheless, given
the ubiquity of the complex of ideas carried by neo-liberalism,
we expect that its impact will be more widespread. We have
suggested that social work as an idea and as a set of practices
was (and to a certain extent still is) largely congruent with the
institutional logic of the welfare state. We have also attempted,
albeit in a limited way, to chart how this correspondence plays
out in different national contexts. By charting the differential
transition from welfare to workfare in both countries, we set
the conditions for comparison. Given that the workfare regime
is more firmly entrenched in the U.S., we would expect that
the concomitant impact on social work would be greater, or at
least, more in evidence. Nevertheless, we also propose that empirical engagement in the Australian contexts where workfare
is well-established will illustrate very similar trends to those
likely to be observed in the U.S. It is even possible that a form
of trans-national convergence may become apparent as the
canons of neo-liberalism penetrate different national contexts.
Also of interest is the mediating impact of the pre-existing
welfare regime types (Esping-Anderson's liberal, corporate
and social democratic regimes) and the manner in which they
interpret and respond to neo-liberalism. We note, for example,
that there are regime-mediated differences in workfare programs for the unemployed in the Danish (social democratic)
regime and the Australian (liberal) regime (Larson, Marston &
McDonald, 2004). In the second half of the paper, we outlined
a theoretical framework for first, understanding the transition
from welfare to workfare, and second, for theorizing its likely
impact on social work, and through social work, to all social
welfare-related professions. As we have demonstrated, neo-institutional theory has proved useful in empirical accounts of
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institutional change. In conclusion, we suggest that the comparative project we have outlined here, guided by the theoretical framework suggested, has the capacity to provide highly
salient knowledge about the future of social work in the still
evolving conditions of the workfare regime.
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Social Security was enacted in 1935 amid political controversy (Amenta, 2006; Domhoff, 1996). Until the passage of the
Social Security Act amendments of 1950, Republicans, conservatives and corporate leaders opposed the program, decrying
it as burdensome to business, workers, and the state as well as
an unfair liability on future generations. Yet, from 1950 through
1995, Congress and presidents generally agreed that the fundamental structure and principles of Social Security should be
retained. Consensus politics continued through two periods of
Republican majority control over the Democrats in Congress
(1953 through 1955 and 1980 through 1986), but dissension
began to mount when Republican majorities ruled both houses
in 1994. We contend that the dissension is the result of an ideological social movement favoring privatization.
Social movements are social processes wherein actors,
linked by dense informal networks and sharing a distinct identity, are engaged in collective action against clearly identified
opponents (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Diani & Bison, 2004).
Social movement actors include individuals and organizations
that engage in sustained resource exchanges with the purpose
of achieving common goals, while at the same time remaining autonomous and independent. The actors, based on their
shared ideals, collectively resist or promote change in the political, economic and/or cultural status quo. Since the 1960s,
social movement scholars have studied four major questions
related to structure, culture, resource mobilization and political
opportunity: 1) what is the structural context within which the
social movement developed; 2) how have the actors defined
the social problem and what symbols have they created to
substantiate collective action; 3) what were the available resources that made the social movement possible; and 4) what
is the interaction between the social movement and the political system.
Questions 2 and 3 above have been analyzed by researchers. Scholars have documented the flow of resources among
individuals, foundations, organizations, government institutions, and media in support of conservative (hence market)
ideals that include privatization of public programs (e.g. Brock,
2004; Callahan, 1999; Covington, 1997; Krehel?, House, &
Kernan, 2004; Media Transparency, 2004; Medvetz, 2006; Rich,
2001; Smith, 1991; Stefanicic & Delgado, 1996). Social Security
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has been framed by conservative think tanks, members of
Congress, and others in conferences, journals, reports and the
media as being insolvent, in crisis, unsustainable, a bad deal for
workers, inequitable among generations, and requiring radical
reform (Baker & Weisbrot, 1999; Estes, 1991; 2001; Fairness and
Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 2005; Lieberman, 2000; Pryce &
Santorum, 2005; White, 2003). A key framing tactic has been
the strategic redefinition of Social Security "privatization" to
"personalization" or "personal accounts," to suggest increased
personal ownership and control instead of connoting corporate takeover. The refraining provides opponents of Social
Security with a conceptual tag that maintains a semblance of
consistency between their ideology and actions for reform.
Our research on the existence of a social movement within the
Social Security policy domain focuses on: a) investigating the
historical context within which the Social Security privatization efforts developed; and b) tracking the interaction between
the reform efforts and the political system.
In the first section of the paper we describe our methodology-an historical and legislative content analyses. In the
second section we trace the structural context of the Social
Security program through a brief background on Social Security
Advisory Boards and Councils as well as an abridged history
of legislative and executive action from the program's inception in 1935 through 1992. We track the interaction between
the reform efforts and the political system in sections three
and four. In section three we document the change in political atmosphere in the early 1980s that coincided with the reappearance of long-term solvency issues and the ideological
shift toward market rationalism within international and national organizations. Subsequently, we illustrate the political
shifts within government through Trustees' reports, Council
and Commission recommendations, Congressional hearings,
and Presidential positions. We conclude with a discussion
of the current status of privatization in national and international organizations, and the legislative and administrative
government.
Methods
We combined two frameworks to analyze the presence of
an ideologically structured social movement for Social Security
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reform. Seven tenets from the work of McAdam, Tarrow and
Tilly (2001) framed our search for mobilization efforts:
1. visible and perceived opportunities for reform
(if we perceived an opportunity and the challengers
appeared to act upon it, we included it as a visible and
perceived opportunity)
2. appropriation of new or pre-existing sites to house
reform efforts (the organizations used to challenge
support for Social Security as a social insurance
program)
3. interactive framing of disputes among challengers
and supporters of Social Security, elements of the
state, third parties and the media (ideas and values
that are used to promote reform and are incorporated
into rhetoric, slogans, metaphors, myths, causes, and
to define heroes, villains, and victims-previous and
future studies)
4. interaction among collective action repertoires
that are used as a resource by challengers of the Social
Security program
5. episodes of contention that signal mobilization
processes and which can be distinguished from routine
politics
6. mechanisms in trajectories of contention that produce processes of polarization, including: competition
for power, diffusion of information, repression of
action or groups, and radical agendas (the expansion
of collective action frames such as "crises" to more
extreme agendas such as cutting or limiting entitlement
programs)
7. mechanisms that bridge ideological divides and
deter competition (brokerage) or drive opposing actors
together to oppose common threats (radical flank
effects)
Our examination of the impact challengers might have
had on Social Security was framed by the three-level approach
of Edwin Amenta (2006). We asked whether the challengers
achieved:
1. a win or concession from supporters of the Social
Security program
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2. structural reform that provided greater leverage
over the political process, such as through legislation,
government communications, or positions of power
3. gains in rights of entitlement
To track the development of market rationalism within
the Social Security policy domain, we: a) compiled congressional and administrative documents, journal articles, reports
on the privatization of public pensions internationally, and
documents from think tank websites; b) systematically documented the on-line historical database of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) pertaining to legislative action, presidential speeches, and trustee and commission reports; c) perused
historical accounts to identify information on Social Security
and international pension reform (e.g. Altman, 2005; Amenta,
2006; Andrews, 2006; Ball, 2000; Beland, 2005; Deacon, 2000;
Domhoff, 1996; Gill, Packard, & Yermo, 2004; International
Monetary Fund, 2005; James, 1994; Light, 1995; Schieber &
Shoven, 1999; Skidmore, 1999; World Bank, 2001); d) searched
the CQ Weekly on-line database for legislative information
and action under the subject heading Social Security; e) attended conferences on public pensions (Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta, 2006) and Social Security (National Academy of
Social Insurance, 2006); and f) researched legislative hearings
(Svihula & Estes, 2007).
Structural Context
Although market arguments have been part of the legislative debate since Social Security's inception, the social
insurance principles and structure of the program have survived many amendments (Kollman & Solomon-Fears, 2001).
However, recent expressions supporting privatization have
been emanating from the President and Congress. This section
denotes the institutions, social relations, social definitions, and
axioms that pre-date the privatization efforts.
Advisor ! Boards and Councils
From its inception in 1935 until 1994, the Social Security
program was served by an Advisory Council (Council) composed primarily of non-government members who were
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appointed every four years. The members were to represent
the public at large in advising government officials on Social
Security policy. Under 1994 law, a permanent seven-member
advisory board was formed to serve many of the same functions (DeWitt, 2003). In 1939 a Board of Trustees (Board) was
established to oversee the Social Security Trust fund. The
Board comprises six members (Trustees), four of whom are
from the federal government: the Secretary of the Treasury
(the managing trustee), the Secretary of the Department of
Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
Commissioner of Social Security. The other two members are
appointed to four year terms by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. The Trustees' report is politically significant in
that it estimates Social Security's short- and long-term finances
(Light, 1995; Wayne, 2005a).
The Social Security Programfrom Inception through 1992
Political consensus in support of Social Security persisted
from 1950 until 1994 (Amenta, 2006). Trustees, commissions,
presidents and Congress supported the program's basic structure and principles in recommendations and amendments they
made to the original Act. Major amendments to the program
were expansionist until short-term financing problems appeared in 1977 resulting in increases in the Social Security
tax rates as well as the taxable earnings base (Cooper, 2004;
DeWitt, 2001). Additionally, a basic flaw in the benefit computation formula was corrected to reduce long-term financing
problems.
In December 1977, Congress created a nine-member, bi-partisan National Commission (Commission) on Social Security. It
directed the Commission to undertake a "fundamental, longterm, comprehensive consideration for change in the entire
Social Security system" and to develop a "policy blueprint
for the kind of system that would best serve the Nation in
the future" (SSA, 1981, p. 1). After extensive study-including public hearings, meetings with scholars, public opinion
polls, and international research-the Commission concluded
that the Social Security system was sound in principle and the
best of all alternatives for "stable income support, especially
in times of economic adversity." Other alternatives would
be "too costly or offer insufficient assurance" that workers'
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income would be there when they needed it" (1981, pp. 3-4).
Even so, in their supplemental statement, members Laxson,
MacNaughton, Myers, and Rodgers recommended that the
nation should forestall generational conflict by limiting intergenerational transfers that protect citizens against insufficient
income and adversity. Conversely, members Cohen, Duskin,
and Miller concluded that Social Security was not at the brink
of disaster and that the nation could continue to support Social
Security because "even with fixed resources, we still have the
option of deciding how those resources will be divided among
competing uses" (SSA, 1981, p. 20).
The last major amendments to the Act occurred in 1983.
Legislative changes with the greatest impact on long range
financing included: a) covering nonprofit and new federal
employees; b) taxing benefits for higher-income recipients; c)
shifting COLAs to a calendar-year basis; d) revising the tax
rate schedule; e) increasing the tax basis for self-employed individuals; and f) raising the full benefit retirement age from 65
to 67, gradually phasing-in the increase in age over the years
2000 through 2027. President Reagan stated upon signing the
amendments that the program "must be preserved," and that
the 1983 amendments guaranteed Social Security benefits and
reaffirmed the government's commitment to the program
(SSA, 1984). The Trustees reported the system was in balance
for both the short and long term, with the balance beyond 75
years reflecting a slight surplus (Office of the Actuary, 1983).
It was not until 1988 that the Trustees again estimated that
the Social Security program failed to meet the 75-year, longrange test for actuarial balance. In 1991 and 1992 the Trustees,
based on a new and more stringent test of financial adequacy,
recommended the development of long-term financing options
(SSA, 1996a). Yet despite the reappearance of long-term financing issues, President G. H. W. Bush was "not prepared to
endorse" changes to the Social Security program. He indicated
that the government would stand behind its social contract
with its citizens, stating " [W]e have firm Government credit to
guarantee the pensions..." (SSA, 1990).
In sum, the Social Security boards and councils were established to represent the public and secure benefits through
stable program financing. The amendments through 1983 reaffirmed the government's commitment to guaranteeing stable
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social insurance income for its current and future citizens.
Through 1995, trustees, commissions, presidents and Congress
supported the program's social insurance structure and principles, and while some considered privatization and means
testing, the majority believed that the program was structurally sound and the best alternative of income support for the
United States.
Political Opportunities: The Global
and National Shift toward Pension Privatization
Theorists (e.g. Kreisi, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998;
Tilly, 1978) stress the importance of expanding political opportunities as stimulus to collective action. McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly (2001) reason that: a) the prospects for collective action are
subject to the political context and challengers' perception of
manifest opportunities or threats; and b) the form movements
take depends on challengers' appropriation of sites for mobilization. Within the climate of the Great Depression, President
Roosevelt recognized the need for political action. Owners and
managers of capital were persuaded to accept government intervention, in the form of pensions and unemployment insurance, with the hope that it would stabilize the social system.
The Social Security Act (Act) legislation of 1935 emerged from
the efforts of many actors (for further discussion see Amenta,
2006; Domhoff, 1996).
The popularity of government spending to improve the
economy (known as Keynesian economics) declined with
the stagflation and unemployment of the 1970s (Baker, 2007;
Myles, 1984). The post-Keynesian political economy appears
to have emboldened economists and others to promote market
ideals, including the privatization of public pensions. Milton
Freidman, a former Keynesian economist, lectured on the idea
of free markets in his visits to Chile and China (Commanding
Heights, 2000). President Reagan sent U.S. Treasury Secretary
James Baker, III to promote market reforms at the annual
meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank (WB). U.S. think tanks, international organizations, and
other witnesses expressed increasing support for privatization
at federal hearings (Svihula & Estes, 2007). We elaborate on the
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proliferation of market ideals in the following paragraphs.
In the 1980s, the period of Reaganomics and Thatcherism,
market rationalism became preeminent in global affairs under
the influence of the IMF and the WB (Beland, 2005; Estes,
1991; Estes & Philipson, 2003). This contrasted with the original roles for the international institutions established in 1944
by members of the Bretton Woods Conference. The members
had established the WB for reconstruction after World War II,
and the IMF for ensuring global economic stability based on
recognition that markets fail and collective action is needed
at the global level (Committee and the Department of the
State, 1950). By the mid-1980s, however, the IMF promoted
free market ideals through its criteria for the use of emergency
funds and the WB provided loans based on fulfillment of IMF
preconditions (Williamson, 2000).
In 1981, Chile, the leader in privatizing public pensions,
converted its defined benefit pay-as-you-go scheme to a fully
pre-funded personal pension account system run by private
fund management. The pension conversion was stimulated
by the theories of Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek,
faculty at the University of Chicago (Elahi, 1986; Silva, 1991).
Their proteges, post-graduates of the University of Chicago
School of Economics generally advocated widespread deregulation, privatization, and other free market policies. Jos6
Pifiera, a Harvard economist trained under the tutelage of
Milton Friedman, was the architect of Chile's pension privatization (Pifiera, n.d.). Due to its veto power, the U.S. government was complicit with the IMF and WB in making market
reforms a precondition of loans to Chile (Elahi, 1986).
The Reagan administration viewed IMF preconditions
as insufficient and pushed to tighten them (Boughton, 2001).
James Baker, III, a key player in the Greenspan Commission
and Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, introduced market reforms,
including privatization, to the IMF and WB at their 1985 annual
meeting in Seoul, Korea (Williamson, 2000). The Baker Plan
broadened IMF preconditions to include structural measures
aimed at strengthening a nation's basis for economic growth
(Boughton, 2001). The IMF directors gave the official stamp of
approval to the Baker Plan on November 13, and on December
2 the WB and IMF issued a joint press release expressing their
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"strong support" for the initiative (p. 424). Subsequently, the
WB has supported pension privatization, most importantly in
a 1994 report, "Averting the Old Age Crisis," which has been
influential worldwide as a blueprint for pension reform. From
1984 through 2004 the WB provided 204 loans to 68 countries
that included mandatory, privately managed pension components (Andrews, 2006; James, 1994; World Bank, 2001).
In the U.S., the idea of private accounts did not become
prevalent until proponents organized and strategically took
the idea into the public policy arena. The movement had roots
in a book called Social Security: The Inherent Contradiction,
sponsored by the Cato Institute (Cato) and authored by Peter
Ferrara (1980), who suggested converting Social Security into
private investments. Three years later Cato published an article,
"Achieving a 'Leninist' Strategy," co-authored by affiliates of
the Heritage Foundation (Heritage) that called for "guerrilla
warfare against both the current Social Security system and
the coalition that supports it" by creating "a focused political coalition" to isolate and weaken its opponents (Butler &
Germanis, 1983, p. 547). The concept debuted nationally when
Pierre du Pont, IV (R-Del.) called for private accounts during
his 1988 presidential campaign (Birnbaum, 2005). The idea
gained support in the financial services industry with William
Shipman of State Street Global Advisors, who, after testifying
before Congress in 1994, was recruited by Cato to co-chair its
Social Security project.
From the 1980s onward supporters of Social Security privatization, such as Peter Ferrara, Barber Conable, Pierre du Pont,
and members of conservative think tanks, were prominent
in national and international politics and government. Peter
Ferrara served in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1983
and was made associate deputy attorney general by President
G. H. W. Bush in 1991. In 2003, Ferrara presented one of the
major privatization plans to Congress (Weisman, 2005). Barber
Conable, former congressman and member of the 1983 Social
Security Commission, became president of the WB in 1986
(Andrews, 2006). Du Pont, who received the acclaim of Milton
Friedman, advised President Reagan and Congress and was
a consultant to Prime Minister Thatcher (National Center for
Policy Analysis, n.d.). Of the five members of the 1994-1996
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Advisory Council who supported private accounts, Sylvester
Schieber, a vice-president at Watson Wyatt Worldwide (Watson
Wyatt), a transnational financial consulting firm, is Co-chair
of Cato's Project on Social Security Choice (formerly Project
on Social Security Privatization). Another member, Carolyn
Weaver, Director of Social Security and Pension Studies at the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) authored "Social Security:
Has the Crisis Passed?" in the 1979 Cato Policy Report (Altman,
2005; Weaver, 1979).
More recently, six members of the 2001 President's
Commission to Strengthen Social Security were affiliated with
conservative think tanks, three with Cato (SSA, 2001). Richard
Parsons, Commission Co-chair and CEO of AOL/Time Warner,
donated to the Bush-Cheney campaign (Brock, 2004). Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, the other Co-chair and Senior Scholar at
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, advocated
for a complete pay-as-you-go system with substantial benefit
cuts and partial privatization. David C. John, Research Fellow
at Heritage, has explained the president's proposals to the
public, lawmakers and media and debated Bush's opponents.
Andrew Biggs, Assistant Director of Cato's Project on Social
Security Choice and associate commissioner of the SSA, has accompanied the President in his private accounts quest (Wayne,
2005a). Cato, the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), AEI and Heritage are leaders among the think tanks in
the U.S. that continue to consistently promote pension privatization through events and publications (for more detail see
American Enterprise Institute, 2005; Cato, 2003; Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2005; Heritage Foundation,
2005; John, 2003; n.d.; Tanner, 2004).
Changes Within Government
Concurrent with international and national ideological
shifts toward neoliberalism and globalization from the early
1980s onward, greater attention was being given to private accounts by members of the Board, Council and Commission, and
President G. W. Bush. They utilized Social Security financial
forecasts to articulate the need for reform in order to solve the
impending "crisis" (Estes, 2001; Light, 1995). In 1993, during
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President Clinton's first term, the Trustees recommended that
the 13-member Advisory Council develop recommendations
for restoring Social Security's long-range actuarial balance.
Although noting that privatization would require additional adjustments beyond what would be required to achieve
system solvency, the Technical Panel to the Council concluded
that private accounts deserved additional study (SSA, 1996b).
In 1995, the Secretary of Health and Human Services directed the Council to conduct an extensive review of Social
Security and develop recommendations for restoring longrange actuarial balance to the program (SSA, 1995). Because
there was minimal political support for increasing payroll
taxes, the Council recommended other ways to address the financing issue, including increasing income to the system and
changes in benefits. Three different plans, two of which included private accounts, were recommended in January 1997:
Maintenance of Benefits, Individual Accounts, and Personal
Security Accounts. Five of the 13 members supported carveout accounts and two members supported add-on accounts.
Carve-out accounts would draw from existing payroll tax
revenues and would reduce or offset Social Security benefits;
whereas add-ons would supplement the program benefits
with new revenue streams. This was the first time in the program's history that consensus was absent among the Council
members.
From 1998 forward, the Social Security Trustees continually reported that the Social Security Fund was not in long-term
actuarial balance, placing greater emphasis as time passed on
the importance of making changes to the program (DeWitt,
2001; SSA, 1996b; n.d.). In their 2003 through 2006 reports, the
Trustees also emphasized the need for creative thinking and
consideration of the welfare of future generations. In 2005 and
2006 the Trustees' projected insolvency dates grew closer and
the costs to offset the estimated deficit increased (SSA, 2005a,
2006a).
Heightened attention was focused on Social Security
reform during the Clinton Administration when Republicans
gained control of both houses of Congress. President Clinton
did not support privatization of Social Security via carveout accounts. In his 1998 State of the Union address, he emphasized the importance of addressing the solvency of the
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Social Security program by stating that the budget surplus
should be used to "Save Social Security First" (SSA, 1998a).
That February, President Clinton unofficially launched the
year-long process of discussing the future of Social Security
at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. In April,
President Clinton participated in the first of his national
forums on Social Security co-hosted by AARP and the Concord
Coalition (Office of the Press Secretary, 1998). In the midst of
the forums, the CSIS National Commission on Retirement
Policy (1998) issued a report that recommended, among other
changes, diverting 2% of Social Security payroll taxes into individual savings accounts. On December 8 and 9, 1998, President
Clinton convened participants in Washington, D.C. at the firstever White House Conference on Social Security to discuss the
program's long-range financing (SSA, 1999). Approximately
270 guests were invited and over 100 submitted statements,
many in support of privatization. In his January 1999 State
of the Union Address, President Clinton presented his proposal, which included government investment of 12% of the
trust fund surpluses into the stock market to create universal
savings accounts as add-ons to Social Security benefits. Hoping
to increase retirees' standard of living and boost the national economy, President Clinton signed the Senior Citizens'
Freedom to Work Act of 2000, which eliminated the retirement
earnings test for beneficiaries at or above the normal retirement age.
During George W. Bush's presidential campaign in 2000,
he proposed allowing 2% of Social Security payroll taxes to
be diverted into voluntary private accounts. President Bush
promised to reform Social Security in his inaugural address,
and in the middle of his first year as president he formed the
President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security to study
Social Security reform. For the first time since the program's
inception, Commission members were appointed based on
their acceptance of a president's injunction to include private
accounts in their recommendations (SSA, 2001). On December
11, 2001 the Commission recommended three possible
scenarios on how Social Security's long-range financing might
be addressed (President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security, 2001). Largely because of the strong preference of the
commission appointees for carve-out accounts, which would
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destabilize Social Security finances faster than predicted under
current law, the three plans they recommended have received
little recognition.
President Bush again promoted privatization through
his national agenda after his 2004 reelection (2004a). He has
continuously advanced private accounts through multiple
venues including radio addresses, the Department of Treasury
fact sheets, conversations with the public, SSA personnel appointments, changes to telephone messages, publications,
and benefit statements (Bush, 2004b; Office of Public Affairs,
2004; Office of the Press Secretary, 2005; Pear, 2005; SSA, 2004,
2005b). The Minority Staff Special Investigations Division
(SID) of the House of Representatives investigated the SSA's
alteration of public communications in support of President
Bush's Social Security privatization proposals (Minority Staff
Special Investigations Division Committee on Government
Reform, 2005). The documents revealed that the SSA "markedly changed its communications to the public over the last
four years.. Public assurances that the Social Security system
faces 'no immediate crisis' [were] eliminated from agency presentations, and descriptions of the role Social Security plays in
keeping seniors 'out of poverty' [were] dropped." The agency
now repeatedly warns that Social Security is "unsustainable"
and "underfinanced" and "must change" (p. 3). The SID also
found that the SSA's primary strategic goal of educating the
public about the program was replaced in 2003 by a new objective to use public communication to "support reforms" to
Social Security (Minority Staff Special Investigations Division
Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 2). In 2005, the
communication plan states that a key "message" is "Social
Security's long-term financing problems are serious and need
to be addressed soon" (p. 3).
Alteration of public communication on Social Security
is not limited to the SSA. For example, a Department of
the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Fact Sheet declares,
"This Administration embraces the need for new ideas. The
creation of personal accounts is critical to ensure Social
Security's sustainability." Additionally, the chairs of the House
and Senate Republican Conferences developed a 103-page
guide in January, 2005 to educate Republicans on how to
promote private accounts in Social Security (Pryce & Santorum,
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2005).
Some have claimed that President Bush's agenda for Social
Security is dead (Barshay & Wayne, 2005). Although privatization was first on the agenda for Mr. Bush at the beginning of
his second term, voters disagreed with the president's agenda,
Democrats rejected it, and Republicans were split on the idea
(NBC News Polling the Nations, 2004; Wayne, 2006a). Yet
without advance comment or consulting Congress, President
Bush inserted estimated expenditures to fund Social Security
private accounts in his 2007 budget, and while Congress was
on recess in 2006 he reappointed two public trustees (John L.
Palmer and Thomas R. Saving) [Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2006; Office of the Press Secretary, 2007; Schor, 2007;
Wayne, 2005c, 2006b]. The appointees are known to support
Social Security privatization. Palmer and Saving contributed
to the 2006 Board report that predicted Social Security insolvency a year earlier than in the 2005 report, and two years
earlier than in the 2004 report. The 2006 Board report contains the same assumptions as the 2005 report (Baker, 2006;
Munnell, 2006). However, in the both the 2005 and 2006 reports
the Board assumed that productivity growth and the pace of
annual immigration would be much slower than in earlier actuarial assumptions and in other government agencies' projections, such as those of the Congressional Budget Office and
Office of Management and Budget (Baker, 2006). The changed
assumptions produce a reduction in the years of full solvency.
The insolvency date is important, as Board and Commission
predictions have influenced the perceived necessity for and
direction of Social Security reform, as well as acted as a political shield for Congress (Light, 1995; Wayne, 2005c). Moreover,
David C. John has advised the Trustees that they could issue a
special public report explaining why Social Security reform is
necessary (2003).
Congressional policymakers have been actively pursuing private accounts from 1993 onward. As shown in Figure
1, most witnesses invited by Congress to federal hearings on
Social Security reform between January 1, 1993 and December
31, 2003 supported private accounts (Svihula, 2005). Think tank
members represented the majority of the witnesses, and international organizations included Watson Wyatt, State Street,
and WB (Svihula & Estes, 2007).
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Figure 1. Witnesses' expressions of support for private retirement
accounts in federal legislative hearings on Social Security reform,
1993-2003.
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The SSA web site lists 26 Social Security proposals addressing the program's long-term solvency from August 2001
through March 2006 (2006b). Just four of the 26 proposals did
not include some form of carve-out accounts; one of the four
involved progressive indexing of benefits based on income.
The proposals supporting individual accounts include that
of Rep. Sam Johnson (R-Texas), who had conceptualized the
formation of the Cato Institute (Wayne, 2005d). The proposals
have heightened discussion on private accounts. While none
have been passed into law, Jim McCrery (former Republican
Chairman Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives) predicted
that Social Security reform would appear on the Congressional
agenda after the 2006 elections and Grover Norquist (GOP
strategist) predicted that "W accounts" will emerge after G. W.
Bush has left the presidency (Barshay & Wayne, 2005; Marshall,
2006).
In summary, political opportunities for Social Security
privatization commenced internationally through a global
network of U.S. policymakers (see Table 1). While Social
Security privatization was refuted in the U.S. through the
1980s, the free market theories of Milton Friedman were employed to press the Chilean authorities to fully privatize their
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public pension scheme. With the support of President Reagan's
administration and under the leadership of Treasury Secretary
James Baker, III, transnational governmental organizations
(IMF and WB) promoted and enforced pension privatization in a
number of countries through their funding policies. Welcomed
by the Republican majority, international proponents of Social
Security privatization (e.g. James, Peterson, Pifiera, Scheiber,
Shipman) became prominent in national politics and government alongside members of conservative think tanks such as
Cato, CSIS, AEI and Heritage (e.g. Biggs, Feldstein, Ferrara,
John, Tanner) [Svihula & Estes, 2007]. With the Republicans
in control of Congress since 1994 and a Republican president
inaugurated in 2001, proponents of privatization became more
deeply entrenched throughout the president's administration,
in the SSA, and in the Social Security commissions and board
of trustees. President G. W. Bush has placed Social Security
reform high on his national agenda. Political mediation continues through linkages with the transnational financial services industry through the relentless promotion of writings,
conferences, and media content produced by conservative
think tanks and by access to and influence on the federal issue
agenda through legislative hearings.
Two areas of research would enhance our ability to predict
the direction of ideological social movements and be a great
contribution to fields such as the politics of aging, policy analysis, political sociology and political science: a) an historical
exegesis of the refraining, or "keying" (Goffman, 1974), associated with the terminology for reform (e.g. privatization, private
accounts, individual accounts, personal accounts) could signal
ideological alignments; and b) a longitudinal network analysis
of the actors, their ideologies and resources could clarify how
dominant interests in the Social Security policy domain are
able to use their power and relationships to influence policy
options.
Discussion
We contend that the Social Security reform efforts are a
substantial component of an ideological social movement. The
decade that comprised the late 1970s through the late 1980s
brought about a shift in political and economic consciousness.
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Table 1. An historical account of ideological action among actors
that favors Social Security privatization and connotes a politically
motivated social movement.
Date
1977

Actor(s)
4 SS
S
Commissioners

Action(s)
Supplemental statements emphasize market values

1978

Milton Friedman

Free market speech in Chile

1978

Chicago
Boys/Pifiera

Hold key positions in Chilean government

1980

Cato/Ferrara

Social Securit y: The Inherent Contradmiction

1980

IMF/WB/US

Complicit in Chilean restructure based on market
ideals

1981

Ferrara

Serves in Reagan administration through 1983

1981

Jose Pifnera

Creates Chile pension privatization scheme, continues to promote pension privatization to countries
worldwide

1983

SS Commissioners

Dissent on recommendations based on market
values

1983

Pierre du Pont

Advises Reagan/Thatcher, acclaimed by Milton
Friedman

1983

Cato/Heritage

Leninist Strategy

1985

Reagan/ Baker, III

Greater structural reforms/privatization from
IMF/WB

1985

IMF/WB

Support Baker plan for loans based on structural
reforms

1986

Conable

Former congressman/SS Commissioner becomes
WB president

1988

Pierre duPont

Runs for president on platform of private accounts

1988

Trustees /Council

Estimate long-term insolvency

1991

Ferrara

Associate Deputy Attorney General to President G.
H. IV. Bush

1993

Congress

Invite largely pro-privatizers to testifx in federal
legislative hearings on reform through 2003

1994

Shipman/State
Street

Testifies before Congress; leads Cato's Social
Security Project

1994

James/WB

Averting the Old Age Crisis

Tech Panel to SS
Council

Considers investing trust funds in the stock market
and private accounts

1995

Secretary of HTHS

Recommends Advisory Council perform extensive
review of Social Security

1995

Trustees

Reports have consistently estimated long-term
insolvency through 2007
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Date

Actor(s)

Action(s)

SS Council

First time in history consensus is absent-3
proposals

5 SS Council
members

Support private accounts, affiliated with Cato,
Watson WVatt, and AEI

1998

Trustees

Through 2004, estimated date of insolvency moves
further into future

1998

Clinton

"Save Social Security First," year-long forums, promotes investing 1 2 % of trust fund in stock market

1998

CSIS

1998

Clinton

2000

G. IV. Bush

Runs on platform of private accounts

2001

Cato

Hosts privatizing Social Security conference

2001

Bush

President's Commission-all members must
support private accounts

Cato's
Tanner/Biggs

Hold 4 luncheon seminars on Social Security
reform on the Hill

2003

John/Heritage

2003 agenda supports private accounts and advises
using SSA mailings to promote reform as well as
using public Trustees to issue special report on
why reform is necessary, explains private accounts
to public, lawmakers, media for Bush

2004

SSA

Primary goal for educating public emphasizes
Social Security problems are serious and require
immediate reform

2004

Cato's Tanner

Writes 6.2' solution to reform Social Securitx

2004

Treasury

Public affairs fact sheet indicates private accounts
are critical for Social Security

2004

Bush

Presidential agenda 2004 places privatization of SS
as priority

2004

Biggs/Cato SS
Choice

Appointed by Bush to Associate Commissioner of
SSA

2004

Blahous

Assistant to President for Economic Policy leads
Bush Social Security agenda

2005

CSIS/Concord
Coalition

Co-sponsor conference on Social Security reform in
Washington, D.C.

2005

AEI

Holds conference on Social Security in support of
private accounts

2005

SSA

In apparent support for Bush agenda, changes
public communication to reflect need for SS reform
and private accounts.

2005

House Special
Investigation
Division (SID)

Notes changes in SSA public communications

1997

Publishes statement supporting 2 % of payroll taxes
into private accounts
First White House Conference on Social Security;
many proposals for private accounts
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Date

Actor(s)

Action(s)

2005

Trustees

2005 and 2006 reports estimate earlier dates of
insolvency, assuming slower productivity and immigration rates

2005

Congress

5 proposals submitted in support of private accounts, I by brainchild of Cato (Sam 1ohnson)

2005

Chairmen
Republican
Conferences

Create guide for Republican congressmen to
promote private accounts

2006

GW. Bush

2007 budget proposal includes private accounts

2006

G. W. Bush

Re-appoints pro-privatization trustees against
Congress and tradition

2006

AEI

Over the years demonstrates support for private
accounts through website, books, events, and publications that it sponsors

2006

Heritage

Over past several years publishes its stance favoring private accounts on website as well as Issues
2006, stating need for SS reform

2006

CSIS

Continues ongoing Global Aging Forums on SS
reform.

2006

M

2007

G. W. Bush

2008 budget proposal includes private accounts

2007

G.W. Bush

Appoints Biggs as Deputy Commissioner of SSA
in an affront to the new Democratic Senate Finance
Chair Max Baucus

rrprivate

Predict action in Congress over next few years on
accounts

While dissension on Social Security's long-term financing
appeared as early as 1977, it took the substantial efforts of
the conservative neoliberals to build the political momentum
necessary to shift the institutional structures of government.
Ideologically structured action (Zald, 2000) around the financing of Social Security has been seen in the activities of Mr. Bush,
his administration, and Congress. Moreover, the Trustees'
estimation of earlier dates for Social Security insolvency is
consistent with the market ideology.
Yet, it appears that the political alignment for and against
privatization may be shifting. The influence of the IMF in Latin
America and middle income countries has collapsed (Weisbrot,
2006). Chile's President Bachelet has begun to reform the country's private pension scheme beginning with free health care to
individuals over 60 years of age and adding a national public
safety net to the Social Security program (Sentido.tv Americas,
2006).
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Latin America has experienced an unprecedented longterm economic growth failure over the last quarter-century
while implementing market policies advocated by the IMF
and World Bank (Weisbrot, 2007). A number of Latin American
countries recently rejected these policies and have elected
governments with an explicit mandate to change economic
policy. This year, the governments of Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Colombia have decided to
form a new "Banco del Sur" as an alternative to the IMF, World
Bank, and allied institutions.
In the U.S., a liberal coalition called Americans United for
Change banded together in 2006 to defeat the president's attempts at Social Security privatization (Young, 2007). The coalition continues its efforts in the fight against the privatization of Medicare. Whereas throughout most of the 1990s and
early 2000s, Republicans staunchly supported private accounts
and Democrats were split on the reform option, currently the
reverse is true (Wayne, 2005a; Wayne & Tollefson, 2007). By
the end of 2006, all top Democrats had signed the "Golden
Promise," a pledge against Social Security privatization initiated by Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid (Graham, 2006).
The struggle is sure to continue as challengers, including
the president, his administration and political appointees, continue their unabated framing of Social Security as "bankrupt,"
"unsustainable," and in "crisis." In September 2006, a group
called For Our Grandchildren reacted to the "Golden Promise"
by asking each member of Congress to sign a pledge that they
would require that all reform options (including privatization)
be placed on the table (Koffler, 2006). Undaunted by his defeat
in 2006, Mr. Bush placed private carve-out accounts in the 2008
federal budgets and appointed Andrew Biggs to deputy commissioner of the SSA during a congressional recess (Office of
the Press Secretary, 2007; Schor, 2007). Almost every elected
Democrat and many Republicans had rejected Bush's plan to
create private accounts and strongly opposed the appointment.
Max Baucus, Senate Finance Committee Chairman, stated that
the appointment of Biggs, due to his support of Bush's plan,
has dimmed any chance of real reform. In the future, perhaps
the ideological divide will be broken by a savvy policy entrepreneur or an advocacy coalition. Through early November of
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2007, candidates were mostly quiet about Social Security reform
on the presidential campaign trail, focusing instead on health
care. However, over the Veterans' Day weekend, Republican
candidate Fred Thompson and Democratic candidates Hillary
Clinton and Barack Obama began to debate the issue publicly
(Sahadi, 2007). Thompson proposes personal accounts funded
by additional individual payroll taxes government matched 2.5
to 1 through general revenues. Clinton anticipates first ending
the practice of borrowing from the Social Security trust fund
and then appointing a bipartisan commission. Obama backs
raising the income ceiling on payroll taxes.
Finally, within the SSA, efforts toward shifting the social
insurance program to private accounts continue (SSA, 2007).
SSA sponsored the Retirement Research Consortium in 2003 at
S5.0 million or more per year through 2007. The RRC has three
goals: 1) conducting research and evaluation; 2) disseminating
information on retirement research and 3) training scholars and
practitioners. The RRC has held events at which speakers and
presenters have promoted personal accounts. At a conference
this year, Andrew Biggs and Sylvester Schieber were the two
invited guest speakers. Sylvester Schieber, a partner with the
financial consulting firm of Watson-Wyatt Worldwide, was appointed last fall by Mr. Bush to the Chairmanship of the Social
Security Advisory Board. Additionally, one of the greatest objections to personal accounts has been the shift of risk from the
government to the individual. At an RRC conference a year
ago, five papers were presented on the possibility of reducing
the amount of individual risk associated with the introduction
of private accounts into Social Security.
In conclusion, Social Security is important to U.S. citizens.
They support it unequivocally, to the point of consenting to
additional taxes to sustain the program. Conversely, citizens
do not favor the individual risk associated with personal accounts in Social Security. There is a great need for an accurate
depiction of Social Security's status to be brought into national debate. Market rationalists are prominent in the presidential administration, the Social Security Administration, the
Department of Treasury, the Board of Trustees, and witnesses
invited to congressional hearings on Social Security reform.
Moreover, they have penetrated research institutions previously perceived as unbiased. In the event of a conservative
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majority in Congress and/or the election of another conservative president, it is likely that the legislative ambush seen with
the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 will recur in Social
Security reform in the form of private accounts.
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The enactment of the Family Support Act was the outcome of a
six-year legislative and administrativereview of, and debate about,
welfare policy and programs. Heralded as the opportunity of the
century, it did little, however, to alter existing policy. This article
examines the evolution of the Family SupportAct within the United
States Congress, spotlighting two important time periods leading
up to its enactment: 1981 to 1985 and 1986 to 1988. Originaldocumentsfroin thefiles of the late SenatorMoynihan, legislativesponsor of the Family Support Act, as well as a comprehensive investigation of Congressional recordsof hearingsand debates, media editorials and commentaries, and extensive Congressionalinterviews
form the basisfor this analysis which vividly illustratesthe politics
of welfare policy-making in the United States. It concludes with observations about the policy implications of the Family Support Act
and offers insightinto how its passagepaved the wayfor the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
Keywords: Family Support Act, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, welfare reform, welfare policy, Reagan Administration
The Family Support Act of 1988 evolved out of a much heralded "historic bipartisan consensus" between conservatives
and liberals. It was Congress' first success in two decades in
changing the federal program of financial support to poor families (most female-headed) with children, Aid to Families with
Journal of Sociology & Social Velfare, March 2008, Volume XXX\

105

Number 1

106

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Dependent Children, commonly referred to as AFDC. Yet, expectations that enactment of this new legislation would chart a
new direction in welfare policy in the U.S. were not realized.
Even the legislative sponsor, U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, proclaimed: "I am near desperate for it to be understood that we are not reforming anything.. .we aren't going to
be able to do a lot."
Moynihan was right; the Family Support Act did little to
alter existing policy, to reform welfare. Centered on the themes
of workfare and parental responsibility for child support, the
intent of the legislation was to reduce the numbers of families
on welfare. Debates centering on restricting financial aid and
supportive services to one of the most vulnerable groups in
society-poor women with children-occurred in one of the
meanest conservative times in the 2 0th century and offered little
hope of remediating the structural inequities that exacerbated
the misery of poor families in the U.S. Despite the good intentions of some lawmakers, real reform was doomed.
The enactment of the Family Support Act did, however, exemplify the triumph of individualistic approaches to framing
and understanding poverty, the politics of policy-making, and
the power of political rhetoric. Antipoverty legislation introduced in the 98th and 99th Congresses (1983-84 and 198586) focused on the problem of poverty was lost to legislation
focused on reforming the welfare system. This change of focus
once again obscured both the precise character of social ills in
the U. S. and the appropriate remedies for their resolution.
This article examines the evolution of the Family Support
Act within the United States Congress. It spotlights two time
periods: 1981 to 1985, which concentrates on House Ways and
Means Committee activities surrounding the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) cutbacks in services to
poor families and the 1983 poverty hearings; and 1986 to 1988,
which focuses on the numerous House and Senate welfare
reform proposals and examines the strategies employed in
maneuvering them through the Congressional arena, culminating in the enactment of The Family Support Act on October
13, 1988. Original documents from the files of the late Senator
Moynihan, legislative sponsor of the Family Support Act, as
well as a comprehensive investigation of Congressional records
of hearings and debates, media editorials and commentaries,
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and extensive Congressional interviews form the basis for this
analysis which vividly illustrates the politics of welfare policymaking in the United States.
AFDC in Historical Context
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
(AFDC) arose out of the Social Security Act of 1935. Title IV,
designated the provision of financial assistance to widows
with children "for the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives... to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the
maximum self-support and personal independence" (42 U.S.C.
601) through the creation of the Aid to Dependent Children
(ADC) Program. Since its inception, three major policy changes
(1962, 1967 and 1988) have altered both its focus and intent.
The focus in 1935 was to provide financial assistance to
children living with their mothers (or relatives) who were
deemed "needy and deprived of financial support" by reason
of the death, absence or incapacity of a parent, usually the
father (LaFrance, 1978). By 1936, 147,000 families received benefits through the ADC program: 534,000 recipients, including
361,000 children, ninety-two percent of whom had a deceased
father. The federal expenditure was $50,000,000 (Rodgers,
1986, p. 72 - 7 3).
The 1960s brought substantive changes. The 1962 amendments emphasized the provision of rehabilitative services to
AFDC recipients, established community work and training
programs for adult recipients and day care facilities for their
children, increased incentives to work, provided for rehabilitative services, and expanded efforts to locate absent fathers.
States could extend coverage to poor two-parent families with
an unemployed father (AFDC-Unemployed Parent program
[AFDC-UP]), a move signaling support for the preservation
of families. In 1967 amendments focused on work, in part a
reaction to the perceived failure of the 1962 rehabilitative approach. Recipients with children over age six were required
to register for work and training through the Work Incentive
Program (WIN).
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The 1960s amendments were set within the context of a raciallymotivated backlash against welfare in the previous decade, the influence of the civil rights movement, and the expansion of the welfare
rolls due, in part, to welfare rights activism. As the population of
what became known as "welfare recipients" grew and the ethnic
and racial composition and marital status of recipients changed,
welfare policy grew more stringent, restrictive, and prescriptive.
The initial aim of keeping women in their homes to care for their
children gave way to requirements forcing them to work outside
the home, handing over to others the care of their children.
By 1970, $5 billion was being expended on almost 8.5 million
AFDC recipients: 2,208,000 families with 5,494,000 children.
Recipient benefits averaged $46 per month/$178 per family
(Rodgers, 1986, p. 72-73). By the late 1970s, the welfare system was
widely considered to be inadequate, inequitable, fiscally burdensome, and nearly uncontrollable. The resolution of the alleged
"welfare crisis" declared by President Reagan in the early 1980s
included several components: reconstituting the traditional family
as a basic institution of American life; redefining the relationship
between government and citizen; re-establishing the work ethic,
especially among the able-bodied poor; and in doing so, reducing
public dependency on government.
By 1986, an estimated 11 million recipients received AFDC benefits. The average benefit was $352 per family/$120 per person per
month and the total U.S. expenditure was $15.4 billion, fifty-four
percent of which was federal (Files', undated). While the increases
over the years in both beneficiaries and expenditures were considerable, recipients of AFDC still represented no more than 5% of the
U.S. population, while budgetary outlays accounted for only 1% of
the federal budget.
Putting Out a Call for Reform
Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 on the crest of a conservative wave. Ideologically, he found an audience receptive to views
he had held for years. Marshaling public opinion, he used it as a
platform from which to enact policies that both tapped and intensified skepticism about AFDC. In his 1986 State of the Union address,
he called upon the White House Domestic Council to evaluate programs targeted on poor families and design a strategy that would
meet their "financial, educational, social and safety concerns." He
was adamant that new strategies be devised that would insure poor
families' escape from the "spider's web of dependency."
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Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), an acclaimed
welfare champion, responded to the President's call and on July
21,1987 introduced the Family Security Act of 1987 in the Senate
(later renamed the Family Support Act of 1988). A key Senate
aide, reflecting with exuberance on Moynihan's actions, noted
that he (Moynihan) "jumped at the chance to do something
2
when Reagan mentioned it in his State of the Union."
Optimism prevailed in 1987. Reformers talked of a "window
of opportunity" for change: many citizens, concerned about the
worsening conditions of poor people but experiencing greater
personal economic security themselves, made the circumstances for this change politically viable and attractive. Here was an
excellent position from which to express compassion, and the
probability of altering the welfare system appeared quite good.
Yet, welfare programs, of which AFDC is the most prominent,
test the political limits of redistribution. Widespread and often
intense dissatisfaction with public assistance coupled with substantial conflict and endless debate about the "deservedness"
of recipients and over what government should or should not
do most often characterize the discourse. These debates were
to be no different. While amassing the political machinery in
1987 to once again "reform" the welfare system was not wholly
unanticipated, the passage of a welfare reform package-The
Family Support Act of 1988-was not wholly expected.
The focus of the Family Support Act was two-fold: to
enforce parental obligations to support children through paid
work outside of the home and to transform welfare from an
income maintenance program to a transitional support system
requiring recipients to participate in programs which would
facilitate their preparation for employment. This transformation would, it was thought, break the "cycle of dependency."
Strategies for accomplishing it included: enforced collection
of child support payments from absent parents, required participation of recipients in education and/or work training,
secured government provision of time-limited transitional services-child care and medical care to recipients moving into
the labor market, and the adoption of a new social contract.
This new social contract reflected a shift from financial support
as an "entitlement" to one of a social obligation to work, with
a corresponding societal obligation to provide supportive resources to facilitate work.
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Evolution of the Family Support Act

The enactment of the Family Support Act was the outcome
of a six-year legislative and administrative review of and
debate about existing welfare programs. The debate which
began in 1981 centered on poverty gave way in 1988 to reforming welfare. During the mid 1980s, participants not previously
so engaged in the welfare debates entered the foray: social
science researchers, policy analysts, theorists and scholars affiliated with both non- and quasi-governmental institutions. By
engaging in the debates they would also influence its outcome.
Thus, the history of the evolution of the Family Support Act
actually begins some six years earlier than President Reagan's
1986 pronouncement to re-evaluate welfare programs. It is to
that evolution that I now turn.
The House Ways and Means Committee Focus on Poverty:
1981-1985
In 1981 a new president took office and a Republican majority was seated in the Senate; both made explicit campaign
promises to reduce the size of entitlement programs. During
the first term, the Reagan administration proposed a 52% reduction in Food Stamps, a 29% reduction in AFDC, 64% in WIC
(Special Supplemental Feeding Programs for Women, Infants
and Children), 46% in child nutrition, 38% in Low-Income
Energy Assistance, and 20% in Housing. Congress, reluctant
to so severely cut programs that aided poor people, agreed to
a 14% reduction in Food Stamps, 14% in AFDC, 28% in child
nutrition, 8% in energy assistance, 11% in housing assistance
and a 9% increase in WIC. Proposed reductions, had they been
enacted at administrative request levels, would have decreased
social program expenditures by $75 billion, more than onesixth below prior levels. As it was, the reductions that were
enacted represented a decrease 10% below prior expenditures.
(See Bawden & Palmer, 1984.)
The enactment of the Omnibus Reconciliation Budget Act
(OBRA) in late 1981 caused an outpouring of concern about the
impact of the cuts on families, from both Congress (despite their
previous support) and a number of non-governmental organizations. Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee

Evolution of the FaiilySupport Act

111

were the first to express concern, although they focused more
broadly on issues of poverty and the plight of poor families than
on the more limited issue of AFDC. The Committee's jurisdiction over the major low-income entitlement programs including Social Security, Medicare, Unemployment Compensation
and AFDC legitimized their inquiry.
In late 1981 and early 1982, a few Ways and Means
Committee members made field trips to five cities-Baltimore,
Detroit, Indianapolis, Seattle, and Sacramento-under the
direction of the Speaker of the House. Their purpose was to
obtain information on the adverse effects of the OBRA cutbacks on poor families and AFDC recipients. Rep. Harold Ford
(D-TN), Committee member and Chair of the Subcommittee on
Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation, likened
the visits to Robert Kennedy's 1960s Appalachian visits: a
"cross-country show and tell." Unlike Kennedy's visits, which
prompted a "rediscovery of poverty," these encounters stirred
the conscience of Committee members, providing them with
anecdotal evidence but lacking in substantive impact findings
(Primus, 1989, p. 25). Rep. Ford indicated that they "didn't (as
some had wanted) see evidence of the victimization of poor
women" and subsequently solicited support from organizations like the Children's Defense Fund and the Governor's
Conference to press for a more comprehensive study of the
impact of the cuts. Their endorsement was secured.
As Ways and Means Committee members coalesced around
the need to undertake an exhaustive study on the impact of
the 1981 cuts, the question of which agency would undertake
it arose: a non-partisan group was essential. The Government
Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to take the lead with
back-up from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) (see also Primus, 1989).
The GAO study was well underway when the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), previously resistant to assessing OBRA's impact, contracted with the Research Triangle
Institute (RTI), a North Carolina-based think tank, to evaluate the changes resulting from OBRA. Interestingly, each study
confirmed the others' findings: four to five hundred thousand
families (almost exclusively single mother-headed-households
with children) were eliminated from the rolls, recipients who
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lost eligibility suffered substantial losses of income that were
not made up by either increased earnings or other means, lack
of health insurance was common among former recipients,
and families terminated from AFDC faced increased emergency situations in basic need areas: food, medical treatment,
and shelter (Primus, 1989). The GAO study was covered extensively by the press and Committee members used the findings
to heighten public awareness of poverty. They anticipated that
by doing so they could influence perceptions and actions of the
electorate, and subsequently of key policy makers.
By 1982 official poverty rates were higher than in 1981; 15%
up from 14% (Danzinger, Haveman & Plotnik, 1986). By 1983
the official poverty rate would rise again to 15.2%, an increase
of 38% from 1978 (Day, 1989). Increased poverty rates were a
clear response to the severity of the 1981-83 recession and to the
reductions in government support programs. Unemployment
rates were also up: 1982 rates (9.7%) were 2.1% higher than
in 1981 (7.6%)[Green Book, 19881. The figures were discouraging, but predicted by those who feared adverse affects from the
1981 cuts.
In 1983 the Committee on Ways and Means, prompted
by these and earlier findings, began Congressional hearings
focused on poverty. The hearings persuaded Congressman
Ford, Chair of the Public Assistance Subcommittee, and
Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), Chair of the Oversight
Committee, to request the CRS and CBO to undertake a
major study of children in poverty. What resulted, according
to Wendall Primus, Chief Economist of the House Ways and
Means Committee, was the most comprehensive study ever
done on this issue (Primus, 1989). Released on May 22, 1985 it
offered two new and important contributions to knowledge:
(1) a detailed demographic analysis of childhood poverty and
(2) a descriptive analysis of income inequality among families with children. It was the combination of these activities,
Primus notes, that established poverty as a major public policy
agenda item in the 1980s.
The Neo-Conservative Influence
While poverty blossomed on the Congressional agenda,
conservative think-tanks flourished. But the notion of changing
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culture, not politics, prevailed. Neo-conservatives were joined
by the administration in claiming that "L.B.J. had changed aid
of worthy widows (AFDC) into a vehicle through which selfish
people indulged their desire for children without marriage
and forced taxpayers to pick up the check" (Berkowitz, 1991, p.
143). They realized, however, that criticizing the liberal policies
of the past was not sufficient; lasting change and substantive
reform would occur only with the institution of an alternative,
conservative vision of the welfare state in America. The intellectual climate now in place was necessary but by itself not
sufficient to carry out a conservative vision that would transform the social policies of the past. Political power, centered in
the Office of the President, was crucial and with the election of
Ronald Reagan it was now possible.
Thus, the welfare reform debates of the 1980s were structured differently than those of the past. What characterized and
differentiated them from past ones was that they took place
within a highly refined intellectual atmosphere. Although both
neo-conservatives and liberals participated, it was the neo-conservative arguments that complemented those of the administration and it was those arguments that the administration
used to justify their actions, albeit often after the fact. Liberals,
usually the champions of poor people's causes and the architects of reform, were confronted with conservative theorists'
proposals for reform, and it was these reform proposals that
the administration took seriously.
The proposals came from six books published from 1978
to 1986: Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the
United States by Martin Anderson (1978); Wealth and Poverty
by George Gilder (1981); Losing Ground: American Social Policy,
1950-1980 by Charles Murray (1985); Beiond Entitlement: The
Social Obligations of Citizenship by Lawrence M. Mead ( 1986);
Out of the Poverty Trap: A Conservative Strategy for Welfare Reform
by Stuart Butler and Anna Kondratas (1987); and The New
Consensus on Family and Welfare: A Community of Self-Reliance, by
Michael Novak, et al. (1987). These books represented a range,
albeit narrow, of arguments centered on the negative effects
of liberal social policy on the behavior and values of poor
people. The War on Poverty, they claimed, had made "welfare
a right, an absolute entitlement, that could not be rescinded
for bad behavior and had, by breaking down the psychological
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barriers that kept people off the welfare rolls, increased welfare
dependency" (Berkowitz, 1991, p.144). Public welfare programs were cast as a costly extravagance that increased rather
than eliminated poverty by fostering work disincentives. As a
collection, the works provided conservatives with a potent critique of welfare programs and serious proposals for reform.
Conservatives were now spearheading a drive toward reforming the system of social and financial supports for poor
people. The change they sought was not, however, directed
toward establishing more adequate support for poor people but
toward a position wherein the state would play a significantly
lesser role in assuming responsibility and providing for vulnerable people. The neo-conservative argument against strong
government intervention was a persuasive one for both public
officials and citizens. It was precisely the intrusive nature of
government, illustrated by the proclaimed failure of the War
on Poverty programs to eliminate poverty, they argued, that
exacerbated the deteriorating condition of poor people and
imprisoned them to internalized notions of helplessness, lack
of motivation, immorality, and despair. The mutual obligation
required between a citizen and their state had gone awry. It
was now necessary to free poor people from their imprisoned
state by forcing them to work, as others were doing, and by reducing or eliminating their dependence on the state. Breaking
the cycle of dependency by reversing decades of social policy
was the administrative goal.
Welfare Reform as a Public Issue: 1986 - 1988
Thus, it was in Ronald Reagan's 1986 State of the Union
address that he called upon Congress and the citizenry to join
with him to:
redefine government's role.. revise or replace programs
enacted in the name of compassion that degrade the
moral worth of work, encourage family breakups, and
drive entire communities into a bleak and heartless
dependency...escape the spider's web of dependency
...
the success of welfare should be judged by how
many of its recipients become independent of welfare.
(CQ Almanac, 1986, p.3-D, 4-D)
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Reflecting his distaste about welfare, he mimicked Franklin
Roosevelt's characterization fifty-one years earlier, calling it as
"a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit." Reagan
inferred that the present welfare system could not continue as
presently designed and put out a call for change, which unleashed a flurry of activity within the Congress and among a
diverse group of non-governmental institutions and organizations. Welfare reform was now on the public agenda. It would
remain there over the next 21 months and result in the enactment of legislation that would change AFDC for the first time
in 20 years.
In response to this call for reform, the National Governor's
Association (NGA) assembled a bipartisan working group on
welfare reform in March 1986. A number of reasons motivated
the Governors interest in reform-among them the "new federalism" challenge to move AFDC to the states, the political
appeal of the issue, and perhaps most significantly, decreased
federal funding for the WIN Program: Between 1981 and 1986
federal appropriations for WIN declined by 70%. Welfare reform
became the top priority of the NGA and in February 1987 they
adopted a statement stating their intent "to turn what is now
primarily a payments system with a minor work component
into a system that is first and foremost a jobs system, backed
up with an income assistance component" (NGA Welfare Reform
Policy, 1987, p.1).
The House Ways and Means Committee momentum from
earlier poverty hearings continued into 1986. The Subcommittee
on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation,
chaired by Congressman Ford, began hearings which focused
on the identification of appropriate federal responses to the
problem of poverty. By now, they had turned away from the
previous concern of the impact of poverty on families (Primus,
1989).
Meanwhile, a number of mostly non-governmental organizations set out to more thoroughly investigate the issue
of welfare reform, the issue Reagan had raised in his State of
the Union address. Their participation was symbolic of their
and others' unwillingness to allow the administration to have
sole authority in designing any new welfare approach. Unlike
welfare reform efforts during the Nixon and Carter years, when
the primary impetus came from and remained in the Executive
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Office, these organizations intended to make conscious and
concerted efforts to engage themselves in the debate and influence the outcome. In fact, during the last two months of 1986
and the first three months of 1987, six organizations issued
seven reports on welfare reform. The last report, issued by
the Working Seminar on Family and American Welfare Policy,
came out only days before the first Congressionally sponsored
bill was introduced.
The most notable thing about the reports, as Robert
Reischauer pointed out, was that they "revealed a surprising
degree of consensus. Liberals, moderates, and conservatives
generally agreed about what is wrong with the current welfare
system and what general directions reform should take." With
great optimism, he contended that "for the first time in decades,
(there is) a relatively hospitable environment in which to formulate welfare policy, which, in turn, has allowed Congress
to move forward with reform legislation" (Reischauer, 1987,
p.4).
The seven reports arose from a diverse spectrum of groups:
two from the White House, one from a state task force, two
from independent think tanks, one from a coalition group,
and one from the governors.' A comparative analysis of the
reports revealed five broad themes around which a consensus
emerged: responsibility, work, family, education, and state discretion (see Deprez, 2002). These themes were "...proclaimed
as a reaffirmation of basic American values... their widespread
acceptance reflects changes in the political and economic environment..." (Reischauer, 1987, p. 4). This observation was supported by David Ellwood (1988): He argues that social welfare
policies are acceptable to the citizenry only if they reflect dominant cultural values such as the obligation to work, support
and nurture families, and affirm both community and personal
responsibility and accountability. The reports concluded that
regardless of intent, the result of welfare policy over the past
two decades had sharply increased dependency, lowered skills
among recipients, and raised costs for government.
Welfare Reform Legislation in Congress
The elections of 1986 turned control of the Senate back to the
Democrats, and a Democratic majority in the 100th Congress
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meant that the prospects of getting a welfare reform bill passed
were on the "probable side of maybe." A favorable review
from the Senate Finance Committee was crucial for passage; a
Democratic majority could better secure such action.
Early in 1987, Senator Moynihan was appointed Chair of the
Senate Finance Committees' newly established Subcommittee
on Social Security and Family Policy. Under the auspices of
the Subcommittee he opened up hearings on welfare. The first
hearing was held on January 23, 1987 and the last on February
4, 1988. In all, 124 witnesses testified, and over 3,500 pages of
testimony were published. (House and Senate hearings yielded
over 200 witnesses and more than 6,000 pages of testimony.)
Using the authority vested in him, he vowed to answer the
President's call to change the present system of welfare. The
result of his work, S.1511: The Family Security Act of 1987,
was introduced in the Senate on July 21, 1987. In the months
to follow, the Senator would regularly refer to this bill as the
"Governor's Bill," a move calculated to motivate their self-interest and secure strong gubernatorial support.
The road to introduction on July 21st had not been easy;
there were many minefields in the Senate, in the House, and in
the White House. Maneuvering the bill through the legislative
process demanded the utmost political and strategic skill of
the Senator and his staff. The ultimate passage of the bill was
considered a tribute to the Senator's political wisdom, intellectual prowess, and Congressional stature. Many in Congress,
when asked the question, "Why was it possible in 1988 to pass
a bill reforming the welfare system?" responded, "because of
Moynihan."
Early in 1987, months prior to the introduction of Senator
Moynihan's bill, four welfare-related bills were introduced
in Congress. The first, H.R. 30: Fair Work Opportunities
Act of 1987, called for an expansion of WIN funding but
disallowed funds for mandatory workfare4. The second,
S.514: Jobs for Employable Dependent Individuals Act entitled states to bonuses for successful job placement of selected AFDC recipients-. A third, S. 539: Trade, Employment
and Productivity Act of 1987, introduced by Senator Bob
Dole (R-KS) at the request of the Administration, sought
to replace WIN with a work program requiring participation of employable adults (except for mothers of newborns)
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in state-selected work activities with child care and other
necessary supportive services provided6 . The fourth bill, S.610:
Low-Income Opportunity ImprovementAct of 1987, introduced
on February 26, 1987 again by Senator Dole at Administrative
request, embodied the recommendations put forth by the
Domestic Policy Council Low-Income Opportunity Working
Group in 1986. This bill sought to authorize states to conduct
anti-poverty experiments of their own design with "funds appropriated for income-tested benefits or allocated in part on
the basis of the distribution of low-income persons."
On March 19, 1987 Representative Harold Ford and 68
co-sponsors introduced a fifth bill, H.R. 1720: Family Welfare
Reform Act of 1987, in the House. It was the outcome of poverty
hearings held by the House Ways and Means Committee from
1983 to 1986. It was a partisan bill, the welfare reform bill of
House Democrats (which would eventually incorporate provisions from S.610, Senator Dole's bill) and represented a consensus which had developed within the House: by equipping
welfare recipients with job skills and encouraging them to seek
employment, welfare programs could end the "cycle of dependence." It focused on adjusted benefit levels with increased
federal matching funds, national education, training and work
programs, Medicaid coverage, earnings disregard, child care,
extension of benefits to two-parent families, targeting of families with teenage parents, and state discretion in administering
work/welfare programs. However, "Despite attempts to draft
the bill so that it would remain solely within the jurisdiction
of Ways and Means," the bill was referred to three committees: Ways and Means, Education and Labor, and Energy and
Commerce, on March 24, 1987 (Files, March 24, 1987).
On June 10th the Ways and Means Committee completed
action on H.R. 1720. Having considered more than 30 amendments, it reported the amended bill to the House for consideration: "The final vote to report was 23:13, along straight
party lines" (Files, June 11, 1987). Rep. Hank Brown (R-CO),
echoing Republican members of the House, stated: "This bill
is a tragedy. It hurts welfare recipients by restricting work
opportunities and keeping them in welfare" (Brooks, 1987).
Similar hard-hitting comments would be forthcoming from
the Administration.
Cognizant of the partisan and contentious nature of the
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House bill, Senator Moynihan and his staff mapped out a
strategy that could secure passage of his bill in the Senate and
the House and culminate in its acceptance by the White House.
Up until July 21, 1987, the day on which Senator Moynihan
introduced S. 1511: The Family Security Act of 1987 to the full
Senate, the Senator's staff worked tirelessly, negotiating with
Senate and White House staffers to draft a bill that would be
politically feasible.
Senator Moynihan's staff focused their "lobbying" attention on both Republican Senators and the White House.
General agreement among Republican Senators was that
the "bill is a good one," but as of June 17, 1987 no uniform
Republican position had come forth (Files, June 17, 1987). Both
Senate Republicans and Senator Moynihan's staff were awaiting a position from Senator Dole, the Senate Minority Leader.
Senator Dole's welfare advisor indicated, however, that while
the bill "was exactly the right thing to do," Senator Dole will
need "something with his finger prints on it, something he can
point to and say you (Moynihan) put it in the bill because he
insisted on it" (Files, April 11, 1987).
On June 25, 1987, Senator Moynihan's staff held a meeting
with the staffs of Senate Finance Committee Republicans and
the White House. The agenda for the meeting was to review
the components of the bill in an attempt to secure bipartisan
consensus before its introduction; at the least, they could ascertain the basis of the opposition. At the meeting, disagreement centered on mandatory participation rates for targeted
groups and the exemption of women with young children,
use of JOBS program funds for absent fathers, post-secondary
education (unanimous Republican opposition), transitional
Medicaid and daycare (Republican proposal to drop transitional daycare), child care tax credit and Earned Income Tax
Credit (Republican and Administration opposition), waivers
and demonstration projects (Files, June 25, 1987).
By June 27th, with "Senator Dole... still holding back,"
Republican staffers were frustrated and angry; they had believed that the June 25th meeting was the decisive one. All
Committee staffers had recommended co-sponsorship to
their respective Senators (Files, June 27, 1987). Meanwhile,
the White House saw "the extension of assistance to two-parent families" as a major problem, and opened up discussion
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on AFDC-UP, transitional child care, and Medicaid. Senator
Moynihan was cautioned by his staff that "you will lose all of
your Democratic cosponsors should you drop the two-parent
programs from your bill.. Inpast Congresses you have championed the two-parent program" (Files, July 9, 1987).
Senator Moynihan and his staff met with White House
Welfare Advisor Charles Hobbs and other White House staff
on July 10th to discuss the White House's position on the
Family Security Act of 1987:
Mr. Hobbs began the discussion by stating that the
House bill (H.R. 1720) was totally unacceptable to the
White House and that it was getting worse every day.
The discussion then moved to the Family Security Act
(S.
1511). You (Moynihan) pointed out that if the White
House did not like the House bill, then it better see to
it that the Family Security Act has sufficient support to
serve as an alternative. (Files, July 10, 1987)
At the meeting, Hobbs appeared eager to point out the areas
of White House disagreement with the Act: Waivers-"did not
seem satisfied with anything less than complete adoption of the
White House position"; and AFDC-UP-" absolutely anathema
to the White House.. .dependency inducing... It was apparent
that as long as AFDC-UP remains in the legislation, agreement
in the White House is unlikely." In an attempt at compromise,
Senator Moynihan indicated a willingness "to drop the Earned
Income Tax Credit adjustment and the refundable child care
tax credit pensions" from the bill but steadfastly refused to
drop the AFDC-UP provisions (Files, July 10, 1987).
By July 21, 1987 Senator Moynihan's staff had managed
to put together a bill that had no strong opposition among
Republican Senators. Senator Moynihan, however, knew that
the legislation he was introducing that day was not "reform"
legislation. In memos to two colleagues he wrote:
On the one hand we aren't going to be able to do a
lot. On the other hand what we do will be very much
worth doing. The huge fact is that we are redefining the
condition of welfare recipients. They are not the coal
miners' widows envisaged in the 1935 Social Security
Act. They are for the most part young women, almost

Evolution of the FaiilySupport Act

121

wholly without work, a circumstance that society
increasingly defines as unnatural and unjust. (Files,
August 5, 1987)
The cost is strikingly low. The benefits are not strikingly
great. But the re-direction of the program are worth it,
or so I think. In essence, we have at hand a bipartisan
opportunity to establish a child welfare policy based
on mutual obligation by society and family and mutual
obligation within families, or so I think. It is striking
how much we have lowered our expectations. In 1969
...
a guaranteed income. In 1977 (Carter).. Program
for Better Jobs and Income.. .$15 billion a year. In 1981
(Reagan)...workfare...minuscule in cost.. .but did take
hold ...(Files, July 6, 1987)
As stated earlier, Senator Moynihan's strategy for support
and passage was to designate the Family Security Act the
Governor's bill: "...I have tried to draft a proposal modeled
explicitly on that of the Governor's" (Files, July 6, 1987). "We
call this the Governor's bill. The Governor's Association made
welfare change their number one priority for 1987, and these
are the provisions they asked for" (Files, Sept. 12, 1987). By
lauding the NGA's position on welfare, embracing it as consistent with his own, and touting their readiness to aggressively
lobby for reform, the Senator attempted to depict the bill as
having broad-based support reflective of a national consensus.
This strategy would become important in the months ahead.
Following the introduction of the Family Security Act in
the Senate, Rep. Willis Gradison (R-OH) introduced H. R.
3148, the Senate version of The Family Security Act of 1987
into the House on August 6, 1987. In his introduction, he envisioned the Act as not only addressing the "current problems of America's welfare system" but securing "the shape of
America's future." (Files, August 6, 1987). In a private note to
Senator Moynihan, however, his tone was more somber: "It is
refreshing on a subject as highly charged as welfare reform to
see a plan which if it errs does so on the side of understatement
with cautious projections of job placement prospects" (Files,
August 8, 1987).
On August 7, 1987 Congressman Bob Michel (R-IL) and
five Republican co-sponsors offered a "Welfare Independence"
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initiative, H.R. 3200: AFDC Employment and Training
Reorganization Act of 1987. This bill, the Republican substitute
for H.R. 1720,
aimed at skill training and job placement for welfare
recipients, while granting states wide discretion in
experimenting with more effective welfare programs....
Michel characterized the proposal as a common-sense
approach to helping those who need assistance by
providing a future of independence, not dependence."
(Files, August 6, 1987)
The bill received wide support from Republicans and the
President. Rep. Hank Brown (R-CO), an aggressive advocate
for the bill, echoed many Republicans when he said:
We now have historic opportunity to reform welfare
by providing states with both carrots and sticks carrots in the form of new money and flexibility to
design employment and training programs and to
help people with child care and health insurance once
they leave AFDC, and sticks in the form of mandatory
participation standards for states and sanctions for
clients who refuse to meet their civic responsibility.
(Files, August 6, 1987)
In a speech before the nation's Governors on February 22,
1988, President Reagan lauded H.R. 3200 as a
cost-effective proposal allows for states to demonstrate
their ideas for reform of a system that is just not
working for poor people. ... Perhaps the greatest test of
federalism is how we meet the urgent need for welfare
reform -how successful we are in fashioning local and
community solutions to problems that would destroy
families, or worse, keep families from forming in the
first place. (Files, Feb. 22, 1988)
A Republican press release touted the bill as the only one
"receiving serious attention that could be endorsed by the
Reagan administration" (Files, August 7, 1987). The bill was
rejected by the House, 251 to 173.
By September 12, 1987, The Family Security Act (S.
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1511) had 55 Senate co-sponsors. In a radio address entitled
"Fiftv-Five and Much Alive," Senator Moynihan noted that
the 55 co-sponsors represented 37 states and 74.4% of the U.S.
population (Files, September 12, 1987). Presenting the bill to
the citizenry as one with wide-ranging, perhaps unanimous,
national support was critical to the Senator's strategy. By May
26, 1988, 62 Senators would sign on as co-sponsors.
Much of the Fall of 1987 was spent negotiating with the
White House staff, most specifically Charles Hobbs. Hobbs
was not supportive of S. 1511 or H.R. 1720. He noted "three
essential reasons" why he did not think the President would
sign either:
state flexibility is reduced through the imposition
of more top-down rules; the 'poor' are treated as a
class of inherently dependent people, who need 'case
managers' to run their lives, rather than as potentially
productive individuals with differing capabilities,
needs and aspirations; and incentives for self-reliance
and self-responsibility are reduced as rewards for
dependent behavior are increased. (Files, September
25, 1987)
White House Chief of Staff, Howard H. Baker, Jr., wrote to
Senator Moynihan that despite Hobbs' objections to S. 1511, he
stood "ready to try to work with you (Moynihan) to see if we
can structure a welfare reform package the President can sign"
(Files, Sept. 25, 1987).
Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services affirmed both the Administration's criticism
of H.R. 1720 citing "great expense to the American taxpayer
...
increase(d) dependency while failing to assist families to
achieve economic independence," and the Administration's
support of H.R. 3200, lauding it as "true welfare reform.. .a balanced, constructive approach that will reduce welfare dependency in a fiscally responsible manner" (Files, Sept. 28, 1987).
On December 3, 1987, a modified version of H.R. 3200 (H.R.
3692) was introduced in the House. It did not pass.
White House opposition to S. 1511 remained fierce. In
private correspondence to a friend, Senator Moynihan wrote:
We are really into a 'last chance' situation, and I am
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near desperate for it to be understood that we are not
reforming anything. Reform: 'to restore to a former good
state.' We are hoping to redefine the entire program,
to make it possible for poor mothers to work. ...
We
must act now. Before we lose another generation and
the country gives up hope or gets ugly. (Files, April 26,
1988)
On April 20, 1988 Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), Chair of
the Senate Finance Committee, announced that the Committee
had completed action on S.1511: The "bill is designed to restructure the basic program of public assistance for families
in ways that emphasize parental responsibility through the
enforcement of child support and expanded opportunities
in education and training" (Files, April 20, 1988). President
Reagan criticized the legislation, threatening a veto if it did not
go beyond job training and include a provision called zvorkfare:
He had repeatedly threatened to veto any bill without a tough
work requirement. Senator Moynihan opposed the President's
demands. Negotiations between the Senator and the White
House took place over two months but to no avail. Finally,
both sides accepted a compromise proposed by Senator Dole
that required at least one parent in two-parent welfare families
to work 16 hours per week. This appealed to the President.
Senator Dole now had his fingerprints on the bill. Approval in
the Senate was now assured.
In June 1988, the Senate voted 93 to 3 in support of S.1511;
the margin reflected "a broad and powerful consensus, cutting
across party, ideology and geography, that welfare must be
changed" (Stevens, 1988). The Governors had lobbied intensely; their intervention was widely regarded as a critical factor.
Still, there was no consensus between H.R. 1720 and S.1511.
In late June, the House voted to reject Senate amendments to
H.R. 1720 and to reject a Republican initiative to vote directly
on the Senate bill.
The House-Senate Conference Committee
A House-Senate Conference Committee was created in
July 1988 to mediate negotiations between the Democrats and
Republicans and the House and the Senate. The goal was to
produce legislation that appeased members of both parties in
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both Congressional houses and was acceptable to the President.
The central elements of both House and Senate bills-a JOBS
program and child support enforcement--were not in dispute.
Conflict did, however, center on whether recipients should be
required to work for benefits and whether increased benefits
would promote dependency. For the next three months negotiations took place.
House conferees were selected from the four committees that had worked on the legislation: Ways and Means,
Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Agriculture.
They were instructed to hold the "cost of the bill to no more
than the Senate measure's estimated $2.8 billion five-year price
tag" and to "permit no impediments which would disallow
work beyond those contained in the Senate bill" (Congressional
Quarterly ICQ] Almanac, 1988, p. 361). House supporters, as
well as the White House, were adamant that welfare not be
made more attractive than work and that recipients not be discouraged from moving into paying jobs. By late July, conferees
dropped a provision enabling states to raise welfare benefits
with federal matching support.
Differences between the House and Senate bills were substantially narrowed during August: Agreement was reached
on mandatory participation rates for the JOBS program and
a work requirement for two-parent families on welfare.
Discussion continued on issues related to extended medical
coverage, earnings disregard, and tax plans that would raise
money by eliminating meal and entertainment expenses
for upper-income individuals. But "Still unresolved was the
touchy but central issue of whether, and how much, welfare
recipients should be required to work in exchange for benefits"
(CQ Almanac, 1988, p. 36). Senate conferees agreed to drop a
requirement that states participate in AFDC-UP and mandate
work from one parent but the Reagan administration threatened to veto any bill that did not contain the 16 hour-per-week
work requirement. A lobbyist working on the bill noted that
"The White House is now in the incredibly ironic position of
threatening to veto the bill because it doesn't have (AFDC) UP
in it" (CQ Almanac, 1988, p. 363). By the August recess, a $400
million gap lay between the conferees-a substantial, albeit
smaller gap than the $4.3 billion they initially confronted.
Things heated up in September as the final days of the
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conference session got closer. House and Senate conferees remained divided over a controversial work requirement in the
Senate bill. Both sides were adamant that they would not agree
to a piece of legislation they did not believe in; they worked
tirelessly to come to a consensus. Aggressive bargaining efforts
of September 26th and 27th paid off.
As with most compromises, both liberals and
conservatives in the end got what they wantedmeaning each side had to swallow certain things it
didn't like.
Conservatives got their workfare in the form of a
requirement that one parent in two-parent welfare
families perform at least 16 hours per week of unpaid
work.
Liberals ...
(gained) a requirement that states offer
benefits to two-parent families.. .a $1 billion-per-year
entitlement for state education and training programs
and a full year of extended child-care and medical
benefits for recipients who leave the rolls for jobs." (CQ
Almanac, 1988, p.364)
On September 27, 1988 the compromise plan, The Family
Support Act of 1988, was adopted by the Conference Committee
in a 35-8 vote. The Committee, which included Charles Hobbs
of the White House, had agreed to the first federally mandated
work program for welfare recipients, a plan designed to make
public assistance more acceptable and to address the "crisis of
public dependency." Included were: (1) a provision that would
require states to withhold the wages of absentee, non-paying
fathers, (2) a five year cost of $3.34 billion, (3) a requirement
that one parent in two-parent families perform unpaid work
(community service) at least 16 hours per week, (4) a delay
in the work provision until 1994, (5) an allowance for parents
under 25 years to complete high school education in lieu of the
work requirement, (6) extension of Medicaid and day care for
one year after leaving the welfare rolls, and (7) no restrictions
on the Medicaid and day care eligibility of former welfare recipients who quit their jobs and rejoin the welfare rolls.
The bill passed in both houses on September 30th. In all,
14 days of debate and 28 days of hearings over six years were
held. In lauding the accomplishment, Senator Moynihan said:
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We had redefined the whole question of dependency.
This is no longer to be a permanent or even extended
circumstance. It is to be a transition to employment,
and it is to be accompanied by child support from the
absent parent. (Tolchin, 1988)
On October 13, 1988 President Ronald Reagan signed P.L.
100-485: The Family Support Act of 1988 into law.
Conclusions
What emerged in the compromise between conservatives
and liberals amounted to a tinkering with the welfare system:
a job program with stiffer penalties for recipients and more
opportunities for states to experiment with ways to reduce
the "welfare burden." The Family Support Act focused on increasing work incentives, reducing the fiscal burden of states
for welfare, and compelling people to work as a condition of
eligibility. No substantive attention was paid to the lack of adequate paying jobs, day care and health care benefits. Nor was
attention directed to issues of race, gender and class-elements
so much a part of welfare debates, yet so understated.
Heralded as the opportunity of the century, the Family
Support Act did little to alter existing policy. Its passage encouraged us to imagine that change had occurred when in fact
the change was merely illusory: it was "less a real restructuring than a shift of emphasis and relabeling," an agreement that
"was always more rhetorical than real" ("House Rules ...
1987, p.A22; "The Senate ... 1988, p. D6). The Act was not a
radical departure from previous legislation but an extension
of it. It was not social innovation but status quo preservation.
The Act did not ameliorate nor address the problems that poor
people considered the systems' worst: sub-poverty benefits
levels, restrictive administration, and coverage gaps (Casey,
1989).
The enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 exemplified the triumph of individualism over structuralism: it reinforced culturally biased notions of individually engineered
social problems, limited and conditional government intervention, and work-based entitlements. The attention to welfare",
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5% of the population, predominantly single female heads-ofhousehold and children, who receive financial assistance from
a designated 1% of the federal budget-was neither about
money nor numbers but about a system of privilege, of double
standards, embedded in the fabric of U.S. society, reflecting
what Jeff Faux calls "the politics of evasion." This change in
focus once again obscured both the precise character of social
ills in the U.S. and the remedies for their resolution.
After twenty-five years of welfare reform debate we saw
not only widespread dissatisfaction with the public assistance
system but a corresponding unwillingness to address the fundamental causes of poverty. What Senator Moynihan and his
colleagues in the Congress neglected, as they tried to redesign
the welfare system, was that poverty and the underlying structural determinants that both cause and maintain it are, and
remain, well beyond individual blame: Policy that ignores the
causes of the problem cannot provide real solutions.
Setting the Stage for the Next Round
of Welfare Reform
Republicans, discouraged by the seemingly insignificant changes instituted by the Family Support Act, vowed
to continue working to reform welfare policy, to provide real
solutions of a different nature: restricted spending, reduced
numbers of people receiving assistance, decreased births to
single women, enforced parental obligations to support children, required work, and re-established foundations for traditional family unions in America. They knew that passage of the
Family Support Act had been, in part, because of concessions
they needed to make to the Democratic majority to get reform.
But, under a Republican majority everything could change. In
1994 they got their chance: Republicans swept the House, the
Senate, and the Governor's offices-the Republican Revolution
had come. They were now positioned to make the changes in
welfare that they had waited for years to make.
So it was that in 1994, under the leadership of Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA), The Contract with America,
a plan whose concept far preceded its name, emerged. With
backing from Republican Governors-who had also felt the
sting of defeat when the NGA endorsed The Family Support

Evolution of the FaiilySupport Act

129

Act-and with The Contract with America as its foundation
and centerpiece, Republicans placed two proposals before
Congress: The Personal Responsibility Act from the House and
The Work Opportunities Act from the Senate. Key aspects of
these bills included provisions that Republicans had proposed
in 1987: (1) abolishing the program of aid for single parent families (AFDC) and replacing it with a fixed dollar amount block
grant to the states; (2) limiting the number of years that a single
mother may receive assistance; (3) (in the House bill) denying
benefits to children born to women under 18 years old; (4) requiring mothers to identify their newborn child's father in order
to receiving benefits; (5) (in the House bill) denying benefits
for any child born to a mother already receiving benefits-the
Senate bill gave the state the option to decide; and (6) significantly reducing federal health care funding to poor families by
over 30%. The problem of welfare dependency had taken center
stage.
President Bill Clinton, a former gubernatorial member of
the NGA Welfare Reform Task Force which had provided critical support in the passage of The Family Support Act, was inclined to support the House bill-The Personal Responsibility
Act-if it was coupled with the Senate bill-The Work
Opportunities Act-despite protests from his advisors and staff,
some of whom would subsequently resign. On August 22, 1996,
President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility
Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), bringing sweeping changes to welfare "as we knew it." States
regained more authority than they had held in six decades for
both financing and eligibility standards; the AFDC Program
was repealed and replaced with TANF (Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families); a "work first" ideology was instituted
forcing most welfare recipients into work within two years;
limited lifetime benefits of five years were imposed; federal
benefits were eliminated for most immigrants; recipients who
did not assist in establishing paternity of children born out-ofwedlock were penalized; and the human capital approach of
The Family Support Act was eliminated by the severe restrictions placed on access to post-secondary education. Marriage
-traditional unions-was secured as the foundation of society
and encouraged through incentive initiatives and faith-based
service providers.
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PRWORA marked a sea-change in public assistance policy,
altering the fundamental basis of the social contract between
the government and low-income parents. It was the change
that Republicans had envisioned in the 1980s. Their time had
now come.
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Representatives, Congressional aides-were conducted in 1992; information obtained from them is used throughout this paper.
3) They are, in order of publication: The Faiily: Preserving America's
Future,report to President Reaganby the White House Domestic Policy
Council Working Group on the Family, chaired by Under Secretary of
Education Gary L. Bauer, November, 1986; One Child in Four,Part I of
Investing in Poor Fainilies and Their Children: A Matter of Comnitment,
report by the American Public Welfare Association (APWA) and the
National Council of State Human Service Administrators, November
1986; A New Social Contract:Rethinking the Nature and Purpose of Public
Assistance, report submitted to Governor Mario Cuomo by the Task
Force on Poverty and Welfare, December, 1986; Upfrom Dependency:
A New National Public Assistance Strategy, report to President
Reagan by the White House Domestic Policy Council Low Income
Opportunity Working Group, chaired by Charles Hobbs, December
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1986; Ladders Out of Poverty, a report of the Project on the Welfare
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on Farilyand Welftre, report of the Working Seminar on Family and
American Welfare Policy, Marquette University and the American
Enterprise Institute, March 1987.
4) Introduced by Rep. Augustus Hawkins (D-CA) it never got out of
Committee.
5) Introduced by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), it was indefinitely
postponed by unanimous consent of the Senate.
6) Provisions of this bill were incorporated into H.R. 4848, "A bill to
enhance the competitiveness of American industry, " sponsored by
Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) and was signed into law as P.L. 100418: Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 on August 23,
1988.
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The landmark 1996 reform to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) provides an opportunity to study processes of
welfare reform in the United States. A potential factor behind the
transformation of AFDC is public opinion, possibly in the form
of changes in attitudes among politically relevant groups. This
study will evaluate this thesis, focusing on attitudinal changes
between partisan identifiers. Most data suggest the American
public may have been critical of welfare programs prior to the
1996 reform. However, the extent of these criticisms generally
varies depending on who is asked, how questions are worded and
the type of program. Using General Social Survey (GSS) data, I
analyze trends in public opinion among political identifiers and
evaluate the process through which the 1996 reform was enacted.
Keywords: AFDC, partisanpolitics, policy change, public opinion, welfare reform
One of the most sweeping changes to U.S. welfare policy in
recent decades was enacted in 1996; just four years after then
president Bill Clinton vowed to "end welfare as we know it."
The changes made to Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) are particularly relevant to sociologists; most notably
because AFDC is the main form of family services and benefits provided by the government in the United States and had
been one of the most important cornerstones in the American
welfare state since the 1930s. While much has been written
about the consequences of welfare reform, little attention has
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been given to the role public opinion and partisan preferences
may have played in bringing about these changes.
The passage of the 1996 reform was remarkable because
other attempts at legislation to reform the welfare system had
previously failed to pass through Congress or win support
of the President. The 1993 Health Security Bill exemplifies an
attempt at change that stalled in the face of opposition by congressional officials and the public. Yet the 1996 Welfare Reform
legislation appeared to garner support from both major political parties (Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995). While each
party had different objectives in passing the legislation, they
seemed to agree that AFDC needed to change. On one side, the
Republicans pushed for changes in the way AFDC was implemented, specifically contending that welfare should be administrated at the state level, while also attempting to minimize
out-of-wedlock births, which Republicans saw as the cause of
individual reliance on AFDC. Many Republicans also wanted
to see changes in the "incentive system" that was believed to
have been in place within AFDC (Weaver, Shapiro & Jacobs,
1995). Specifically, many Republicans advocated that work requirements and caps be placed on the amount of funds that
each family could receive regardless of the number of children.
On the other side of the aisle, Democrats argued that more
should be done to promote childcare services and to provide
jobs to impoverished people. In the end, both Democrats and
Republicans agreed to change AFDC in such a way as to decrease overall benefits, add family caps, create limits on the
time in which individuals could receive assistance, and to implement a work requirement policy.
It could be argued that the bipartisan efforts to overhaul
what previously had been an expanding welfare system, and
the drastic cuts that were implemented, should have been
met with some degree of public resistance (Pierson, 1996).
Indeed, public opinion data at the time suggested most citizens favored the existence of many of the existing social provision programs (Cook & Barrett, 1992; Shapiro & Young, 1989;
Kluegel, 1987) and believed the government should help citizens in time of need. Numerous public opinion polls have illustrated that Americans support programs that provide basic
services to needy children and the elderly (Gilens, 1999; Page &
Shapiro, 1992). Gilens (1999) for example, finds strong support
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for programs that target services for the elderly and provide
education services to children. Thus, when welfare programs
are called into question, elected officials may be required to
"pursue unpopular policies that must withstand the scrutiny of
both voters and well-entrenched networks of interest groups"
(Pierson, 1996, p. 144). This suggests elected officials must
balance their desire to implement program cuts against their
interest in preserving their jobs. As such, elected officials have
no choice but to consider how proposed changes to social provision programs might negatively affect their political careers.
Given bipartisan effort to change welfare and also the
seeming lack of political backlash, previous research and new
theorizing regarding public opinion may usefully be applied
to this instance of policy change. For example, previous scholarship suggests that the public should respond negatively to
the notion of cutting social provisions. However, if this is not
the case there may be some exceptions to when and how political officials receive signals that indicate the public's approval
or disapproval regarding cutting social provision programs.
Here, I consider how partisanship and public opinion may
signal which programs are most vulnerable to change.
If reforms are proposed by political officials that would
likely result in Americans loosing benefits, it would seem
that they must be presented at a time when the public is most
likely to be amenable to change. Accordingly, it is important
to consider the temporal context in which policy reforms are
presented. In the case of the 1996 reform to AFDC, two historical markers likely paved the way for legislative change. (See
Weaver (2000) for a comprehensive analysis of the political
climate surrounding welfare legislation.) First, the passage of
the Family Support Act of 1988, which unlike the failed efforts
of the Nixon and Carter administrations, resulted in new legislation that focused on moving welfare recipients into the work
force. Second was the Republican takeover of Congress in
1994, which provided the Congressional votes needed to enact
change. Buttressed alongside these historical markers were
changes in the political mood of Americans regarding welfare.
In other words, the President and Congress may have finally
decided to make significant changes to AFDC because of the
notable shifts in preferences among "median voters" (Downs,
1957). Moreover, the public's dissatisfaction with the status
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quo may have grown to such a level that elected officials felt
compelled to respond or at least be given the nod of approval
from the public to proceed.'
By taking a more nuanced approach and incorporating
theories about partisan preferences, we can more thoroughly
analyze the relationship between public opinion and social
policy. While over all shifts in public opinion tell us something
about democratic theory and government response, they alone
do not provide the depth of detail that an investigation of partisan shifts would. It may be that growing animosity toward
welfare resulted in Democrats and Republicans converging in
favor of welfare reform. Yet it is also possible the Democratic
Party attempted to reach out to Republican voters by cutting
welfare. This would suggest that even amidst a growing divergence in partisan support for welfare reform, the desire
to garner support from swing voters outweighed the potential consequences of slashing welfare provisions. In this
paper, through analysis of General Social Survey (GSS) data
on Americans' attitudes toward social service provisions from
1973 to 2002, I evaluate different theories and hypotheses of
social policy change.
Theoretical Background
Generally speaking, Americans favor the idea of a
welfare state. However, it is commonly understood that most
Americans do not like the term "welfare." Previous research
has found that Americans' attitudes toward social services vary
depending upon which specific program is in question (Katz
& Thomas, 1998; Gilens, 1996; Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995;
Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Schram, 1992; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).
Americans are often willing to be supportive of programs that
provide assistance to the poor or that help the elderly, but at the
same time object to funding programs such as food stamps or
other forms of "welfare" (Gilens, 1999; Cook & Barrett, 1992).
These seeming inconsistencies in Americans' views regarding
different aspects of the welfare state have caused some scholars to question the relevance of opinion data and the extent
to which public opinion matters in influencing social policy
(Burstein, 2006; Unnever & Cullen, 2005; Manza & Cook,
2002; Burstein, 1998; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Accordingly, any
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analysis of attitudes toward AFDC policy should not only
evaluate the public's attitude toward AFDC, but also include
an evaluation of other policies that comprise the American
welfare state. In doing so we are better able to evaluate theories of public opinion and policy linkages, especially if the
compared policies are also on the Presidential agenda.
In addition to looking across different social provision
domains, it is necessary to consider the partisan aspects of
public opinion. Some scholars have argued that attitudes are
rooted in pre-existing political cleavages and individual value
systems (Feldman & Zaller, 1992). For example, some scholars link specific policies with more general political ideologies
(Brooks, 2006; Bartels, 2000 [1996]), while Hochschild (1981)
argues that attitudes concerning welfare and welfare reform
are related specifically to Americans' beliefs about distributive
justice. Yet, how public opinion trends and attitudes towards
specific welfare state policies differ among individuals with
different political party affiliations over time has received little
attention. How partisan attitudes toward welfare changed
during the period leading up to and after the enactment of the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 merits further attention because it
can tell us how much support or opposition Republicans and
Democrats in Congress faced from their constituents regarding
welfare reform at different points in time.
In this paper I examine differences in Americans' attitudes
concerning social provision programs and changing partisan
identifiers. Because the primary focus is on the Welfare Reform
Act of 1996, particular attention is given to specific points in
time when shifts in public opinion on welfare favored the enactment of reform. More specifically, this research addresses
the following two questions: (1) Did public opinion trends
among Americans facilitate pressure to reform AFDC?; and (2)
Did attitudes among Republicans and Democrats converge or
diverge in favor of cutting welfare, as compared to other social
provision programs, in the years leading up to the Welfare
Reform Act of 1996?
Theories of Opinion-Policy Linkages
The relationship between public opinion and social policy
has been at the forefront of several debates in the fields of
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sociology and political science. Some researchers have argued
that public policy shapes public opinion (McGraw, Best, &
Timpone, 1995). Others suggest that elites are capable of
shaping aggregate public opinion (Zaller, 1992), or capable of
manipulating preferences through their influence and media
attention (Domhoff, 1990). Still others have argued that public
opinion shapes the outcomes of government policies (Burstein,
1998; Brooks, 2003). Research suggests that there is a temporal order to the relationship between U.S. government policies and American public opinion (Page, 1994; Monroe, 1998;
Burstein, 1998), thus providing the foundation for new and
fruitful research on the linkages between public opinion and
social policy. Page (1994), for example, utilizes survey data to
identify aspects of public opinion that are particularly influential in shaping social policy. Like others, Page concludes that
public opinion does matter under certain circumstances, but
only with respect to some policies. For example, policies that
affect domestic issues are generally more susceptible to public
opinion than those relating to foreign affairs. Moreover, public
opinion may be more influential to policy formation when the
public is clear and vocal (Manza & Cook, 2003). This research
specifically speaks to the example of welfare policy, since it is
both a domestic issue and an issue and a policy arena on which
most Americans have a clear and vocal position.
Burstein (1998) suggests that public opinion affects policy
outcomes; however, the mechanism and conditions under
which public opinion directly influences policy may be constrained by several other factors. Specifically, Burstein reviewed
three different studies of public opinion and welfare policy and
determined that each found a significant relationship between
public opinion and the resulting government policy. Burstein
contends that the public, and specifically public opinion, should
be brought back into sociological research due to the potential
impact on governmental policies. Consequently, if scholars are
to understand why some social welfare programs are adopted
and others not, including why the Welfare Reform Act of 1996
became law, an analysis of public opinion is essential.
Variation in Social Welfare Programs
The welfare state is generally described as consisting of
different social provision programs, ranging from benefits for
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the sick and the elderly to family services and assistance to
the poor. Sometimes, these programs are referred to in general
as welfare expenditures. For example, welfare expenditures
include programs like Social Security, food stamps, unemployment insurance, and other cash or benefit allocation programs.
Each of these arenas of social provision tends to benefit different groups of people. It is not surprising to find variations
in public opinion based upon whether a question is directed
toward a specific program or toward an individual's belief
about welfare as a whole. Consequently, scholars have debated
how much or little support individuals have for welfare when
conceptualized as AFDC, as compared to other social provision programs. As an example, Cook and Barrett (1992) find
that in the early 1990s Americans supported the idea of the
welfare state, especially when the recipients are thought to be
deserving of the help. According to this line of research, we
should expect to see variation in support among all Americans
with respect to different kinds of social provision programs
and the targeted recipients.
Focusing specifically on AFDC, Weaver, Shapiro, and
Jacobs (1995) argue that Americans appear to be growing more
frustrated with the welfare system, and generally think of it as
ineffective. Citing, for example, a 1995 ABC-Washington Post
poll, 69 percent of Americans agreed with the statement, "[tihe
welfare system does more harm than good, because it encourages the break up of the family and discourages the work
ethic" (Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995, p. 611). In addition
to causing more harm than good, many Americans thought
the existing welfare system fostered dependency (Frazer &
Gordon, 1994), was replete with fraudulent cases, and that recipients were discouraged from participating in the workforce
(Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995).
In contrast to these perceptions of AFDC, Americans have
a distinctly different perspective of Social Security. An overwhelming majority of Americans in the 1990s supported the
Social Security system and believe it is one of the most important government programs (Baggette, Shapiro, & Jacobs,
1995). Levels of support for Social Security have remained
relatively constant since the program's inception. Indeed, when
Social Security was presented as a policy in need of change, the
public appeared to react with outrage (Baggette, Shapiro, &
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Jacobs, 1995).
In sum, the literature on public opinion suggests several
noteworthy challenges. While previous research suggests
elected officials are likely to consider mass opinion when advocating for welfare policy reform (Burstein, 1998; Manza,
Cook & Page, 2002), we know little about those to whom the
elected officials listen. For example, is strong support among
only one party more likely to facilitate the adoption of a particular policy or is bipartisan effort the key to policy change? We
know little about how public opinion among Democratic and
Republican identifiers has changed over time with respect to
attitudes toward social provision programs, and particularly
with respect to welfare. Attitudes toward welfare are amply
important because the Clinton Administration may have recognized an opportunity to reach out to partisan groups and
voters that Clinton himself, and the Democrat Party wished to
attract, especially amidst a Republican takeover of Congress.
This scenario appears particularly relevant to the political
context of the early to mid 1990s, an era of strong partisan
divide and intense competition between the Democrat and the
Republican parties.
One of the distinguishing features of the Clinton
Administration was the degree that Democrats and
Republicans held very different views on the role of the government and social policy (Weaver, 2000). While Reagan was
able to attract some self-identified Democrats during his
presidency, Clinton's time in office was plagued by hostility,
scandal, and congressional shutdowns. Yet, it seems possible
that welfare was one issue that Clinton may have been able to
use to bridge the divide among partisan identifiers in order to
move forward with his overall policy agenda. This issue can
only be addressed through analyses of partisan identifiers and
their preferences toward various social provision programs.
Taken together, scholarship on public opinion and partisanship offers a perspective that may help us better understand how and why the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996 emerged and took the specific form
it did. Public opinion theories suggest that changes over time
in public support for social services may affect the likelihood
of welfare reform. Research on political behavior and partisanship can be applied to the question of why welfare reform was

When Does Public Opinion Matter?

141

passed during the Clinton administration as compared to the
Reagan administration. Furthermore, because of the expansive time period of GSS data (1973-2002), whether there was
an overall downward trend in support for welfare spending
prior to the welfare reform of 1996 can be investigated. In
addition, an analysis of a convergence or divergence among
Democratic and Republican attitudes toward welfare over time
can help in understanding when constituents, the President,
and Congressional Democrats and Republicans were attuned
to enacting the reforms.
Data and Methods
The data come from the General Social Surveys 1973-2002
cumulative file collected by the National Opinion Research
Center. 2 The sample was drawn from all non-institutionalized
English-speaking individuals over the age of 18 who resided
in the United States. Data was restricted to include only individuals with valid responses on the dependent and independent variables of interest.' Depending on the dependent variable, the original sample of 43,698 was cut roughly in half as
a result of the restrictions; however, there do not appear to be
significant differences between the original sample and the restricted sample used in this analysis. The dependent variable
for welfare spending has a total sample of 25,348; spending on
race has a sample of 24,341; educational spending has a total
sample of 25,694; and spending on Social Security has 35,340
respondents.
The data allows examination of trends in public opinion
regarding welfare, race policy, education, and Social Security. I
hypothesize that attitudes towards welfare became increasingly negative prior to the election of Bill Clinton in 1992. Also, I
expect that during the 1990s, overall support for welfare effort,
relative to all other policy domains, declined.
Dependent Variables

Four dependent variables are analyzed; welfare support is
respondent's attitudes towards welfare spending (too much,
about right, too little); support for blacks is the second measure
which is used as a comparison to welfare support allowing
a test of whether changes in support for welfare paralleled
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support for race policy, thereby suggesting a tightly connected
relationship between welfare support and attitudes toward
assistance to blacks; support for education is a measure of a
respondent's support for government spending on education;
finally, Social Security as measured by support for government spending is included. Support for education and Social
Security are used to inform the analysis of overall shifts in
public support for government spending on social provision
4
programs.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Construct
De
escription

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Age

Respondents Age

46
(1741)

of129
Years
Education

Number of Years of Schooling Completed

Region

Geographical Region of Residence
0=South; 1=Non-south

Race

Dummy for Race: 0- "'tire; I-Black

Gender

Dummy for Gender: 0=Male; 1=Female; 0=Male

Employment
Status

Dummy for Employment: 0= Not in the Labor Force;
I- In the Labor Force

Year

First Survey ear Current SurveyYear

(9.04)

Democrat

Dummy for Democrat: I-Democrat; 0Republican;
0=Independent

0.40
(0.49)

Dummy for Independent:
1 Independent; 0=Republican; 0=Democrat

0.35
(0.48)

Democrat x
Survey Year'

Interaction for Dummy for Democrat and Survey
Year

4,58
(7.93)

Independent x
Survey Year'

Interaction for Dummy for Independent and Survey
Year

4.35
(8.07)

12.96

Note: N=23,577 (Entire Sample); N= 9,338 (Democrats); N= 8,193 (Independents);
N=6,046(Republicans)
*Republican x year isthe reference category for both comparisons of Democrats and
Independents.

Independent Variables
The independent variables are shown in Table 1, along with
a description of the measure and how each is coded. Consistent
with previous research, controls for age, education, gender,
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race, region, and work status were included. Political party
is measured as Democrat, Independent, or Republican. These
categories were created by merging strong and weak identifiers among both Democrats and Republicans into a single
Democrat or Republican category. To assess change in public
opinion over time, dummy variables for each year were created
along with a continuous measure of time. Interaction terms of
Democrat x year and Independent x year are included to allow
for comparison between partisan identifiers (Democrats and
Independents) compared to Republicans.
Method
Multinomial logistic regression is used to analyze changing
attitudes among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans
across each policy domain. The more common ordinary least
squares estimation was not used because it is inappropriate for
models with nominal outcomes (Long, 1997).
Results
Trends in Attitudes toward Government Spending
Attitudes towards spending differ depending on the
program. Figure 1 summarizes the percent of Americans who
believe the government is spending too much on each of the
four policy domains investigated. Attitudes toward welfare
have dramatically changed over time. There is a net decline
in the belief that the government is spending "too much,"
but also a sharp 20% upswing during the early 1990s in such
perceptions. In contrast, there has been far less variation in
the percentage of Americans who believe the government is
spending too much on assistance to blacks, education, and
Social Security. In each case, public support remains rather
steady over time.
A similar analysis was done for the "too little" category,which reveals that Americans are least likely to say that the
government is spending too little on welfare. While the percentage of Americans reporting these views changes over time,
welfare is always the least favorable expenditure out of all
social provision programs investigated. Second, Americans are
more likely to say that the government is spending too little on
education as compared to all other social provision programs.
In the 1970s, roughly 50 percent of Americans believed the
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Figure 1.General Trends Spending Preferences for the "Too Much"
Category
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government was spending too little on education. Today, that
number has grown to nearly 75 percent. Spending on Social
Security has also garnered significant levels of support. In 1984,
53 percent of Americans believed the government was spending too little on Social Security. While there was a slight dip in
support in the early 1990s, Americans' support rebounded to
over 60 percent in 2002.
Attitudes toward spending on welfare and blacks stand in
stark contrast to other forms of social service spending, having
never reached the same level of support of either education
or Social Security, even at points in time when support levels
for the latter two dipped. There are, however, some notable
differences between Americans' attitudes toward spending
on welfare and race policy. Spending on blacks garners more
support than spending on welfare and has changed only
slightly over time. For example, in 1973 support for increasing
assistance to blacks was roughly 35 percent, where it remains
today. Support for an increase in assistance to blacks did drop
to 25 percent in the early 1980s, but then steadily increased
as the 1980s progressed, and peaked at 45 percent in 1988. In
contrast, less than 30 percent of Americans believe the government is spending too little on welfare. Like attitudes toward
assistance to blacks, support for welfare was the highest in the
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1980s; however, in both the late 1970s and 1990s support for
welfare spending dropped by nearly 10 percent.
Additional analyses show changes in the belief that the
government is spending about the "right amount" on social
provision programs. While variation can be found between
the different programs, overall support for the status quo has
remained mostly stable with respect to welfare, assistance to
blacks, and Social Security. With respect to welfare spending,
there has been a slight reduction in the percentage of Americans
who support keeping welfare spending at its current level. In
1991, 37 percent of Americans felt the government was spending about the right amount. However, by 1994 this had dropped
to 25 percent and this trend appears to have shifted again
since the passage and implementation of the Welfare Reform
Act of 1996, as evidenced by the 18 percent jump in public
opinion supporting an increase in spending between 1996 and
2000. When looking at spending on blacks, the data indicates
roughly 45 percent of Americans say the government is spending about the right amount. This level of support is similar to
that for spending on social welfare, where 40 to 45 percent of
Americans favor the current level of spending. Supporting
the status quo on education, however, has decreased from 40
percent at its peak in 1973, to roughly 20 percent in 2002.
In sum, the data on the percentage of Americans' spending
preferences illustrate several trends in American public opinion
over the past 30 years. Levels of support for each social provision program differ across the four policy domains. Unlike any
other policy domain, support for welfare spending fluctuates
significantly over time and is the least supported of all of the
social provision programs. Accordingly, welfare appears to
be the one social provision program that Americans are most
willing to support changing. Spending on assistance to blacks
is also less favorable than education and Social Security for
which most Americans indicate they would prefer for the government to increase spending. Support for spending on blacks
and welfare not only lack support from most Americans, but
in the case of welfare, support levels are quite volatile. To
get a more nuanced understanding of what factors are likely
to explain these trends and how they differ among partisan
groups, I now turn to the multivariate analyses.
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Explaining Supportfor Welfare Spending
Table 2 presents the coefficients for the statistical models
applied to each policy domain. The first column presents the
model for attitudes toward welfare spending, the second for
spending on blacks, the third spending on education, and the
last reports the coefficients for spending on Social Security.
Each of the spending variables has three response categories:
spending "too little"; "about right"; and "too much." There are
two sets of coefficients presented for each model, along with
standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients
(Standard Errors In Parentheses)
(1)

elfare
Too
Little
-.10*
Constant
.13
Sociodenographic Variables
Age (in years)
-1.29'
*100
(11)
Education (in
-.
04*
ers)
(.01)
Race
1.50"
Black
(.05)
Gender
.19'
Female
(.04)
Reion
14'
South
(.05)
Work Status
- 50'
05
Emploed
Political
Partyl
.60*
Democrat
(.07)
Independent
Variable

(3)
Education,

,

About
Right
-.
51"
.12

Too
Little
-.
73*
.14

About
Right
22
_.13)

-.04
-1.28'
-.501
(.09)
(12)
(11)
.01"
.10*
.06*
(.01) (.01) (.00)

Too
Little
2.84*
(.20)

About
Right
2.81*
(.20)

(4)
Social
Securi t
Too
About
Little
Right
3,62*
1.52'
(.20)
(.20)

-3.67'
-2.60'
(.16)
(17)
.10"
-.
03*
(.01) (.00)

.351
(.19)
-.
00"
(.00)

1.97
(,19)
-.
05*
(.01)

.61"
(.05)

3.87*
(.14)

1.70
(.15)

3.88
(.14)

.95'
(.14)

.56
-.04
(.10) (.11)

.09*
(.03)

.35
(,04)

.36*
(.04)

.50'
(.05)

.45
'05)

.67'
(.06)

.40'
(06)

-.12
(.04)

-.
33*
(.05)

-.23 "
(.04)

.34'
(.05)

.15
(.07)

-.
07
(.07)

-.13
(.07)

-.37'
.04

23*
-.
(05)

-.111
(.05)

-.14 "
(.06)

-

15'
(0

-15
(.08)

-.31
(08)

.13"
(.06)

.48*
(.07)

.3

.01

.35

.07

.06

.08

-.00
(.06)
-.06
_.06}

.36*
(.09)
-.
15"
(.09)

.16
(.10)
-.16
(.10)

-.01
(.24)
-.18
.20

-.16
(.24)
-.10
.21

YearDemocrat

.01'
(00)

.01 "
(.00)

.03'
('00)

.01 "
(.00)

.04'
(.00)

.02*
('00)

.04'
(.07)

.03'
('01)

Year*
Idependent

.02*
.00

.01"
.00

.01*
.00

.01
.01)

-.
03*
(.00)

.02*
(.00)

.03*
.01

.01*
.01

Independent
Interaction Effects

Source: General Social Survey
*p < .05, 1N = 25,348; 1N = 24,341; 1N

25,694, d N = 25,340
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Effects of Sociodetnographic Characteristicson Social Spending
The effects of sociodemographic characteristics on policy attitudes are reported first. The effect of age on attitudes towards
government spending differs significantly across policy
domain. Older people are more likely than younger people to
say the government is spending too much on welfare, blacks,
and education. As might be expected, older people are also less
likely to say the government is spending too much on Social
Security as compared to too little or about the right amount.
The effect of gender on attitudes toward social spending
is consistent with previous research (Howell & Day, 2000).
Women have more liberal attitudes than men toward spending
on all policy domains. Overall, women are also more likely to
claim the government is spending too little or about the right
amount on all of the policy domains.
Blacks are considerably more favorable than non-blacks
toward spending on all policy domains. Additionally, there is
evidence of regional variation in support for social spending.
People living in the south are consistently more likely to agree
the government is spending too much as compared to too
little or about the right amount on welfare, blacks, and education, but do not differ from residents of other regions in their
support for spending on Social Security.
Employed people, as compared to people who are unemployed, retired, or in school, are more likely to agree the government is spending too much on welfare, blacks, education,
and Social Security and to say the government is spending too
much as compared to about the right amount of money on all
policies except Social Security.
While years of schooling are generally thought to have a
liberalizing effect, the results suggest this is not always the
case. Education level has a liberalizing effect with respect to
supporting spending on blacks, but in contrast, there is a conservative trend for spending on Social Security. Well-educated people are less likely to agree the government is spending
too little or about the right amount as compared to too much.
Education increases the likelihood a respondent will agree the
government is spending too much on welfare as compared to
too little. Furthermore, well-educated respondents are also
more likely to say the government is spending about the right
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amount as compared to too much on welfare policy. When
asked about spending on education, well-educated individuals are more likely to say the government is spending too little
as compared to too much. They are also less likely to say the
government is spending too much as compared to about the
right amount on education.
Effects of Political Party Affiliation on Social Spending Attitudes
Turning to the measures of partisanship, we see that
Democrats have consistently more liberal attitudes toward
government spending on welfare policy, assistance to blacks,
and education in comparison to Republicans. The greatest difference between partisan identifiers is on the issue of welfare
spending. The odds of choosing the too little option as compared to selecting the too much option for welfare spending is
1.82 times greater for Democrats than for Republicans, holding
all other variables constant. In other words, Democrats are
nearly twice as likely to believe the government is spending too little on welfare. Regarding assistance to blacks, the
odds of selecting the too little spending option as compared to
the "too much" option is 1.62 greater for Democrats as compared to Republicans, holding all other variables constant.
Again, Democrats are more likely to report that they believe
the government is spending too little on assistance to blacks.
Regarding spending on education, the odds of selecting the
too little option, as compared to too much is 1.43 times greater
for Democrats as compared to Republicans, holding all other
variables constant. However, there is no significant difference
in attitudes between Republican and Democratic identifiers regarding spending preferences toward Social Security.
Independents differ from Republicans with respect to
welfare and race policy, but only when comparing attitudes toward spending too little as compared to too much.
There is no significant difference between Independents and
Republicans when spending preferences for the about right
option is compared to the too much option. In general, the
differences in policy attitudes between Independents' views
and Republicans' views are smaller in magnitude in comparison to the earlier differences found between Democrats and
Republicans.
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Changing Preferencesamong PartisanIdentifiers
To assess changing attitudes among political party identifiers, the statistical model includes an interaction term for
Democrat x year, Republican x year, and also Independent
x year.6 The results show a statistically significant difference
between Democratic and Republican attitudes toward spending on welfare policy, race policy and education policy over
time. To elaborate on this finding, not only are there partisan
differences in social policy preferences, but also those differences have themselves changed over time.
Independents are consistently situated between Democrats
and Republicans in their attitudes toward spending preferences. As compared to Republicans, Independents are more likely
over time to favor increasing spending on welfare, race policy,
and Social Security, yet the same pattern does not hold true
for education. Over time, Independents favoring the too little
spending category has shifted in a conservative direction.
As for Democrats, the significant 0.01 coefficients for the
two response categories for the welfare item show a trend relative to Republicans. This suggests that over time Democrats
have become more supportive of both the too little and the
about right option as compared to the too much option. For
Independents, the 0.02 coefficient for the too little category and
the 0.01 coefficient for the about right category further suggests
increasing levels of support for welfare policy as compared to
Republicans.
Turning to assistance to blacks, the 0.03 interaction coefficient shows Democrats have moved (relative to Republicans)
in a more liberal direction. The 0.01 coefficient for the status
quo category also shows a smaller, yet statistically significant
trend involving a preference for the about the right option as
compared to the too much option. Similarly, this pattern holds
true for Independents.
Regarding education, Democrats have again become noticeably more favorable toward spending than Republicans
and Independents over time. As indicated by the 0.04 coefficient, there is a growing divergence between Democratic and
Republican beliefs that the government is spending too little
on education. Attitudes toward education spending are perplexing when we turn to the differences between Independents
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and Republicans. More specifically, over time, the -0.03 coefficient for the too little category suggests Independents have
become less supportive than Republicans are toward education spending, and that they have also become more likely to
favor the status quo as indicated by the 0.02 coefficient for the
about right category than are Republicans.
Democrats and Independents have become more favorable toward Social Security spending over time. The 0.04 coefficient for the too little category and the 0.03 coefficient for the
about right category indicate a growing difference in support
levels between Democrats and Republicans. Likewise, the corresponding coefficients for Independents, 0.03 for the too little
category and the 0.01 coefficient for the about right category
also indicate a persisting trend.
Trends in Policy Attitudes among Partisan Identifiers
An analysis of the predicted logits for partisan identifiers
was completed for each of the policy domains and compares
the estimated responses across the three levels of spending
preferences. 7 The novel extension of these analyses reveals a
rise in partisan divergence over time when comparing preferences for the "too little" option to the "too much" option toward
spending on assistance to blacks. From the 1970s through the
1980s support levels were on a downward trend, but in the
early 1980s support levels increased significantly. These differences continued to rise through the early 1990s at which point
support for assistance to blacks dropped and partisan divergence increased.,
The results for education differ in two respects. First, the
data suggest a generally higher level of support for education
spending among all groups, but also reveal the largest partisan
divergence, so that larger partisan differences have become
amplified over time. Whereas initially, Independents and
Republicans were fairly similar in their education spending
preferences, a growing divergence between these two partisan
groups was clearly visible by the 1990s and has consistently
become magnified since that time.
The final part of the analyses describes partisan attitudes
toward Social Security spending. The analyses suggest there
are relatively small differences among partisan identifiers;
however, it should again be emphasized that overall support
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for increasing spending is high among all three partisan
groups.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has sought to address two key questions with
respect to the nature of the relationship between public opinion
and social policy. First, did support for welfare spending
sharply decline during the period leading up to the passage
of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, which may have indicated
the public was willing to support reform? Second, to further
the literature in this area, analyses have been included to test
whether attitudes among Republicans and Democrats in favor
of cutting welfare expenditures converged or diverged prior
to the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. The results presented here
advance our understanding of how changing support for social
provision programs may signal to public officials which policies are "fair game" for retrenchment.
Beginning with the first question of whether there was a
net decline in support for welfare as compared to other social
provision programs, I find a conservative shift in spending
preferences over time, and that the American public, across
partisan identifiers, was less supportive of welfare spending in comparison to other aspects of the U.S. welfare state.
Moreover, I find that welfare was the policy domain most
vulnerable to retrenchment efforts due to the overall lack of
support among most Americans regardless of party identification. The timing in which these conservative trends became
most evident is crucial. The most notable shift in public opinion
toward welfare spending occurred during the early years of
the Clinton administration, and more specifically from 1991
to 1996. Thus, these trends may have signaled to government
representatives that AFDC was the least supported social provision program and the policy domain with falling levels of
support. These findings are not at odds with other scholarship
suggesting that shifts in public opinion may have coincided
with Clinton's anti-welfare campaign or even been somewhat
influenced by it (Schneider & Jacoby, 2005). Instead, this suggests a more nuanced explanation for why more drastic cuts
to welfare were enacted under the Clinton administration as
compared to the Reagan administration. Absent from the equa-
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tion under the Reagan administration was an overarching negativity toward welfare spending among partisan identifiers.
Specifically, the data demonstrate that among all of the social
provision programs that were on the table for reform--education, Social Security, assistance to blacks and welfare-the
one that eventually resulted in changing legislation, welfare,
required the Clinton administration to be very attuned to centrist and Republican voters, and therefore, be more strategic in
listening to only certain dimensions of public opinion and only
on a specific issue.
While these findings suggest that public opinion matters,
the analyses also show how partisanship in conjunction with
public opinion may have contributed to what appeared to
be bipartisan support for welfare reform. A partisan divide
on welfare spending during the Clinton administration may
have created further impetus for welfare reform. In general,
Democrats, Independents, and Republicans have had quite
different attitudes toward government spending on all kinds
of social provision programs over the three decades from 1973
to 2002. The partisan divide is greatest with respect to welfare
and education spending and is not nearly as large with respect
to spending on assistance to blacks or Social Security. Simply
put, some policies are more politically divisive than others,
and in turn, some issues appear to have experienced strong
partisan divergence over time.
The focus on AFDC rather than education, Social Security,
or assistance to blacks, may have been a response to declining Republican support for welfare spending rather than shifts
in Democrats' attitudes toward this issue. Rather than cut all
social programs, Democratic politicians may have focused on
AFDC in order to appeal to Republican voters. The fact that
the Clinton Administration focused on a program that was as
politically divisive as AFDC suggests the Welfare Reform Act
of 1996 was likely an attempt to reach out and garner support
from Republican and swing voters rather than members of the
core Democrat constituency.
As a final note, this analysis allowed an investigation of
how partisan identifiers reacted after the welfare legislation
was passed and implemented and results on its effectiveness
were released to the general public. Interestingly, in the years
just after the implementation of AFDC reforms, there was a
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dramatic shift in public support. In 2000, levels of support
for welfare had almost returned to the levels present during
both the Reagan era and early Clinton era when they were at
their 30-year peak. Possibly, the reforms passed were enough
to pacify most AFDC opponents. Or, alternatively, Americans
faced with inconclusive evidence of the effectiveness and implications of the reforms were again indicating to political officials the need for more change, but in the opposite direction
of the 1996 reforms. Regardless, these trends may prove to be
fruitful grounds for future research.
In conclusion, public opinion likely provided the electoral background for Clinton to enact major reforms to welfare
policy without fearing political reprisal. Possibly because of
growing animosity toward welfare spending and AFDC in
particular, it is likely that Clinton knew he would not be faced
with much of a political backlash from either his constituents
or Republicans. Unlike any other social provision program
during the 1990s, this domain of the American welfare state
was the most vulnerable to substantial reforms and retrenchment effort.
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(Endnotes)
1) While scholarship on elite theories (Zaller, 1992) posit that elites,
such as the President, are capable of manipulating or influencing public opinion, in the case of welfare, a highly salient issue in
American politics, there is a history of scholarship supporting the
argument that the main causal effects go in the other direction and
that public opinion is likely a driving force for welfare reform (Page
& Shapiro 1983; Lowery; Gray & Hager, 1989; Burstein, 1991 [1998];
Manza, Cook & Page, 2002; Wlezien & Soroka in press).
2) While the focus of this study is on variation in public opinion
among partisan identifiers leading up to the passage of the 1996
Welfare Reform Act, current GSS data allow for additional descriptive analyses regarding changes in support for welfare policy after
the implementation of the new AFDC regulations.
3) Ultimately, the 2002 data had to be excluded from the analyses
due to complications in coding the race variable. During this year
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the National Research Opinion Center allowed for respondents to
pick several different racial/ethnic identities, as such it would be difficult to make comparisons between White and Black respondents in
a consistent manner.
4) The specific wording of these variables can be found at the searchable GSS codebook at the ICPSR located at http://www.icpsr.umich.
edu/GSS/
5) For the sake of brevity, not all figures related to these analyses are
presented. However, they are available by request from the author.
6) The full model reported here also included a variable for year in
order to allow for the interpretation of the interaction effect for partisan year.
7) These analyses are available graphically by contacting the author.
8) A similar analysis was done comparing the about right option to the
too much option, and suggests that Independents and Republicans
are nearly indistinguishable from one another, while Democrats are
much more favorable of the status quo with respect to assistance to
blacks.
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Through the lens of political and moral economy, I examined
the dominant values and actors in the legislative process of the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. In my content analysis of
federal hearings, I found that witnesses from government agencies, Congress and think tanks had almost equal presence at the
hearings. Witnesses who were invited by Congress to testify at
the hearings expressed twice as much support for private interests than for the general Medicare population or low-income beneficiaries. Few expressed concern for the uninsured population.
Witnesses offered almost four times as many expressions of support for market rationalism than social insurance and three times
as many than for improving Medicare's solvency/sustainability.
The 2008 presidential candidates are split between support for
social insuranceand support for the private market. Medicare advocates will need to devote extraordinary efforts to significantly
counterweigh the strength and influence of market rationalists.
Keywords: Political economy, Moral economy, Medicare ModernizationAct of 2003, Medicare, Privatization,Market rationalism, Social insurance
Who decides, in the federal legislative process, who wins
and who loses? Is it the public through their Congressional
representatives? Is it the state, through the president and his
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administration? Or, does policy reflect the economics and politics of market rationalism and the power of corporate capital
(Estes, 2001)? The political economy model elucidates how
social policy reflects the structural arrangements of society and
the distribution of resources within it. Political elections disguise the reality that private property and capital determine
the availability of public expenditures. Estes notes that the
state is funded through and dependent on the resources generated by private profit and wealth, creating state interest in
facilitating the growth of private property. Thus the state provides business with incentives to maximize profits and imparts
limited resources to sustain the health and welfare of its citizens. Health care services, transformed into commodities, are
viewed as economic products rather than social goods.
The moral economy model provides a conceptual lens to
examine the composition of normative practices and reciprocal arrangements contextualized within shared beliefs and
values about what is socially just (Hendricks, 2005). Market
rationalists believe the market is the best social mechanism for
exchanging goods and services, assuming that competition
and profit-seeking will create fair exchange for consumers and
higher rates of return for capital (Johnson, 2000). As part of
their repertoire, market rationalists promote privatization, a
transfer of public services provided at various levels of governments to the private sector ("Privatization," 2007). Market
rationalism, which reinforces the ideals of "individualism, selfreliance, independence, and gainful productivity as a measure
of worth" (Hendricks, 2005, p. 515), is privileged in today's
political economy. In policies informed by productivity and
economic priorities, the health and well-being of individuals
and groups are cast as commodities as hegemonic interests
exert their influence on the moral codes accepted by society.
This study examines the actors and values that influenced the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) and analyzes the
results within the context of public opinion on the legislation.
After a brief review of Medicare's history in section one, including the actors involved and amendments to the program,
section two outlines the study methodology. In section three,
the research results are detailed, noting the predominance
of support for market rationalism and private interests over
concern for Medicare and its beneficiaries. Section four
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summarizes the views of providers and beneficiaries as reported in surveys and opinion polls. The paper concludes with a
discussion about the influence of the pharmaceutical industry
on the MMA legislation, the 2008 presidential candidates' platforms on health care, and a final note on the political status of
Medicare.
Medicare's History
Until the passage of Medicare in 1965, the American
Medical Association (AMA) had successfully framed any form
of national health insurance as a "first step" toward socialism
(Oberlander, 2003; Quadagno, 2005; Smith, 2002). Because of resistance from the conservative coalition that included southern
Democrats, the AMA, employer groups, insurance companies,
and some trade-unions, presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt
to John F. Kennedy were unable to garner the congressional
majority necessary to enact such legislation. Bipartisan controversy split along ideological lines in favor of market rationalism until three events happened: 1) the Democratic president
in office had a definitive social vision (the Great Society) and
powerful influence over Congress, 2) the Democrats gained
control of Congress, and 3) trade union leaders defected from
the conservative coalition. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
the Medicare legislation into law on July 30 as part of the
Social Security amendments of 1965. The Medicare program
was modeled after private health insurance plans and, despite
their misgivings, medical providers profited from Medicare.
Hospitals were reimbursed at cost plus 2% and physicians
were compensated for whatever costs the market would bear.
Health care expenditures rose dramatically. The increasing fees
along with the lack of accountability and controls in Medicare's
reimbursement process prompted administrative concern over
the program's costs and its portion of the federal budget. Yet,
attempts by the federal government to contain health care costs
via freezing price increases, utilization review boards, and professional standards review organizations were ineffectual.
Alternative payment systems were encouraged through the
Social Security Act (SSA) of 1972 and the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) Act of 1973. The 1972 SSA legislation made provisions for research and demonstration projects, waivers (dispensations from Medicare regulations) for
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experiments, and Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations.
The 1973 HMO legislation utilized the private sector approach
of payment capitation within HMOs to contain health care
costs. Capitation systems pay the provider a flat fee per enrollee over a specified time period, frequently per member
per month. Pro-market idealists favor capitation because it
encourages competition and cost-saving mechanisms among
providers.
The ideological debate on controlling health care costs
formed around pro-competition (e.g. capitation) and proregulation (e.g. fee schedules) methods (Smith, 2002). In 1982,
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the 1982 Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). In addition to introducing new cost containment methods for hospitals and physicians,
TEFRA provided incentives for HMOs to enroll Medicare beneficiaries. TEFRA was followed by the Prospective Payment
System of 1983, which based reimbursement on diagnosisrelated groups, and the Medicare Fee Schedule (part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989), which based reimbursement on resources used and work accomplished. Until
the 1990s, all major reforms except those pertaining to Medicare
HMOs followed fee scheduling and price regulation.
A major shift in program philosophy would have occurred
in 1986 with the Catastrophic Coverage Act (CCA), which
would have required beneficiaries to pay for additional benefits through self financing (Oberlander, 2003). However, the
CCA was repealed the next year due to a public misunderstanding of and ensuing opposition to the Medicare benefits
and supplemental insurance. The ideological shift from social
insurance to market rationalism did take place a decade later
when the Republicans gained control of Congress. After a
debate over Medicare's first principles, Congress created the
1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA). The BBA created Medicare
+ Choice, a new structure for private insurance plans within
Medicare that included HMOs and Medical Savings Accounts,
tax-privileged savings accounts that can be used to pay for
health care. When the private market failed to produce savings,
HMOs exited Medicare + Choice leaving beneficiaries scrambling to find replacement plans. Subsequent research showed
that over the three decades from 1970 through 2000, Medicare
was more successful than private insurance in controlling costs
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per enrollee (Boccuti & Moon, 2003). The Medicare capitation
system currently provides payments to private plans under
a diagnosis-based risk adjustment model (for more detail see
Pope et al., 2004).
Since 1995, Congress has continually increased payments
to Medicare + Choice (renamed Medicare Advantage in the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003). The siphoning off of
funds from traditional Medicare to Medicare + Choice plans
has had the effect of reducing the Medicare Trust Funds and
destabilizing the program's financing (Marmor & Mashaw,
2006). The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 was a big step
taken by market rationalists to erode Medicare's social insurance structure. Social insurance entails government responsibility for its citizens through spreading risk across a large population-rich and poor, healthy and sick-in order to reduce
financial risk to individuals. The MMA provides prescription
drug coverage to beneficiaries under Medicare (Medicare Part
D), either through stand-alone drug insurance plans for individuals wishing to remain in the traditional fee-for-service
program or through new private managed care networks (CQ
Weekly, 2003). The legislation was crafted in isolation from
Democratic opposition and passed in 2003 with support of
AARP, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), and insurance companies. In the name of improving
competition and incentives to remain in the market, subsidies
are being provided to private insurance companies and employers, and Medicare is prohibited from using its leverage
to negotiate lower drug costs. Additionally, wealthier beneficiaries are being charged additional premiums for Medicare
Part B; Health Savings Accounts (formerly Medical Savings
Accounts) are being promoted through tax incentives to those
buying individual rather than group insurance; and an alert
procedure is established for the President to notify Congress to
take action when the percentage of Medicare reimbursement
from general funds reaches 45%. The alert is sure to recur, as
traditional Medicare loses more funding through payments to
private plans and incurs greater costs by being prohibited from
using its negotiating power to achieve lower drug prices.
The crafters of the MMA, hypothetically to maintain beneficiaries' sensitivity to prescription drug costs, created a gap
(referred to as the "doughnut hole") in the Medicare Part D
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coverage. Through the doughnut hole, which begins once they
reach an initial limit of total drug expenses ($2,400 in 2007)
and ends when they reach a "catastrophic" threshold of drug
expenses for the year ($5,451 in 2007), beneficiaries receive no
prescription drug coverage. Medicare Part D beneficiaries must
continue to pay their monthly premiums through the coverage gap even though they are not receiving the drug benefit.
In 2007, the number of beneficiaries without meaningful coverage through the gap is almost 7 million (Steinberg, 2006).
Individuals with plans that do provide meaningful coverage
through the gap will experience substantial increases in their
monthly premiums at a national median of about 87%.
Estes (2005) has noted that prior to 1997, private plans were
promoted to reduce costs; in 1997 the BBA promoted private
plans to provide choice; and from 2003 forward, private plans
have been promoted as the only way to update and expand
Medicare benefits, giving greater payments and flexibility for
private plans compared to traditional Medicare.

Methodology
Scholars contend that legislative hearing testimonies are
used as a key method to influence legislation and that such testimonies are reflected in policy options, which can be conceptualized as "sets of value priorities and causal assumptions"
(Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Knoke, 2001; Sabatier & JenkinsSmith, 1993, p. 16). Via a content analysis of federal hearings
on the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, this study identified: a) the actors who were invited by Congress to provide testimonies; and b) the recurring values that the actors expressed
in their testimonies.
Sample
Testimonies are the unit of analysis in this study. The study
analyzed the distribution of testimonies available through
the Lexis-Nexis Congressional Information System electronic
hearing database. All testimonies available in the database
were collected using the following criteria: a) they occurred
between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003, the date
when the legislation was enacted; b) they were listed under the
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subject heading search term "Medicare Modernization Act";
and c) the hearing specifically addressed Medicare reform.
Witnesses were identified over the entire study period January
1, 1999 through December 13, 2003. The testimonies selected
for coding were presented to Congress in 2000 and 2001, the
years that contained the greatest frequency of testimonies. The
coded sample comprised half (n=90) of the total number of testimonies (n=180).
Data Analysis
Atlas.ti, a content analysis software package, was used to
measure values by outright expression or times mentioned by
witnesses in their testimonies. The testimonies were examined
based on their thematic cohesion within two ideological categories, market rationalism and social insurance. The market
rationalism category comprised values that included: a) relief
from government regulations, b) control of national health
care by private interests, c) individual choice, control, and
self-responsibility/assumption of risk, d) generational equity,
and e) market solutions [e.g. competition, means testing and
reducing entitlement benefits], and f) the use of managed care,
pharmacy benefit managers and formularies to reduce costs.
The social insurance category comprised values such as such
as: a) support for traditional Medicare; b) citizen entitlement to
the earned benefit; c) benefit adequacy and accessibility; d) intergenerational interdependence; e) shared responsibility/ risk
pooling, and f) government solutions [e.g. use of government
leverage, administration, regulation and oversight to reduce
costs].
Results
The study involved: a) identifying and classifying the witnesses who testified in the years 1999 through 2003; b) identifying and classifying the population sub-groups who received
the witnesses' expressed support; and c) coding the value
domains that were consistently expressed by witnesses in their
testimonies in the years 2000 and 2001. The witnesses were
categorized into four major affiliation groups: 1) government
agencies (n=38); 2) US Congress (n=38); 3) think tanks/interest groups [hereinafter think tanks for brevity] (n=36); and 4)
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assorted private interests (n=50) [comprised of witnesses from
health insurance (n=15), healthcare providers (n=10), business
(n=10), pharmaceuticals (n=8), and pharmacy/pharmacists
(n=7)]. The remaining seven witnesses were from state government (n=3) or did not indicate affiliation with any organization
(n=4).
As depicted in Figure 1, witnesses expressed support for
three major population groups in their 2000 and 2001 testimonies: 1) private plans (n=64) [in general (n=31), orby type (n=33)
which included pharmaceuticals (n=10), healthcare providers
(n=9), pharmacies or pharmacists (n=7), and insurers (n=7)1;
2) the entire Medicare population (n=29); and 3) low-income
Medicare beneficiaries (n=29). Just under half (46%) of the witnesses expressed support for market solutions; 27% expressed
support for regulatory relief/flexibility; a quarter (24%) expressed support for individual control/choice. Twenty-eight
percent supported government solutions and just over a third
(34%) expressed a desire to improve Medicare's solvency/sustainability. Few supported complete private control over the
drug benefit.
Figure 1: Number of MMA witnesses (n=90) expressing support for
selected population sub-groups
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Of the witnesses at the 2000 and 2001 hearings, those associated with government agencies expressed the greatest
support for market solutions (65%); over half (53%) of whom
also expressed concern for Medicare's solvency/sustainability
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(see Figure 2). More than half (n=54%) of the witnesses from
think tanks expressed support for market solutions. Of the
congressional witnesses, close to half (45%) expressed concern

for program solvency/sustainability, a third (33%) supported
market solutions, and over a quarter (28%) expressed support
for individual control/choice, regulatory relief/flexibility or
government solutions. Six of the 10 witnesses associated with
health insurance expressed support for regulatory relief/flexibility and half (50%) supported individual control/choice in
their health plans. Witnesses associated with health insurance
expressed no support for government solutions. Two-thirds
(66%) of the witnesses representing healthcare providers expressed support for market solutions, and half (50%) supported private control and regulatory relief/flexibility. A majority
of academic witnesses expressed support for government solutions (50%). All of the witnesses from pharmaceutical companies expressed support for market solutions, and most (80%)
supported regulatory relief/flexibility as well as individual
control/choice. Close to two-thirds (60%) of the witnesses who
were associated with pharmacies expressed support for government solutions. Witnesses from businesses expressed some
support for three values: 20% each for regulatory relief/flexibility, market solutions, or government solutions.
Public Opinion
Public opinion on the MMA through 2004 has been mixed
(Shaw & Mysiewicz, 2004). Initially (1999-2001), most respondents from multiple surveys expressed high support (between
70% and 74%) for a prescription drug benefit, even if it meant
additional premiums. Opinion was split on whether the
benefit should be provided by government or through individuals paying private plan premiums. After the MMA passed
(2003/2004), about one-half of respondents stated they felt the
MMA would help drug companies more than Medicare beneficiaries. From one-half to two-thirds felt the program did not go
far enough and from one-quarter to one-third stated they felt
the MMA would help beneficiaries.
The Kaiser Family Foundation surveyed respondents'
perceived effects of the MMA on beneficiaries (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2007a; Kaiser Family Foundation & Harvard
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Figure 2: Number of MMA witnesses (n=85), by affiliation, who
expressed support for selected values; nonaffiliated (n=3) and state
government (n=2) excluded.
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ries save money, especially individuals with low incomes. Yet
they also said the plan was too complicated and that it benefits

health plans and drug companies too much. Pharmacists said
the plan works well at getting beneficiaries access to prescription drugs they need, however, almost a quarter said "most"
and about half said "some" of their clients had problems filling
prescriptions. As of November, 2006 most Medicare beneficiaries who signed up for the prescription plans were pleased.
Ninety percent of seniors favored allowing the government
to negotiate with drug companies for lower prices. Sixty-five
percent favored spending more federal money to get rid of the
existing coverage gap. Adults ages 18 and older agreed that
improving coverage for the uninsured and reducing health
care costs should top the health care agenda for Congress and
the President in 2007.
In summary, during the 1999 through 2003 MMA
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hearings, witnesses from government agencies, Congress and
think tanks had almost equal presence. Overall, witnesses expressed twice as much support for private interests than for the
general Medicare population or low-income beneficiaries. Few
expressed concern for the uninsured population. Witnesses
offered almost four times as many expressions of support for
market rationalism than for social insurance and three times
as many than they did for improving Medicare's solvency/
sustainability. Because of their greater frequency in providing
testimonies at the hearings, witnesses from Congress, government agencies and think tanks provided most of the expressions of support for market rationalism. Witnesses from health
insurance companies also expressed overwhelming support
for market rationalism and almost no support for social insurance and, although their number was small, witnesses
from pharmaceuticals gave eight times as many expressions
of support for market rationalism than for social insurance.
Across various polls and surveys, the public and their providers appeared mostly to be pleased with the MMA, although
they felt the prescription benefit provided too much to the
drug companies. Almost all seniors favored allowing the government to negotiate with drug companies for lower prices
and most favored spending more federal money to close the
existing coverage gap. Adults of all ages felt Congress and the
President should prioritize helping the uninsured gain coverage as well as lowering health care costs.
Discussion
Economic, social and historical events affected Medicare's
inception and subsequent reforms. Wars, demographics,
changes in private industry, and public misunderstanding of
the program affected the legislative processes. Yet, dominant
political and economic interests through the vehicles of government agencies and congressional majorities have had the
greatest influence. The ideological shifts of those involved in
Medicare's legislation impacted the policy options that were
proposed and implemented. Invited by Congress to testify at
hearings, private interests (including health insurance, healthcare providers, business, pharmaceuticals, and pharmacies)
were the largest group of witnesses at the MMA hearings. The
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next largest group, outside the federal government, was comprised of witnesses from think tanks. It is not surprising, then,
that the witnesses expressed the greatest support, by far, for
private interests and market rationalism. Future research might
clarify the existence and memberships of advocacy coalitions
in the Medicare policy domain. A cluster analysis of the total
number of witnesses identified in the MMA hearings (n=180),
based on the values they expressed in their testimonies, would
be helpful in determining members of the advocacy coalitions
for social insurance and market rationalism. Further, a media
analysis of the terminology framing the need for Medicare
reform (e.g. "crisis," "socialized medicine," individual choice
and control, personal responsibility, big government) could
signal ideological alignments.
A question arose from the study as to why the results indicated that few witnesses from PhRMA testified before Congress
on the MMA, a topic of great importance to it. Research by
Michael Heaney (2006) provided an explanation. Heaney interviewed 95 congressional members, including Republicans and
Democrats from the House and Senate as well as senior, junior,
committee and personal congressional staff (49 Republicans
and 46 Democrats; 62 House and 33 Senate; 45 senior staff
and 50 junior staff; 18 committee staff and 77 personal staff).
Heaney's respondents stated that PhRMA topped the list of the
most influential groups in Congress (followed by the AMA,
AARP, and the American Hospital Association). One of his
principal findings was that although influence over healthcare policy is widely dispersed among many groups, size and
money make a big difference. No other industry has spent
more money to sway public policy over the past seven years
than PhRMA (Ismail, 2005). In 2003, the year that the MMA
was passed, PhRMA spent $116 million lobbying government.
Moreover, 52% of the lobbyists were former federal officials.
PhRMA's efforts have resulted in favorable tax laws, price containment, and industry-friendly regulatory policy at the FDA.
Indeed, the U.S. government contributes more money to developing new drugs in the form of tax breaks and subsidies,
than any other government.
The cost of prescription drugs is rising rapidly for consumers. Over the seven years 2000 through 2006, the manufacturers'
list prices of 153 widely used name brand drugs increased an
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average of almost 54% annually; a cost increase of $368.00 over
the seven-year period (Gross, Gross Purvis, & Schondelmeyer,
2007a). In 2006, the list prices increased an average of 6.2%,
almost twice the rate of inflation. On the other hand, manufacturer's list prices for 75 widely used generic drugs increased
a cumulative 28% from 2001 through 2003 compared to a cumulative inflation rate of about 7% and decreased a cumulative 4% during the years 2004 through 2006 compared to a

cumulative inflation rate of about 9% (Gross, Gross Purvis, &
Schondelmeyer, 2007b). Nevertheless, any trend in savings on
generic drugs is likely to be offset, either by out-of-pocket costs
paid through the Medicare Part D coverage gap, or by increases in the premiums paid for meaningful coverage through the
gap.
Drug prices are pushed by utilization (influenced by direct
to consumer advertising), price (reflective of manufacturer
pricing of new drugs, changes in pricing for existing drugs,
and profit margins), and changes in types of drugs used
(newer more costly drugs and fewer FDA approvals than a
decade ago) [Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007b]. Proponents of
the MMA say costs will be offset by increased availability of
prescription drugs in general, increased use of generics, more
people covered under tiered co-pay plans, and a shift to overthe-counter status. Alternately, opponents say that costs will
continue to increase because the MMA promotes a dynamic of
risk segmentation, not risk pooling (Marmor & Mashaw, 2006).
In the health insurance industry, plans compete on price and
coverage for healthy beneficiaries. The MMA legislation shifted
expenses from the private sector and Medicaid to Medicare,
increasing the cost of the program to the federal government
and thus taxpayers. As healthy individuals are siphoned off
into private plans, the pool of insured people remaining in the
traditional program increasingly will become more risky and
more costly. Funds paid for plans to participate in the private
market will be unavailable to support the traditional program.
As a result, traditional Medicare will look more costly and
financially unstable because individuals who are high risk
have been separated from those who are low risk.
Providing health insurance and slowing health care
costs are top issues in the 2008 presidential campaign (Davis
& Collins, 2007). Democratic candidates Clinton, Edwards
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and Obama envision expanding health insurance coverage
by spreading risk over large groups, generating efficiencies
through employer-based plans, and building on the success of
public programs. In contrast, Republican candidates Romney
and Giuliani foresee tax incentives to persuade individuals
to purchase personal health insurance coverage, eliminating
state regulation of private insurance, and expanding coverage without increasing the federal budget. Romney proposes a
"federalist" approach that would encourage states to develop
their own market-based reforms. To improve the efficiency
and quality of the health system, the three Democratic candidates foresee utilizing pay-for-performance strategies, soliciting comparative effectiveness research, and promoting models
that improve the chronic disease management as well as addressing health disparities. Candidates on both sides anticipate
pursuing preventative health care, promoting transparency in
health information technology, and disseminating information
on plans and providers.
As long as market rationalists have the greatest influence
over Medicare legislation, there is little likelihood that maintaining Medicare's social insurance structure and principles
will counterbalance politically impelled economic concerns.
Increasing health and prescription drug costs are reflected not
only in Medicare but in private plans as well. Medicare's relative success in controlling costs makes it apparent that rhetoric about the efficiency of the private market is ideologically
motivated. The values underlying the MMA, such as competition, individual choice and control, personal responsibility,
and incentives for private plans, primes the Medicare program
for massive reform in the form of privatization. Already the
Bush administration is proposing to means test the prescription drug benefit through higher premiums and deductibles
on individuals with upper-incomes, which would hasten
the reduction of Medicare's traditional risk pool (Weisman,
2007). To be significant counterweights to market rationalists, supporters of traditional Medicare will need to be smart
organizers and savvy framers of social insurance ideals as well
as to continue building and strengthening their advocacy coalitions. In the media, all sides extol their concern for Medicare
beneficiaries, rarely mentioning their own financial and political self-interests (Espo, 2007). Democratic presidential
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candidates can facilitate the repeal or modification of the MMA
and encourage legislation toward universal health care by embracing social insurance ideals and bringing them to the forefront in their 2008 debates.
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Housing policy is the result of a complex exchange among
economic, political, and social agendas competing for attention within the multiple levels of local, state, and federal governments. Missing in recent history is the commitment for a
"...decent and suitable living environment for every American
family" as specified in the Housing Act of 1949 (Orlebeke, 2000,
p. 489). Instead, current housing policy reflects the dynamic
tensions between a capitalistic economy and the shelter needs
of those in vulnerable economic conditions or those who may
be unable to sustain or afford accommodations.
This article intends to capture what we consider a few of the
significant initiatives since 1980 that reflect these tensions and
comprise our current housing policies and directions. Many of
these programs are the result of legislation and social upheavals that occurred prior to the Reagan Administration. Their
impact, however, has had lasting implications and has set the
course for our housing policy today. Therefore, we will begin
with a brief review of key events that shaped the direction of
housing policy prior to the Reagan Administration. (Critiques
of these events are readily available in the literature.) We will
discuss significant housing policies that have emerged since
1980. Finally, we will offer our thoughts on what the housing
policy issues may be for the next presidential administration
beginning in the year 2009.
The Emergence of Housing as a National Goal
A fundamental economic and social principle embedded
in the American psyche remains the value of shelter. This
commodity provides access to assets, goods, self-sustainability, and self-esteem (Bratt, 2002). However, obtaining shelter
is not an easy feat. Within the context of this article, we note
that race, gender, socio-economic status, language proficiency,
immigration category, and residency location have been and
continue to act as barriers to obtaining housing and, in particular, to property ownership. In addition, we acknowledge that
these factors are mitigated by and embedded within larger societal forces. To discuss the impact of each of these issues is
beyond the scope of this work; however, it is not surprising
that the role of the federal government in interceding to ensure
that shelter is available to all citizens can be traced back to the
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economic conditions of the 1930s (Colton, 2003).
During that decade, several important initiatives were
started that serve as the foundations for current housing policy.
Briefly, these included the National Housing Act of 1934, which
created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and subsequent enhanced mortgage insurance options for single family
dwellings and multiple family complexes; the Housing Act of
1937, which sanctioned a public housing program that set limits
on rental rates for low-income individuals and conditions for
administration of such programs; and the 1938 amendments to
the National Housing Act which created Fannie Mae, thereby
establishing a mechanism to provide a consistent stream of
mortgage monies into what is now known as the secondary
housing market.
In tandem with the expanding role of government in the
financing, demolition, rehabilitation, and/or production of
physical housing units, the effects of World War II on the citizens of this country demanded legislative action. In particular,
the housing needs of returning soldiers and their place in the
urban workforce received the most attention (Colton, 2003).
The result was the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, landmark legislation which fundamentally redefined the role of
the government with respect to shelter. According to Orlebeke
(2000), this legislation marked the beginning of federal consideration of issues such as "...defining who besides the immediately desperate might receive housing assistance, what
form such assistance might take and for what types of 'decent'
housing, and who should be administratively responsible for
running the system" (p. 480).
In the following decade, federal efforts were focused on
urban renewal and redevelopment efforts. These included programs to develop nonresidential areas, provision of relocation
monies to those displaced by renewal efforts, and financial incentives for acquiring property to proceed with renewal efforts.
In 1959, local housing authorities were given the ability to
assign flexible rents within their properties, allowing access to
dwellings previously unavailable to those of very low income.
However, despite ambitious goals set by various legislations,
housing for low-income households remained in short supply
(Colton, 2003).
By the 1960s, with the explosion of social activism in
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numerous arenas and the returning focus on poverty, renewed
attention to the importance of housing and the conditions
of these properties emerged (Erickson, 2006). In 1965, the
various federal administrative entities which oversaw individual segments of housing issues were joined under a new
cabinet level organization, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). Emphasis on housing production, federal below-market interest rate financing for private
and nonprofit builders of low-to-moderate income housing,
and rental subsidy programs were implemented as strategies
to address many of the issues raised during these times. In addition, during this decade, governments' role in housing was
recognized and intrinsically linked by the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. In Title III of this Act, issues of fair housing
practices are addressed "...making it unlawful to refuse to sell,
rent, or make a dwelling unavailable to any person because
of race, color, religion or national origin, or to deny a loan or
other financial assistance for the purchase, construction, repair,
or maintenance of a dwelling" (Colton, 2003, p. 218).
The emphasis on housing policies changed again under
the Nixon administration. Budget issues, media attention to
failing public housing entities and abuses in other HUD programs, and organizational consolidation of housing programs
helped to create the conditions for a two year moratorium regarding housing policy. However, emerging out of this hiatus
was the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.
The legacy of this legislation remains influential in current
housing policy programs. Included in this law was the origination of a "certificate program" which serves as a basis for the
current Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8) program, the establishment of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG
funds) to assist local governments with redevelopment efforts,
and the end of government building of public housing (Colton,
2003; Erickson, 2006). Other significant policies during this
decade are the 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
a policy implemented to address (among other things) the
then common practice of "redlining" by mortgage lenders or
banks, followed by the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), which "encouraged" lenders to serve underserved
communities (Collins, 2007, p. 69). Although President Carter
was a strong advocate for supporting housing developments
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for low-income individuals through self-help neighborhood
established, nonprofit programs (Marcuse, & Keating, 2006),
he failed to recognize the potential for the extreme profitability
for developers in producing specific types of housing stock for
low-income housing in private-public partnerships, a condition which remains today (Orlebeke, 2000).
In summary, the emergence of housing as an issue associated with the well-being of a civil and democratic society is
closely linked to the economic and social turmoil in past history.
Within these periods, strategies for addressing housing needs,
particularly for low-income persons, have reflected the prevailing view of the Presidential political party. Perhaps due to this,
approaches to shelter policies reflect a mix of public-private
market incentives (especially for those in the housing industry
and in community redevelopment), favorable tax policies for
certain types of dwellers and dwellings, and a decreased emphasis on the housing needs of those unable to sustain participation in the economy.
The ongoing evolution of housing policy is dependent on
the resolution of the varying approaches to the following policy
questions: 1) Should public entities or the private sector build
housing? 2) Should assistance target suppliers of housing or be
provided directly to tenants? 3) How large should subsidies be
and who should be targeted? and 4) Should programs support
rental options or homeownership?
Support for the Private Market
As Reagan entered office, it was evident that housing issues
had at least two influential lobby groups which those making
policy had to consider. These were the housing industry and
tax policy groups. A signature document reflecting the direction of housing policy under the Reagan Administration is the
1982 President's Commission on Housing. As a supply-side
conservative, Reagan did not support federal construction programs for public housing, favored privatizing public housing,
and increasingly cut HUD's budget for new commitments to
housing (Johnson, 1991).
With increased pressure from housing advocates pushing
for support for low-income dwellings, by 1985, the Housing
Choice Voucher (Section 8) certificate program begun in the
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1970s was expanded. In this program, a participant with a certificate was able seek a place to live in an approved private
market housing dwelling and only pay the difference between
the voucher value and the rental rate. All participants accepted
into this program had to (and continue to) meet certain income
requirements and properties available to certificate holders
must have rents below a specified threshold and be approved
by the local public housing authority.
Clearly, what emerged under this administration was the
reliance on individual income to support housing needs and
the private housing market to supply available units. However,
what was neglected during this time was the construction of
units specifically for those with low-to-modest incomes or
those who were socially and/or economically vulnerable and
could not participate in the workforce. The shortage of affordable housing was beginning. Subsequent legislation only exacerbated the problem.
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program Operations
(LIHTC Program)
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 dealt a severe blow to the building of commercial real estate, which includes rental housing
units. Prior to 1986, several tax incentives existed to encourage
the provision of rental housing. Generally, these involved the
opportunity for property owners to claim (for tax purposes)
that a building was depreciating at a faster rate than the actual
economic and physical deterioration of the property and to
deduct this depreciation amount from income earned by the
property in calculating the tax liability for the year.
The accelerating of depreciation deductions for tax proposes resulted in the ability of property owners to claim negative earnings from a property and reduce their tax bill on other
income. Negative taxable income was allowed by the tax law,
despite the fact that the building, without the depreciation,
generated a positive cash flow. Further, when the building
was sold, net proceeds from the sale were taxed a lower rate
than other income earned by the investor, furthering the tax
advantage of owning rental housing. Preferential treatment for
rental housing investment was ended in 1986. Elimination of
these tax incentives reduced the enticement to invest in rental
housing. In their place, the Tax Reform Act created the Low
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Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. With modifications, the LIHTC program was consistently renewed by
Congress, and Congress legislated permanent status for the
program in 1993.
The LIHTC program has replaced not only prior tax incentives for low income rental housing but other subsidy programs
for low income housing construction as well. For example, the
Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation
program, also known as project based Section 8, was cancelled.
The Section 8 program provided commitments to developers
of affordable housing that rent would be subsidized in their
units and that these payments would be made on units even
if the units were not occupied. Further, the LIHTC program
shifted the trend of federal low income housing policy, which
had been moving toward providing assistance through direct
(or "demand side") subsidies to tenants (i.e., Section 8 vouchers and certificates). Instead, the LIHTC program provides investor tax incentives (i.e., "supply side" subsidies). But also
note that the program provides no direct subsidy to developers of affordable housing, only a tax incentive.
The operations of this program can be daunting (McClure,
2000). We will highlight a few of its features. The LIHTC
program provides a "tax credit" rather than an income deduction as an incentive for rental housing property owners. A
credit is a direct reduction of taxes owed, rather than an offset
against income prior to calculating taxes. For new construction and substantial rehabilitation projects, the tax credit is
approximately 9 percent of the development cost of a project
excluding the cost of land, acquisition of an existing property,
projects financed with tax-exempt bonds, or those receiving
below-market rate loans from a federal source.
The tax credit is taken each year for ten years. In return for
receiving the credit, the developer must ensure that the project
continuously satisfies restricted-income criteria for at least 15
years and, after 1989, for 30 years. However, after 15 years the
owners may notify the state administrative agency of their intention to begin renting the units at market determined rates.
Once notified, the state has one year to find a buyer willing to
maintain the restricted income occupancy and pay a price for
the project determined by a statutory formula. If the state does
not find such a buyer and the project is converted to a market-
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rate project, current tenants must be allowed to maintain their
status for a period of three years.
The income and rent restrictions that developer/owners of
tax credit properties must meet are as follows: First, at least 20
percent of the units must be occupied by tenants whose income
is less than 50 percent of the metropolitan area's median family
income, or 40 percent of the units must be occupied by tenants
with income less than 60 percent of the metro area median.
Second, maximum allowable rents on the units against which
the tax credits are claimed are constrained by the level of the
median income in the metropolitan area. More specifically, allowable rents are capped at what a household with the
maximum qualifying income in the area could afford if it paid
30 percent of its income for rental housing (including tenant
paid utility expenses). For example, if the developer has chosen
to meet the 40%-60% units-income standard, the maximum allowable rent is equal to the amount a household-with income
equal to 60 percent of the area median-would spend on rent if
30 percent of household income is devoted to rent. In practice,
most projects include 100 percent of the units with rents at the
60 percent of median income standard.
It is important to note that allowable rents are not based
on the household income of the tenant(s) occupying the unit.
Rather, they are based on the area's median household income.
Thus, the program does not guarantee that an individual
household will not have to pay more than 30 percent of its
gross income in rental expenses. Instead, the program guarantees that rental expenses will not exceed the level considered
to be affordable by standards within the overall area (McClure,
2000). This is what is referred to as a "shallow subsidy." This
implies that households at the lowest income levels pay
a greater share of their income toward rent. In contrast, the
Section 8 program provides a deep subsidy because the subsidy
isbased on tenant income and assures that the tenant pays no
more than 30 percent of income toward housing costs. Further,
the shallow nature of the subsidy is most severe for very low
income households in high median income metropolitan statistical areas because maximum rents, based on area median
incomes, are highest in those areas.
Additional subsidy from federal, state, or local sources is
often needed for a viable LIHTC project. Many projects require
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substantial amounts of federal and state-funded special financing, making the burden of administrative compliance substantial for projects using multiple funding sources.
Although the subsidy to investors is provided entirely
through the federal income tax system, LIHTC programs are
administered through state-level government agencies, generally the state housing finance agency. Developers/inestors
seeking tax credits for their projects must apply to the state
administrative agency. Tax credit bidders are put through a
competitive evaluation process. After a successful bidder is
"allocated" his/her credits, the development or rehabilitation
completed, and the completed project occupied by tenants, the
program begins to grant 4 percent or 9 percent credits against
the property owners' federal income tax liabilities.
As discussed above, because most units are built with rents
near the maximum allowable, the LIHTC program does not
meet the needs of the households with the greatest housing
needs as consistently shown by HUD studies, those with
incomes below 30 percent of area median income. The 60 percent
of median income standard for the LIHTC program translates
into qualifying income exceeding $30,000 in a number of metropolitan areas and approaching $40,000 in some. Households
occupying such units would require additional subsidy assistance such as a Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8) to keep
their expenditures on housing below the 30 percent of income
standard commonly thought to be the maximum that should
be spent on housing.
Homelessness
While major changes were occurring in the areas of tax
reform to support private developers and real-estate initiatives during the 1980s, a convergence of social problems led
to the increasingly visible number of homeless individuals
on the streets, especially within urban centers. However, the
presidential response was to cast the issue of homelessness in
terms of the failure of the individual rather than systemic problems, such as inadequate social services resources to meet the
need of this population or the insufficient supply of affordable
housing or shelters (Marcuse & Keating, 2006). Unfortunately,
this philosophy remains dominant despite numerous scholarly reports documenting the struggles of this population and
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the complexity of their service and housing needs (Burt, Aron,
& Lee, 2001; Burt, Hedderson, Zweig, Ortiz, Aron-Turnham, &
Johnson, 2004; Wright, Rubin, & Devine, 1998)
Yet back in 1987, despite unenthusiastic presidential
support, the Democratic Congress was able to push through
what remains to date as the only major legislation focusing on
housing and homelessness-McKinney Homeless Assistance
Act-now known as the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance
Act. Currently, there are nine programs in the Act that describe
a range of services including emergency food and shelter
support, transitional housing programs, guidelines for surplus
land or property use, health care programs, and supportive
work programs (National Coalition for the Homeless, 2006).
However, this legislation was never intended to eradicate the
many underlying causes of homelessness or address the shortage of affordable housing units. Rather it was and remains a
beginning step to launch targeted efforts to address the continuing and growing problem of sustained homelessness in the
country. According to the latest Annual Homeless Assessment
Report to Congress, it can be estimated that approximately
313,000 to 415,000 persons are homeless on any given day (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2007a).
The Re-Emergence of Housing in the 1990s
As the last decade of the 2 0 1h century began, the federal government continued to remove itself from the public housing
sphere and to support private-based housing options. The influence of the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez Affordable Housing
Act, which established the HOME Investment Partnership
Program, provided various opportunities for low-income
rental tenants in the housing market, including the ability of
public housing residents to use subsidies to rent or purchase
homes on the private market and support services to promote
homeownership as a goal for all households (Carliner, 1998).
Further, the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere
(HOPE VI) program provided for the revitalization of federally-backed public housing in partnership with private and local
government entities to support the housing needs of a select
group of low-income individuals and families and those of
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will be discussed next.
Housing Opportunitiesfor People Everywhere Program
(HOPE VI)
The HOPE VI program was a response to a 1992 report to
Congress by the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing. In this report, the Commission estimated
that 86,000 of the existing 1.4 million units of public housing
were in severely distressed condition. Their recommendation
was to demolish these units and replace them over a ten-year
period at a cost of $7.5 billion (in 1992 dollars). The program,
administered by HUD, is intended to improve the living environment for residents of severely distressed public housing,
as well as to contribute to the revitalization of surrounding
neighborhoods (Finkel, Lennon & Eisenstadt, 2000; Popkin,
Katz, Cunningham, Brown, Gustafson, & Turner, 2004a;
Salama, 1999). The program follows a mixed-finance model
where public funds are leveraged by private investment and
nonprofit participation to create new housing opportunities.
HOPE VI developments may include not only public housing
units, but also units funded through other public programs
(such as the LIHTC) and market-rate units funded solely by
private investment. In addition, some HOPE VI developments
include opportunities for homeownership.
Expected residents of these properties included former
public housing residents, those individuals or families participating in the Housing Choice Vouchers (Section 8) program,
and individuals who would pay market rate for a dwelling.
This program also includes case management and supportive services for specific groups of residents, including those
former public housing residents returning to live in the housing
complex.
The mixed-income approach to housing is a fundamental component of the HOPE VI program. It is based in large
part on the work of sociologist William Julius Wilson. In his
1987, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass,
and Public Policy, Wilson describes an underclass culture existing in many inner-city neighborhoods. The underclass culture
includes weak labor force participation, high rates of welfare
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receipt, teenage pregnancy, drug use and violent crime. He attributes this phenomenon to the lack of middle- and workingclass residents to serve as role models and the absence of important institutions within the community, such as schools and
name-brand stores (Epp, 1996; Popkin, Levy, Harris, Comey,
& Cunningham, 2004b; Wilson, 1987). The HOPE VI mixedincome approach was intended to be a policy remedy for the
conditions that have contributed to the isolation of poor minorities in the inner city.
By early 2007, more than $6.2 billion' in HOPE VI funding
had been allocated, although funding levels experienced
a marked decline in federal fiscal years 2004, 2005 and 2006
when compared with earlier years in the program's history
(U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2007).
The decline in funding is attributable to rising federal budget
deficits and efforts by the current Bush administration to terminate the program.
Belmont Heights Estates in Tampa, Florida, provides a
HOPE VI example. This redevelopment effort began in 1997
with the Tampa Housing Authority's successful application for
$32.5 million in HOPE VI funding. The redeveloped community replaced 1,300 units of severely distressed, barracks-style
public housing where only the most impoverished households
lived with 789 units of mixed-income housing in attractive and
varied designs. Also, there were a limited number of specially
designed units to accommodate the needs of older adults or
those with disabilities. Residents of this community included
former public housing tenants from the demolished community, Housing Choice Voucher recipients, and others able to afford
market rate rentals. The redevelopment effort also included
opportunities for qualified low-income households to build
their financial knowledge and social and economic capacity to
move toward homeownership to affordable detached homes
in the community (Fogel, Smith & Williamson, in press-a).
This HOPE VI program has been credited with significant
reductions in crime and increased property values in the surrounding Belmont Heights neighborhood. Further, the effort to
mix individuals and families based on incomes has also been
successful (Shimberg Center, 2006). Residents in this community reported feeling safer, trusting their neighbors, and
an increased appreciation for how their community looks to
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others (Fogel, Smith & Williamson, in press-a). These findings
are similar to other reports evaluating HOPE VI communities,
although generalizing findings from one site to other should
be done cautiously, as each HOPE VI community has unique
characteristics (Fosburg, Popkin & Locke, 1996; Popkin, Levy,
Harris, Comey, Cunningham, Buron, & Woodley, 2002).
HOPE VI has been credited with considerable success.
By mid-2003, 60,580 severely distressed public housing units
had been demolished (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 12).
In many instances, HOPE VI redevelopment efforts replaced
distressed housing with new, high-quality developments representing innovations in design, management and financing.
Many former public housing residents have been able to use
Housing Choice Vouchers (Section 8) to relocate to improved
housing in safer areas. Further, HOPE VI redevelopment has
led to wider revitalization efforts in many neighborhoods
surrounding the former sites of distressed public housing.
Improvements in many instances include dramatically reduced
crime rates and the construction of new community centers,
revitalized parks and other community facilities (Fogel, Smith,
& Williamson, in press-a; General Accounting Office, 2003;
Naparstek, Freis, Kingsley, Dooley, & Lewis, 2000; Popkin, et
al., 2004a; Zielenbach, 2002).
Achieving such successes has not, however, been without
its challenges. HOPE VI implementation has generated concern
about the impact of relocation on original residents, decreasing
numbers of deeply subsidized housing units and the failure of
some housing authorities to effectively implement the program
(Clampet-Lundquist, 2004; General Accounting Office, 2003;
Popkin, et al., 2004a; Popkin, et al., 2004b). Many relocated
residents were simply moved to other public housing developments; thus, relocation has done little, if anything, to reduce
the concentration of poverty or racial segregation they experience. Those who are hard-to-house due to mental illness,
physical disabilities, large families, or being custodial grandparents may be especially likely to relocate and stay at their
temporary housing site rather than moving to the new HOPE
VI community (General Accounting Office, 2003; Popkin, et
al., 2004a). Therefore, as access to HOPE VI property diminishes for some, the concentration of poverty and households
with various problems increases at remaining public housing
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developments in the area (Clampet-Lindquist, 2004).
Another problem is arises for some who have relocated
using vouchers. For instance, former residents may face higher
housing costs due to paying utilities on the private market,
as well as problems finding landlords willing to accept the
voucher. They may also find it difficult to use the vouchers in
areas where an adequate supply of moderately priced rental
housing is not available (General Accounting Office, 2003;
Popkin, et al., 2004a).
Further, while HOPE VI implementation has demolished a
substantial proportion of the 86,000 severely distressed public
housing units identified in the Commission's 1992 report and
is responsible for the construction of a large number of affordable rental units, the majority of the new units are not deeply
subsidized (as are public housing units). In results reported
for mid-2003, the General Accounting Office indicated that less
than one-third of the 60,580 of the demolished public housing
units had been replaced with new public housing units. Other
HOPE VI units were either provided with shallow subsidies
(such as the LIHTC, which sets tenant rents based on area
median incomes rather than actual tenant incomes) or at market
rates. Therefore, the number of units affordable to households
below the federal poverty level has been significantly decreased by the HOPE VI program (General Accounting Office,
2003; Schwartz, 2006).
Finally, although many housing authorities have been successful in redeveloping demolished public housing within
a reasonable period of time, others have been plagued with
delays associated with local political controversies, litigation
and inefficient timelines for the expenditure of HOPE VI funds
(Popkin, et al., 2004a). Delays in redeveloping some HOPE
VI sites have opened the program to criticism about lack of
program effectiveness.
Despite concerns raised by tenant relocation issues and
ineffective implementation on the part of some housing authorities, HOPE VI has widespread support among housing
policy experts. Among its other positive impacts, HOPE VI has
been described as changing public perceptions about public
housing and its desirability. Further, it has engaged privatesector investors and state and local governments in the production and operation of public housing, thereby permanently
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transforming housing policy directed towards the poorest
households from public provisions of housing-of-last-resort
into a public-private collaborative effort designed to build successful, revitalized communities.
Homeownership
Also in the 1990s, housing policy shifted to an emphasis
on homeownership for low- and moderate-income households, as several initiatives at the Federal, state, and local
levels have promoted homeownership, including opportunities for HOPE VI residents. Among the homeownership initiatives were the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (now
NeighborWorks America), Campaign for Homeownership,
President Clinton's National Homeownership Strategy and a
trillion dollar commitment by Fannie Mae. In 2002, the current
Bush administration reiterated the goal of securing homeownership for Americans, particularly for minority individuals
with an ambitious plan to raise homeownership levels for this
group by 5.5 million (Marcuse & Keating, 2006). Furthermore,
financial institutions have expanded their commitment to
lending to low-income and minority households, in part
because of the lending test required by the 1977 CRA legislation. The Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and
Soundness Act impacts the government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) in the secondary mortgage market (Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac) by allowing HUD to set affordable housing goals
(see Wyly, Cooke, Hammel, Holloway & Hudson, 2001 for a list
of these and other initiatives in support of homeownership).
These efforts reflect the growing literature supporting the
benefits of homeownership in household stability, children's
success, and community participation. (Boehm & Schottmann,
2002; Bratt, 2002; Green & White, 1997; Harkness & Newman,
2002; Haurin, Parcel, & Haurin, 2002; Rohe, Van Zandt, &
McCarthy, 2002; Rohe & Stewart, 1996; Sykes, 2005). In addition, these efforts are a response to low homeownership
rates for African-American, Hispanic, and other low income
households that have lagged behind those of non-Hispanic
white households. At the core of homeownership initiatives are public-private partnerships with nonprofit housing
and community based organizations, such as Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) as key participants, and
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the establishment of homebuyer training programs that target
underserved potential homebuyers. While the importance of
homebuyer training programs is acknowledged, only recently
has research examined the components of homebuyer training programs that help to prevent default and foreclosure
(Fogel, Smith, & Williamson, in-press-b; Hirad & Zorn, 2002;
McCarthy, Van Zandt, & Rohe, 2001; Quercia & Wachter, 1996).
An outcome of these efforts is that significant portions of the
rental household population of generations past are converting to homeownership.
However, despite these significant efforts, critiques of the
Clinton administration note that the number of affordable
housing units available to low to moderate income individuals
dramatically dropped due to a combination of several factors.
These include the conversion of previously subsidized rental
units available to Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8) holders
to market-rate rental housing, the decline in the stock of existing housing units, and the decrease in building of new units
for these tenants (Bratt, 2003).
The Turn of the 21s' Century
Despite the success of initiatives in the 1990s (Belsky
& Duda, 2002), the gap in homeownership rates remains.
In response, President Bush announced in June, 2002 a goal
of closing the homeownership gap for minority households by 5.5 million households by the end of the decade
(see http: //www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeownership /
20031216p2.html). Paralleling the Federal efforts, a number
of states and local governments have created trust funds
and other mechanisms to increase homeownership. Using
Federal and local resources, local governments and nonprofit
housing organizations working in cooperation with lending
institutions and the real estate community have endeavored
to expand homeownership largely through front-end programs such as homebuyer training programs, downpayment
assistance, second mortgage loans, housing rehabilitation, and
first mortgages that aid families in getting into a home. The
evidence suggests that these programs have been successful in
increasing the homeownership rate of low-income and minority households.2
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The sustainability of homeownership has become a recent
and significant policy concern. The rise of defaults and foreclosures within the middle class and other relatively stable
economic markets has generated national interest in the relationship between the housing industry and the subprime
market.' Default and foreclosure are generally the end result
of the failure to sustain homeownership, although households
may also sell their home to end their homeownership status.
Much of the literature on default and foreclosure addresses
factors related to personal financial situation, characteristics
of the property, or terms of the loan. (See Baku & Smith, 1998
for a summary of the literature.) While circumstances such as
loss of job, unexpected illness, and divorce may be unavoidable, other risks may be reduced through increased training
in financial literacy, mortgage option choice, choosing a home,
home maintenance, and other relevant topics.
While homeownership remains a stated priority for the
current Bush administration, critics argue that significant
housing concerns remain unaddressed and unfunded. Issues
of housing affordability remain a serious concern, as do
other specialized housing needs for target populations (such
as Native Americans, homeless, and immigrants) and needs
of specific regions in the county (Marcuse & Keating, 2006).
According to the 2006 State of the Nation's Housing, in the
three years from 2001-2004, 15.6 million low-to middle-income
households were paying more than half of their incomes
for housing, representing a severe cost burden. Further, it is
estimated that in 2004, 49% of working poor families with children had severe cost burdens, with 75% experiencing moderate burdens. For those that are classified as the near-working
poor, 17% had severe burdens; with an astounding 52% experience moderate burdens (see http://www.jchs.harvard.
edu/publications/markets/son2006 / index.htm). Despite organized lobbying efforts from diverse constituents, the establishment of a National Housing Trust Fund, which would have
provided dedicated, on-going financial resources to support
efforts to acquire and preserve 1.5 million housing units for
the lowest low-income families over the next 10 years, was not
supported by the Bush administration. Reasons given for this
decision include suggesting that this program duplicates the
efforts of the HOME program, will impact funding allocations
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of current housing programs, may jeopardize the financial stability of established governmental insurance funds and may
be vulnerable to the influences of political pressures, thereby
reducing its intended purposed to serve low-income families
(National Housing Trust Fund, 2007). Additional attempts to
improve funding for HUD failed; housing issues remain a neglected policy area.
Future Issues
At the time of this writing, housing issues are at the forefront of news coverage. Declining home values and a severe
downturn in housing construction and sales after a rapid escalation through the beginning of the current decade, a crisis
in foreclosures resulting from predatory lending practices and
mortgages that overextended borrowers, and the continuing
loss of affordable rental units from both the assisted housing inventory and the private rental stock are among factors making
finding and sustaining occupancy in suitable housing increasingly difficult for low and moderate income households. As
Gabriel (1996) predicted, the decrease in the number of rental
dwellings as well as decreased income supports to those least
able to afford housing has led to increased economic difficulties from those in the lowest income brackets. With this, an
awareness of the approaching crisis with regards to housing
policy has occurred. However, housing policy issues remain
surprisingly absent from current presidential debates. Likely
areas in which policy initiatives might need to arise are in efforts
to assist households facing foreclosure to sustain homeownership, increased income support to tenants, reexamination of
the appropriateness of homeownership for all households, and
continuing efforts to preserve the already existing subsidized
housing stock. However, we predict that marginalized and
vulnerable populations will continue to have to struggle to get
their housing needs met.
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(Endnotes)
1) This figure has not been adjusted for inflation over the period of
the program's history.
2) Bostic and Surette (2000) find that from 1989 to 1998 homeownership rates for the lowest and second lowest income quintiles increased by one and three percent, respectively, and attribute these
increases to federal policy initiatives.
3) An excellent overview of the subprime market and foreclosure
issues can be found at the following websites: http://www.federalreserv.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2007ll05a.htm, http: //
www.treas.gov/pres/releases/hp612.htm, or at http://www.
nw.org/network/neighborworksprogs/ foreclosuresolutions/
reports.asp.
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Numerous studies have reemerged examining social psychological
variables as predictors of individual differences in the human expe-

rience. Still, current researchfocusing on the effects of self-beliefs
on welfare use and exit is limited. This study examines the effects
of social psychological variables on the likelihood of welfare use and
five-year outcomes of wonen using data from the 1979 through
2000 waves of the National LongitudinalSurvey of Youth (NLSY).
Binary logistic regression estimates suggest that social psychological characteristicsare initially related to welfare use, but do not
remain oce control variables are introduced. While social psychological predictors do not appear to have strong or robust direct ef
fects in mnultivariate models, traditionalhuman capital variables
of public assistance outcomes past initial entry are significant.
Keywords: welfare use, welfare exit, social psychologicalpredictors

Introduction
Welfare policies during the 1980s, including the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), restructured the
main form of public assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), by including mandatory workfare, lowered
benefits, stricter work rules, and tightened work requirements.
Such policies were intended to reduce the number of individuals on the welfare rolls while reinforcing the prevailing work
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ethic (Abramovitz, 1989). At this important juncture, AFDC
was effectively transformed from an income maintenance
plan to an employment program. The main goal of AFDC was
to encourage self-sufficiency of welfare recipients through
work. More recently, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 attempted
to end long-term dependence and promote self-sufficiency
by limiting public assistance eligibility to five years over the
course of an individual's lifetime and required employment
or participation in work-related behavior after just two years
of cash assistance. As a result of these major shifts in welfare
policy, interest in the factors that lead to welfare receipt and
exit has increased substantially.
While most studies of the factors contributing to welfare
receipt, dependency, and exit focus on human capital variables and labor market experience, interest in locus of control
and self-efficacy as predictors of individual differences in the
human experience is reemerging as a major theme in the social
science literature. Locus of control has been defined by Rotter
(1966) as a generalized expectancy or a person's perception of
control over a life outcome. The durability and impact of locus
of control is best demonstrated by its wide application to the
understanding of social phenomena such as unemployment
(Frost & Clayson, 1991), health (Ross & Wu, 1995), marital
strains and conflict (Myers & Booth, 1999) and income (Duncan
& Morgan, 1981; Goldsmith, Venum, & Darity, 1997).
Self-efficacy is a parallel term developed by Bandura (1977,
1981, 1986) that is more situation specific and refers to one's
judgment of their capability to perform a given action required
to attain a particular outcome. It has also been used to examine
a wide range of social concerns including work-related behavior (Sadri & Robertson, 1993), homelessness (Epel, Bandura,
& Zimbardo, 1999), occupational choice and career preparation (Betz & Hackett, 1997), unemployment (Eden & Aviram,
1993) and academic performance (Lent, Brown, & Larkin, 1984;
1986). Although important work has been done by Stellmack
and Wanberg (2000), Benjamin and Stewart (1989), Kunz and
Kalil (1999), and Caputo (1999), locus of control and self-efficacy are seldom used to further our understanding of welfare
use.
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Literature Review
Previous research of welfare receipt, dependency, and
future attainment has focused primarily on human capital
characteristics of the individual receiving public assistance
(for example, Edin, Harris, & Sandefur, 1998; Harris, 1993;
Meyer & Cancian, 1998; Pavetti & Acs, 1997). Results of these
studies have found that women with greater investments in
human capital are less likely to receive public assistance, the
most likely to exit welfare through work, and are more likely
to remain off welfare permanently (Anderson & Levine, 2000;
Harris, 1993; Sandefur & Cook, 1998). More specifically, higher
levels of educational attainment have been linked to increased
self-sufficiency of recipients. Based on an analysis of welfare
research, Edin, Harris, and Sandefur (1998) conclude that education (at least a high school diploma) helps former recipients
exit welfare and, more importantly, remain off. In addition,
higher levels of educational attainment have been demonstrated to increase earnings potential and greater employability.
Poor education levels were linked to low-paying, unstable jobs
which contribute to the return to public assistance. In addition, previous research has found that former welfare recipients with greater human capital resources are likely to work
in stable, better-paying jobs following an exit from welfare.
Those with more disadvantaged resources have a higher likelihood of remaining dependent on welfare or occupying a job
which does not lift them out of poverty.
While much of the research examining human capital variables has focused on accumulation by the individual, Iversen
and Armstrong (2006) suggest that economic mobility needs to
be studied through the intersection of actors and institutions
(such as the family). The income, poverty status, and educational attainment of recipient's parents have been shown to be
important factors related to the human capital accumulation
of welfare recipients. Family poverty during adolescence has
been shown to have a stable, robust effect on the likelihood
that a young woman will receive welfare (Edwards, Plotnick, &
Klawitter, 2001). Likewise, family background variables, such
as mother's educational attainment, poverty status of the respondent's family, and family of origin size, have been shown
to indirectly affect the likelihood of leaving welfare through

200
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
work for welfare mothers (Harris, 1993). Greater family resources lead to more investments in individual human capital
and more success in the job market. Research has demonstrated that the higher the family's income, the greater educational
achievements made by children and the more likely they are
to finish high school (Corcoran, 1995; Duncan et al., 1998).
Welfare recipients whose mothers have achieved high levels
of educational achievement, for instance, have been shown to
have shorter periods of welfare dependency (Harris, 1993).
Other background characteristics have been shown to influence welfare receipt, exit route, and future socioeconomic
achievement of welfare recipients. The number of children has
been found to increase welfare dependency, deter work exits,
and limit welfare mothers from obtaining the type of work
that facilitates self-sufficiency (Edin, Harris, & Sandefur, 1998;
Harris, 1993; Spalter-Roth et al., 1995). Stellmack and Wanberg
(2000) found that the fewer children women had, the greater
the period of time during which respondents did not require
public assistance. Spalter-Roth et al. (1995) found that welfare
mothers with only one child are two percent more likely to work
than those with two or more children. Pavetti (1999) finds that
the presence of children lessens the likelihood of employment.
Of welfare mothers studied who worked 25 percent or less of
the time, nearly half had three or more children. Sandefur and
Cook (1998) identified the number of children as a significant
factor affecting the likelihood of leaving welfare permanently.
Women who have two or more children are far less likely to
exit welfare.
While it is clear that the majority of welfare recipients
have lower levels of human capital, what is less clear in the
welfare literature is an analysis of how self-beliefs formed and
measured early in life influence welfare use. Differences in
social psychological characteristics of welfare recipients often
predate welfare use and may be the function of one's social
environment earlier in life. These early factors may function as
mediators of behavior leading to poor outcomes in education,
work skills, labor market experience, and demographic characteristics (such as fertility and marriage).
Evidence that locus of control influences the employment,
wages, and earnings of women is limited and contradictory;
however, recent longitudinal studies have found long-term
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effects of locus of control on labor force variables (Duncan &
Morgan, 1981; Goldsmith, Venum, & Darity, 1997). O'Neill,
Bassi, and Wolf (1989) report that locus of control affects the exit
outcomes of welfare mothers. Women with more internal locus
of control were more likely to exit AFDC through earnings, but
were not more likely to exit through marriage. Caputo (1999),
however, finds that social psychological variables do not affect
the likelihood of using public assistance programs.
Previous research utilizing self-efficacy theory to examine
welfare, while limited, has found self-efficacy to be somewhat
predictive of welfare outcomes. Stellmack and Wanberg (2000)
found that current welfare recipients with a strong sense of
self-efficacy spent more months doing without welfare assistance and were working more hours at their current jobs. The
usefulness of self-efficacy in understanding the factors leading
to welfare dependency and participation in the workforce was
demonstrated by Benjamin and Stewart (1989). They found
lower levels of self-efficacy in those individuals who had received assistance for greater lengths of time. Kunz and Kalil
(1999) found that welfare recipients scored lower than other
women on measures of self-efficacy prior to welfare receipt
using a modified version of the Rotter locus of control scale administered to respondents in the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth. In another study conduced by Nichols-Casebolt
(1986), low-income mothers who did not receive welfare were
found to score significantly higher on measures of personal efficacy and self-satisfaction. Popkin's (1990) research examined
personal efficacy among long-term and short-term welfare recipients. Long-term recipients had a lower sense of personal
efficacy than their short-term counterparts and were less likely
to view work as an alternative to welfare.
While a bounty of research has used social psychological
variables to examine academic and occupational choices, less
attention has been paid to the usefulness of these variables
in the examination of welfare outcomes. With few exceptions
(e.g. Kunz & Kalil, 1999; Edwards, Plotnick, & Klawitter, 2001;
Harris, 1997; Caputo, 1999) neither welfare studies nor the sociological literature analyze whether beliefs and personality characteristics affect attainment following welfare exposure. Few
of the studies that do examine social psychological variables
to address welfare spells examine the effects of these variables
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past initial entry into welfare or prediction of whether or not
a young woman ever goes on welfare. This research will build
upon the current body of literature by examining the effect of
both self-efficacy beliefs and locus of control on the likelihood
of welfare use and on five-year outcomes after an initial entry.
In this study, the relationship between perceived self-efficacy
and locus of control on welfare use and five-year outcomes of
welfare recipients will be investigated. Two basic questions
guide this research. First, are welfare recipients more likely to
have an external locus of control and lower self-efficacy beliefs
than other women? Second, does perceived self-efficacy and
locus of control affect five-year welfare outcomes, including
the likelihood of continued receipt and types of welfare exit?
Hypotheses
The following two hypotheses, derived from previous research, are tested:
Hypothesis 1: Women with external locus of control
and low occupational self-efficacy will be more likely
to ever use welfare than women with internal locus of
control and high occupational self-efficacy.
Hypothesis 2: Among female welfare recipients, those
with external locus of control and low occupational
self-efficacy will be more likely remain on welfare five
years after initial entry. Welfare recipients with internal
locus of control and high occupational self-efficacy will
be more likely to be off welfare. Furthermore, I expect
those with internal locus and high efficacy to be off
welfare and working.

Data and Methods
The data were obtained from the 1979 through 2000 waves
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The
NLSY is sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
U.S. Department of Labor, and is a longitudinal panel administered by the Center for Human Resource Research (CHRR)
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at Ohio State University. The NLSY includes a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women between
the ages of 14 and 22 collected yearly from 1979 to 1994 and
biennially from 1996 to present.
The sample consisted of women in the NLSY who were
childless as of the 1980 interview and were younger than 20 at
that time. This restriction was necessary to ensure that socialpsychological characteristics were measured before a young
woman had experienced a premarital birth or had received
welfare. This may bias the results of this study because of the
elimination of respondents who became mothers at an early
age; however, because the measures of locus of control and selfefficacy were obtained in 1979, the restriction was necessary to
observe these characteristics before any type of welfare receipt
(see Kunz & Kalil, 1999). Restricting the sample to women
under the age of 20 was imposed to minimize this known bias.
Data through the 2000 survey are used for the initial measurements, when respondents were 35 to 41 years old. It was necessary to restrict the sample to 1998 for five-year outcomes
since labor force status was not computed for the 2000 wave.
The full sample size is 3,047 which is the number of women at
risk before deleting cases with missing information.
Dependent Variables
This study investigates two related dependent variables.
The first is whether the 3,047 women received any form of
public assistance between 1979 and 2000. Like Caputo (1999)
public assistance includes the receipt of AFDC, TANF, as well
as other types of public assistance including food stamps,
Supplementary Security Income (SSI), or other welfare assistance. The dependent variable was dichotomized into two categories: recipient and non-recipient of public assistance.
The second dependent variable is the socioeconomic
outcome of welfare recipients five-six years following an
initial spell of welfare receipt. In other words, where do respondents end up five to six years following their first exposure to welfare? There are four possible outcomes, as suggested by the literature, which will be examined. Respondents
could continue to receive welfare. Alternatively, they could no
longer be on welfare due to marriage, employment, or some
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combination-these are the primary ways that persons leave
welfare. Here, I cross-classify persons according to work and
marital status to identify major pathways of leaving welfare.
While it is possible for a respondent to be unmarried, not
working, and not on welfare, the number of respondents with
this unusual outcome is small (n = 43 or 5.5%) and will be
deleted for the purposes of this study.
Independent Variables
The two main independent variables of interest are (1)
locus of control and (2) occupational self-efficacy. Locus of
control will be measured using a modified version of the 60item Rotter Adult Internal-External locus of control scale (1966)
which was administered to respondents of the NLSY in 1979.
Scores for the index range from 4 to 16. Higher scores indicate
a more external locus of control.
A separate more specific component of personal control,
occupational self-efficacy was measured by a single item
asking each respondent to rate their expected ability to achieve
occupational aspiration at age 35. Thus, the self-efficacy item
specifically refers to labor market achievement. While this
item was asked in 1979 and 1982, in order to maintain focus
on social psychological characteristics formed early in life and
prior to an initial welfare spell, only the 1979 responses will be
examined. Expected ability to achieve occupational aspiration
consisted of a forced choice response ranging from excellent to
poor. Women who report excellent or good chances of achieving their occupational aspiration are defined as having high
levels of occupational self-efficacy. Responses of fair or poor
are indicative of low levels of efficacy.
Control Variables
To estimate the effects of social psychological characteristics measured early in the life course, the empirical models in
this study control for family background, individual lifestyle
variables, and human capital measures. Each control variable has been demonstrated by previous research to influence
the risk of welfare participation and the likelihood of leaving
welfare through work of young women by affecting economic
resources, future income potential, or preferences about work,
education, marriage, childbearing, or welfare use.
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In this study, an individual's level of education was measured by the number of years of education obtained at the
time of their five-year marker. For descriptive statistics, level
of education was categorized as being less than high school, a
high school diploma, or more. A dummy variable was created
indicating women who were high school graduates compared
to those with less than a high school level of education.
The percentile score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT) measured in 1980 was also used to assess human
capital resources, more specifically skill level. The AFQT determines general aptitude for enlistment in the Armed Forces.
The percentile score on the AFQT is created from the sum of
the number of correct scores for the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) used by the Department of Defense.
The ASVAB is also used to assess vocational interest and preparation of students. Work experience was measured by a variable indicating the number of weeks the respondent spent
working with current employer in the past year. Job tenure
was obtained at the five-year marker for those women who
were off welfare and working (married or unmarried).
Another aspect of the human capital framework that will
be controlled for is the socioeconomic circumstances of the
respondent's family of origin. Family socioeconomic status
during the respondent's childhood is reflected by family size
(number of siblings respondent has), highest grade of education completed by the respondent's mother, and whether the
family was in poverty in 1978. The effect of children is measured by examining the number of total children in the household of the respondent at the five-year marker. For the descriptive statistics, number of children is categorized as zero, one,
two, and three or more. For some of the multivariate analyses,
number of children is dummy coded as three or more compared to less than three.
Personal and family challenges, such as physical health
limitations, mental health issues, substance abuse, and involvement in crime or delinquency have been shown to influence the work efforts of welfare mothers (Anderson et al.,
2000; Danziger et al., 1999; Jayakody et al., 2000; McLanahan,
Garfinkel, & Mincy, 2002; Pavetti, 2002; Spalter-Roth et al.,
1995). Health limitation for this research is defined as whether
or not an individual reports a physical limitation on her ability
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to work. It is measured in the NLSY by asking whether the respondent is limited in the kind of work they could do for pay
by their health. Health limitation is asked yearly in the NLSY
and is measured at the five-year marker for those women who
have ever used welfare. Lifestyle variables examined in this
study are drug use and involvement in illegal activities. An
extensive set of questions on drug use was included in the 1984
survey in the NLSY. Drug use is measured using a dichotomous
variable which identified whether the respondent used any
drug (including inhalants, narcotics, heroin, cocaine, psychedelics, tranquilizers, barbiturates or sedatives, amphetamines
or stimulants, and marijuana) as of 1984. The NLSY collected
information about illegal behavior in a confidential questionnaire supplement administered during the 1980 survey. Illegal
behavior in this study is measured by an item which asked the
respondent whether, not counting minor traffic offenses, they
have ever been booked or charged for breaking a law.
The racial classification for this research is based on selfidentification, with individuals being grouped into the following categories: black, white, and other. For most of the
multivariate analyses, the white and black categories will be
compared.
Analyses
In the initial analyses, mean-level differences in occupational self-efficacy and locus of control between women who
did and did not receive welfare were examined. Since the dependent variables are categorical (welfare use being dichotomous), logistic regression models were estimated to investigate whether pre-existing differences in self-efficacy and locus
of control affected the odds of ever being on welfare and the
five-year outcome of welfare recipients, net of other factors
known to predict welfare receipt. Binary logit analysis using
the maximum likelihood method was utilized for welfare
use since the data is individual-level and the dependent variable (welfare use: ever or never used) is dichotomous. For
the subsequent analyses where the dependent variable (fiveyear outcome) is categorical, multinomial logistic models are
estimated.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Entire Sample and by Welfare Participation
Entire
Sample
(0)

Ever
Received
Welfare (0)

Never
Received
Xelfare (%)

Excellent

22.0

17.5

24.9

Good

48.5

46.8

49.6

Fair

25.8

30.5

22. 8

Poor

3.7

5.2

2.7

1st- 10th

13.1

25.2

5.2

11th - 25th

25.0

33.1

19.7

26th- 100th
Race

61.8

41.7

75.1

White

68.7

55.9

77.1

Black

25.4

37.1

17.8

Other

5.9

7.0

5.1

Not Poor

71.9

57.3

81.5

Poor

28.1

42.7

18.5

Less than high school

44.4

58.5

35.2

High school graduate

3.0

31.9

43.6

Beyond high school

16.6

9.6

21.2

Occupational Eficacy

AFQT Pece ntile
Rank

Fanily Poverty Status 1978

Mother's Education

Siblings
0

2.7

2.3

3.1

1

13.7

9.3

16.7

2-3

41.0

36.0

44.3

4-6

30.7

35.3

27.6

7+

11.9

17.1

8.3

Yes

23.4

24.4

22.7

No

76.6

75.6

77.3

Ever Used Drugs

Illegal
Behavior
Yes

3.2

5.8

1.6

No

96.8

94.2

98.4

N

2313

917

1396
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Welfare Recipients for the Entire Sample and by Outcome
Entire
Sample
(0)

Still On
Welfare
(0)

Married
(0rrie)
N

Working/
Married
I..

Working
(I)

Occupational Efficacy
Excellent

16.5

Good

40.3

Fair

37.9

Poor

5.3

Education
Less than high school

34.7

13,7

12.7

High school graduate

50.3

51.2

48.6

Beyond high school

15.0

35.1

38.7

White

65.5

50.7

Black

26.8

47.2

Other

7.7

2.1

Not Poor

67.3

62.2

Poor

32.7

37.8

Less than high school

50.0

52.8

High school graduate

38.1

36.6

Beyond high school

11.9

10.6

Yes

21.4

19.0

No

78.6

81.0

AFQT PercentileRank
1st - 10th

35.6

11th

25th

35.6

26th

100th

28.8

Race

Famiily Poverty Status 1978

Mother's Education

Siblings

Illegal Behavior
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample
and separately for women who have ever received welfare and
those who have never received welfare. The sample size after
deleting cases with missing values is 2,313. Approximately 40
percent (n = 917) of the 2,313 women received some kind of
welfare assistance between 1979 and 2000. While this number
seems high compared to similar research studies using the
NLSY, in this study welfare is broadly defined to include not
only AFDC receipt, but any kind of welfare assistance including food stamps, SSI, and other types of welfare assistance. The
average locus of control score for the full sample is 8.96 (range
4 to 16). Self-efficacy was relatively high with 70 percent believing that they had a good or excellent chance of obtaining
their desired occupational outcome. Consistent with previous
research, those women who received welfare had significantly
less investment in human capital. These women were also more
likely to come from socially disadvantaged backgrounds.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample
of women who had an initial receipt of welfare between 1979
and 1993 (n = 736). Nearly half of this sample of women was
receiving welfare five years following a first exposure. In addition, of those still on welfare, approximately 37 percent had
been permanently on welfare for the entire 5 year period. In
comparison, only 25 percent were off welfare all four years
following initial receipt. Consistent with previous research,
the most common outcome for those off welfare was combining work and marriage. Marriage alone was the least likely
scenario.
Comparing the descriptive statistics for women within each
of the four outcomes (Table 2) provides an interesting picture
of the characteristics associated with remaining on or being off
welfare five years after an initial exposure. Women who were
working and married had the most advantaged family backgrounds. Those still on welfare five to six years following an
initial receipt had more disadvantaged backgrounds compared
to those who had left welfare. Women still on welfare were the
most likely to feel that their chances of obtaining desired occupational aspirations were fair or poor. These women were
more likely to have families who lived in poverty in 1978, came
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from families with a large number of children, and had mothers
with less than high school education. In addition, women still
on welfare were more likely to have used illegal drugs or to
have been charged with illegal behavior than those who had
left welfare for work, marriage, or a combination of the two
states.
Bivariate Analysis of Welfare Use and Outcomes
Means for the independent variables differ significantly
between welfare recipients and non-recipients. Compared to
non-recipients, women who have ever been on welfare have
poorer scores on locus of control and self-efficacy. Differences
between welfare users and all other women in this sample for
locus of control (9.35 versus 8.71) and self-efficacy (2.24 versus
2.03) are statistically significant (p<.001). These differences are
consistent with the hypotheses of this study and suggest that
locus of control and self-efficacy are at least initially related to
welfare use. Those women who remain off welfare had a more
internal locus of control. Welfare recipients were more likely to
have an external locus of control. When examining self-efficacy, welfare recipients were less likely to believe that they could
achieve their desired occupational outcome by the age of 35.
Means and standard deviations for the independent
variables for each of the four outcomes were compared.
Interestingly, those who were off welfare and working had the
lowest mean locus of control score (9.09). This suggests that
those with more internal locus of control formed early in life
are most likely to leave welfare through work. A more external
locus of control score is associated with leaving welfare but
being married and unemployed (9.47) or remaining on welfare
(9.41). Those women who are off welfare, are married and are
working (9.12) have a higher locus of control score than those
who are off welfare and working, but a lower score than those
who are off welfare and married or still on welfare. While the
differences between the means are substantively intriguing,
statistics obtained from one-way analysis of variance are not
significant for any of the pairs. Thus, one can conclude from
this initial evidence that locus of control, while affecting the
likelihood of ever going on welfare, does not seem to affect the
likelihood of occupying a particular outcome five years later.
The means for occupational efficacy also differ among the
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outcomes. Consistent with expectations, those women still on
welfare were the least likely to have high occupational efficacy.
Once again, the working group was the most likely to have
believed in their ability to achieve desired occupational aspiration with a mean score of 2.11. Interestingly, the married and
not working group had higher occupational efficacy scores
than those women who were off welfare, were married, and
were working. Again, the effects of occupational efficacy on the
five-year outcome category were not statistically significant.
MultivariateAnalysis of Welfare Use and Outcomes
To explore the relationship between the probability of ever
receiving welfare and locus of control and occupational self-efficacy, binary logistic regression models were estimated. Since
locus of control and occupational self-efficacy are measuring separate constructs and they do not take any explanatory
power away from each other in the regressions, both will be
included together in the models for this and subsequent analyses. Model I (Table 3) examines the effect of these predictors on
welfare use before controlling for lifestyle, human capital, and
family background variables. Consistent with expectations, a
strong relationship is evident between welfare use and the two
social psychological variables. A one unit increase in locus of
control was associated with an 11.5 percent increase in the odds
of ever receiving welfare. In other words, women who had a
more external locus of control were more likely to ever receive
welfare than women who had more internal scores. Having a
more external locus of control raises one's odds of receiving
welfare. Additionally, women with low occupational efficacy
were more likely to receive welfare. These findings confirm
that social psychological characteristics formed early in life are
at least initially related to welfare use in predictable ways.
The coefficients for locus of control and occupational
self-efficacy show the same pattern of significance and have
roughly the same magnitudes when the lifestyle variables of
drug use and illegal behavior are controlled (model 2, Table 3).
Adding human capital and family background variables to the
models (models 3 and 4, Table 3) reduces both the statistical
significance and magnitude of the coefficients for the two independent variables. Neither locus of control nor occupational self-efficacy is significant in this model. This suggests that
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human capital and family background variables have stronger
effects than social psychological variables on the likelihood of
welfare receipt. The importance of family background and lifestyle is obvious in models 3 and 4. In these models, all background and human capital variables have highly significant
effects (p<.001) on the likelihood of ever receiving welfare.
As expected, having a mother with higher levels of education, not living in poverty in 1978, and having higher AFQT
scores decreases the odds of experiencing a welfare spell.
Having a larger family size (number of siblings) increases the
odds of ever being on welfare, though less significantly (p<.05)
than other human capital and family background variables.
Consistent with previous research, women who use drugs or
engage in illegal behavior have significantly greater odds of
receiving welfare (model 4). Both model 3 and model 4 suggest
that race is a significant factor in affecting who is likely to ever
use welfare. Black women are much more likely to ever go on
welfare than white women.
To explore the relationship between the likelihood of occupying a given five-year outcome and locus of control and occupational self-efficacy, multinomial logistic regression models
were estimated. The analysis presented in Table 4 identifies
the characteristics that distinguish women who are off welfare
and working, are off welfare and married, or are off welfare,
working, and married, relative to women who remain on
welfare five years after an initial exposure. The results reveal
that social psychological characteristics have very little direct
influence in determining the odds of still being on welfare compared to the four off welfare outcomes. There is one notable
exception. Those women with high occupational efficacy are
more likely to be off welfare and married than those with low
efficacy. The odds that a woman with high occupational efficacy will be off welfare and married rather than still on welfare
is 1.5 times the odds for those with low occupational efficacy.
While family background characteristics were significant
in determining who is likely to ever use welfare, they do not
significantly differentiate off welfare outcomes from being still
on welfare. Having a mother with a high school degree, having
been poor, and being the product of a large family may determine who enters the welfare program but not who is likely to
leave.
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The effect of human capital investments largely determines
five year outcome after an initial exposure. Being off welfare
and married is more likely for those with three or more children and higher AFQT scores. While unexpected, it is interesting that women with three or more children have 2 times
the odds than those with fewer children of being off welfare
and married. It may be that those with large families have significant costs serving as a barrier to work, but necessitating
marriage. A large family may constrain full-time employment
that would facilitate a work outcome, while serving to encourage marriage. Since the children variable is the total number of
children in the household, it is impossible to tell if any or all of
the children are biologically related to the woman. In contrast,
women who have three or more children had odds that were
only one-third the odds for women with fewer children to be
off welfare and working.
Consistent with previous research, the human capital
model explains the likelihood of being off welfare and working.
Educated women have higher odds of being off welfare and
working and off welfare, married, and working than women
who have not invested in education. In addition, AFQT scores
are significantly related to all three off welfare outcomes. The
odds that a woman with high AFQT scores will be off welfare
and married rather than still on welfare are 1.66 times the odds
for those scoring in the lowest percentile. Similarly, women
with high AFQT scores have higher odds of being off welfare
and working and off welfare, married, and working than those
with lower scores.
While Harris (1993) found that race did not differentiate
the route of welfare exit, the results of this analysis suggest that
black women were less likely to be off welfare through marriage or work and marriage than white women. If a woman is
black, her chances of being off welfare, married and working
are reduced by 50 percent compared to white women.
The effect of lifestyle variables partially determines fiveyear outcomes. While being charged with illegal behavior does
not differentiate five-year outcome, having used illegal drugs
reduces the chances of being off welfare by 46 to 52 percent
compared to those who have never used drugs. Using drugs
may serve as a barrier to both employment and marriage.
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting the Odds of Ever
Receiving Welfare

Occupational Selt-Efficacy

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

.105"**
(.019)

.108"**
(.019)

036
(.020)

.039
(.021)

-.407**
(.094)

-.371(.095)

-.169
(.108)

-.123
(.110)

Drug Use
Illegal Behavior

.030
(.104)

.508***
(.118)

1.284"**
(.264)

1.245wx
(.283)

AFQT Percentile Rank

-.740***
(.077)

-.
770***
(.078)

Family Poverty Status 1978

.592***
(.113)

.577***
(.114)

Mother's Education

-.
297***
(.074)

313**
-.
(.075)

Siblinos
i

.116
(.054)
.564***
(.112)

.120*
(.055)
.693***
(.115)

407***

453***

Black (versus white)
Chi-square

60***

88xxx

df

2

4

7

9

N

2313

2313

2177

2177

Notes: Standard errors inparentheses
x - p <.05, **- p <.01' - - p <.001

Summary and Conclusions
This research began with the question of whether or not
the social psychological characteristics, locus of control and
self-efficacy, affect initial welfare use and outcomes five years
after initial exposure. Consistent with Caputo (1999), the findings of this study indicate that social psychological variables,
when measured early in life, have little effect on the likelihood
that a woman will ever receive public assistance. In addition,
the social psychological predictors do not appear to have
strong or robust direct effects on welfare outcomes; however,
occupational self-efficacy provides a possible exception. There
remains fragile evidence that a more specific measure of locus
of control, occupational efficacy, affects the odds that an individual will be off welfare and married rather than still being
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Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates of Off Welfare
Outcomes
Off Welfare,
Married

Off Welfare,
Married and
Working

Off Welfare
Working

-2.45"
(37)

-2.02"
(,46)

-2.49**
(.50)

022
(.28)

001
(.22)

028
(.23)

0.40**
(.28)

0.12
(.22)

0.62
(.24)

High School Graduate

(0.10
33)

0.77**
(30)

0.77*
(.32)

Three or More Children

0.72*
(33)
(.33)

-0.33
(3
(.35)

-.(46)5
(.46)

AFQT

0.51"
(.20)

0.56**
(.16)

0.50"
(.16)

Mother's educ. high school +

-0.26
-04)
(354)

-0.03
-. 03
(.37)

-0.06
-. 06
(.38)

Family poverty status 1978

-0.06
-0206
(.28)

-0.42
(,2
(.23)

-0.27
(2
(.20)

Three or more siblings

0.27
(.32)

0.10
(.24)

0.01
(.24)

0.97**
(.32)

-0.69**
(.24)

0.08
(.24)

Ever Used Drugs

-0.78*
(.33)

-0.71"*
(.26)

-0.66*
(.28)

Illegal Behavior

-0.04
(.60)

0.19
(.46)

0.16
(.52)

Intercept
Locus of Control
Occupational Efficac

Race

Black (vs. white)

Model Chi-Square

782.61

df

879

N

681

Notes: standard errors in parentheses; Still on Welfare is the reference category.
*-p <.05,** =p <.01

on welfare. Those women with high occupational efficacy are
more likely to be off welfare and married than those with low
efficacy, even after controlling for human capital, background
characteristics, and personal lifestyle variables.
The effects of classical predictors of welfare outcomes,
human capital and family background characteristics, appear
to have the strongest effects on the likelihood of ever receiving
welfare. The human capital model is consistently supported
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throughout this study. Women with greater investments in
human capital were less likely to ever receive welfare. In addition, the effect of human capital investments largely determines five-year outcome after an initial exposure. Women with
higher AFQT scores and higher levels of education had higher
odds of being off welfare.
As it stands, the results of this research have important
implications for the current welfare system, especially concerning time restrictions and self-sufficiency goals. As stated
previously, the United States has heatedly debated the role of
welfare to help the poor throughout much of its history. Most
of the current debate has focused on the end of "welfare as
a way of life" with the replacement of the federal program
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) during the
1990s with the more state-centered Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF). The federal and state reforms associated with TANF attempt to discourage welfare dependency
and encourage permanent exits by limiting the amount of time
welfare recipients can receive benefits. The federal legislation
established a limit of two years of assistance without engaging in work activity and a lifetime limit of five years of total
assistance. States are able to establish more restrictive limits
if they desire to do so. Of the group of women in this sample,
nearly half (46%) were still on welfare five years after initial
entry. Furthermore, of those still on welfare, 37.4 percent had
received welfare for all four years between initial receipt and
the five-year outcome. While many of these women had initial
entries before the implementation of lifetime restrictions, these
findings suggest that many women may experience sanctioning for exceeding time limits or will be cut off from receiving
benefits altogether.
In addition to attempting to promote work and self-sufficiency, another underlying goal of welfare reform has been
to promote marriage, marital parenting, and paternal support
(see Mink, 1998). Consistent with previous research, combining work and marriage was the most common route off
welfare compared to marriage or work alone among those in
this sample. Not only is the work-marriage combination the
most common route off welfare, it also appeared that those
who were off welfare, working, and married five years after
initial exposure were the most likely to have been off welfare
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the longest during the four year interval. This provides support
for current legislative goals seeking to encourage marriage in
order to move women off public assistance permanently. While
I am not proposing incentives to marriage, these findings may
illustrate the difficulty of achieving self-sufficiency through
work alone and the need for more research acknowledging the
intersections of social institutions such as marriage and family
as suggested by Iversen and Armstrong (2006).
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Prior to January 1, 1997, individuals with drug- or alcohol-related
disabilities could qualifij for federal public assistance through the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. During the welfare
reforms of the Clinton administration, this policy was changed,
resulting in lost income and health care benefits for many lowincome substance abusers. This paper examines the historical underpinnings to the elimination of drug addiction and alcoholism
(DA&A) as qualifjing impairments for SSI disability payments.
Following this, empirical evidence is presented on the effect this
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policy change had on the subsequent economic security offormer
SSI DA&A beneficiaries. Findings indicate that study participants who lost SSI benefits suffered increased economic hardship folloving the policy change. These findings have important
implications for future social wvelfare policymaking decisions.
Keywords: Welfare reform, Supplemental Security Income, substance abuse, economic security

The legitimacy of drug addiction and alcoholism as disabling impairments to occupational functioning has been a
point of contention among politicians, physicians, and substance abuse treatment professionals and advocates for some
time. The lack of a clear understanding of substance abuse
coupled with many subjective interpretations of the phenomenon has made defining drug addiction and alcoholism problematic. Ambiguity related to the nature and consequences of drug
addiction and alcoholism has made constructing social welfare
policy and providing public assistance for drug addicts and
alcoholics a difficult proposition. Philosophical and ideological divisions among political constituencies (e.g., politicians,
recovering addicts and alcoholics, and substance abuse treatment professionals) have complicated efforts to address this
issue. In 1974, with the initial implementation of Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), the federal government attempted to
assist low-income substance abusers by categorizing drug
addiction and alcoholism (DA&A) as a disability. Under this
public assistance program, low-income individuals dependent
on drugs or alcohol and unable to work had the opportunity to
claim their condition as a disability. Individuals with substantiated claims were mandated to substance abuse treatment,
to having a representative payee, and to continued disability
reviews in exchange for monthly cash assistance and health
care benefits (i.e., Medicaid) [Social Security Amendments Act,
19721. Unfortunately, due to a variety of administrative and
programmatic problems, as well as a shifting political environment, this attempt by the federal government to assist lowincome substance abusers was relatively short-lived.
In the summer of 1996, Congress passed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA; PL 104-193), more commonly referred to as
"welfare reform," as the culmination of a campaign by
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politicians to redefine the American welfare system. In March
1996, Congress preceded the PRWORA with passage of the
Contract with America Advancement Act (PL 104-121). It was
in this act, the Contract with America Advancement Act, that
Congress mandated the elimination of drug addiction and
alcoholism as eligibility categories for SSI disability benefits
(Davies, Iams, & Rupp, 2000). When Congress eliminated the
DA&A category, it estimated that 75% of former SSI DA&A
beneficiaries (approximately 125,000 out of 166,666 recipients)
would requalify for SSI benefits under a different disability
category, such as chronic physical or mental illness (Watkins,
Podus, Lombardi, & Burnam, 2001). Unfortunately, only 35% of
beneficiaries were reclassified (Lewin & Westat, 1998). This left
over 110,000 low-income substance abusers without monthly
income or health care benefits.
In this paper, a brief description of the historical, social,
and political antecedents that influenced the elimination of
substance abuse as a disability category is provided (see Hunt,
2000; and Hunt & Baumohl, 2003, for a more thorough description of this topic). Following this, a number of implementation
issues that affected the saliency of the DA&A program are presented. Lastly, empirical evidence on the effects terminating
the DA&A category had on the economic security of former
SSI DA&A beneficiaries is examined.
Policy Change Antecedents
Social and Political Issues
The elimination of drug addiction and alcoholism as a
category for SSI disability eligibility was influenced by a
combination of social and political reactions. Moral interpretations of substance abuse called into question its legitimacy
as a disability. Opponents of the benefit continued to argue
that substance abuse was "self-inflicted," more a characterological deficit than a disease or medical condition. Concerns
related to drug addicts and alcoholics as worthy or deserving
recipients of welfare benefits, and the legitimacy of drug addiction and alcoholism as a disability category, can be seen in
the differential treatment DA&A beneficiaries were subjected
to by policymakers and program administrators. First, DA&A
beneficiaries were the only group receiving public assistance
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that were required to receive treatment or have their benefits
suspended (Gresenz, Watkins, & Podus, 1998). This criterion
did not apply to any other disabled group. Individuals suffering from chronic health or mental health problems were not
required to seek treatment to avoid losing benefits. Second,
DA&A beneficiaries were the only group of public assistance
recipients mandated to have representative payees. While
severely and persistently mentally ill beneficiaries may have
representative payees, mentally ill beneficiaries are not mandated to use a third party (Rosen & Rosenheck, 1999). Finally,
following passage of the Social Security Independence and
Program Improvements Act of 1994 (PL 103-296), SSI benefits
for DA&A recipients were limited to 36 months (Davies, et al.,
2000). This implies, at the very least, that public officials did
not consider drug addiction and alcoholism to be chronic disabilities. This sentiment was reinforced in May 1994 by the SSA
Commissioner when she expressed to Congress that it was the
expectation of DA&A recipients to take full responsibility for
their recoveries and get off of the SSI disability payment rolls
(Departments of Labor, 1994). This statement reflected the personal responsibility rhetoric being propagated by conservative
politicians at that time.
Disapproving politicians and moral entrepreneurs expressed further concern for the DA&A program and its beneficiaries with claims of inappropriate use of cash benefits. Many
felt that DA&A recipients used their benefits to buy drugs and
alcohol (Satel & Glazer, 1993). According to Anderson and
others (2002), many DA&A recipients could be characterized
as "lying, swindling, drug addicts who were squandering taxpayers [sic] money on dope" (p. 266). Senator William Cohen
(R-ME) was quoted in a number of prominent newspapers
criticizing the DA&A program's approach to helping lowincome drug addicts and alcoholics. For example, in a 1994
New York Times article, he stated that "[h]undreds of millions of
scarce Federal dollars" were being used by DA&A recipients
to buy illegal drugs (Cohen, 1994a, p. 15). In the Washington
Post, he stated that DA&A benefits were "often used to perpetuate addictions, rather than cure them, and the addicts
and alcoholics ride along on a drug-laden train fueled by their
continuing disabilities" (Cohen, 1994b, p. 17). Such comments
were indicative of the political dissatisfaction with the DA&A
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program that existed among some elected officials during the
early 1990s. While this position was not universally regarded
by members of Congress, the bipartisan support it did receive
would eventually compromise the political saliency of the
DA&A program.
Disharmony among constituents of the DA&A program
would escalate when it became evident that many substance
abuse treatment and service providers were also dissatisfied
with the program. Television programs broadcast stories with
recovering alcoholics, shelter operators, and substance abuse
treatment administrators and clinicians, all stating how SSI
payments were harming drug addicts and alcoholics, and preventing effective treatment (Goldstein, Anderson, Schyb, &
Swartz, 2000). A story on CBS's 60 Minutes described how the
SSA was providing drug addicts and alcoholics with public
assistance for the explicit use of perpetuating "addictive lifestyles" (p. 217). NBC's Dateline aired a similar segment not
only criticizing DA&A beneficiaries for using public funds to
purchase drugs and alcohol, but demonstrating opposition to
the DA&A program from substance abuse treatment providers and individuals in recovery (Hunt, 2000). These mediated
accounts of DA&A recipients spending their public assistance
benefits on drugs and alcohol, and of members of the substance
abuse treatment community criticizing a program specifically
designed to help drug addicts and alcoholics, provided considerable ammunition for opponents of the DA&A program.
Implementation Issues
The greatest impediment to the successful implementation of the DA&A program was the administration of the substance abuse treatment and representative payee mandates.
According to policy, DA&A beneficiaries were required to participate in a substance abuse treatment program (if appropriate
treatment were available) and receive SSI payments through a
representative payee (Davies, et al., 2000). To administer the
treatment mandate of the program, the SSA developed a plan
to create a system of independent state-contracted referral
and monitoring agencies. These agencies were set up to refer
DA&A beneficiaries to substance abuse treatment services,
as well as to monitor treatment compliance (Watkins, Wells,
& McLellan, 1999). If beneficiaries failed to comply with the
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substance abuse treatment mandate, they would be subject
to progressive sanctions up to, and including, loss of benefits
(SSA, 1995). The trouble with the representative payee mandate
was not whether a beneficiary had a representative payee; this
requirement was handled administratively upon entry into
the program. The problem that developed was more related to
whom the benefit checks were being sent.
Treatment Mandate
One reason implementing the mandated substance abuse
treatment requirement for DA&A recipients was so difficult was that appropriate resources were never provided.
Congress never adequately compensated for the operational
responsibilities that were assumed by the SSA in acquiring a
new service population, nor were funds appropriated to treat
DA&A beneficiaries (Hunt, 2000). By law, the SSA could not
pay for treatment for beneficiaries; it had to rely on Medicaid
and Medicare. Substance abuse treatment, however, was not a
federally mandated Medicaid benefit. Furthermore, Medicaid
coverage varied by state. While some states included some
type of substance abuse treatment in their coverage, others
did not. DA&A beneficiaries that resided in states that did not
cover treatment were relegated to the public treatment system
(e.g., county-funded substance abuse treatment services). This
resulted in substantial barriers to treatment and great inconsistency in treatment provision across states. Beneficiaries in many
rural areas found it difficult to even locate appropriate treatment services. Beneficiaries requiring methadone maintenance
or dual diagnosis treatment services were further limited by a
lack of such services in many areas (Hunt & Baumohl, 2003).
The actual number of DA&A recipients that ever made it to
treatment is unclear. Reports vary, ranging from nine percent
(Government Accounting Office, 1994) to a self-reported 47%
(Office of the Inspector General [OIG], 1994b). The lack of
available and appropriate substance abuse treatment resources
compromised the intent of the original policy mandate.
Because the SSA had to defer the provision of treatment
service requirements to existing public substance abuse treatment programs, the increased bureaucracy made effective implementation of the treatment mandate much more difficult.
In theory, the referral and monitoring agencies (RMAs) were
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to administer the treatment mandate for the SSA. In reality,
for most of the life of the DA&A program, most states did not
have a functional RMA. The first RMAs chosen by the SSA
were state vocational rehabilitation programs. When these
agencies proved ineffective, Congress, as part of President
Reagan's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, authorized contracts with private rehabilitation programs with the
caveat that no rehabilitation program would be reimbursed for
services until a beneficiary achieved nine continuous months
of employment (Berkowitz, 1987). This mandate, which was
reflective of the Reagan administration's agenda to make the
receipt of public assistance benefits more difficult, thereby reducing federal spending on such programs, discouraged most
agencies from participating in the RMA system. As a result, by
1984, there were only 10 states with RMA contracts (Hunt &
Baumohl, 2003). This created more problems for the SSA due
to the fact that, if no RMA was available, then the regional SSA
office had to perform the task. Since resources were not provided for such an undertaking, many DA&A beneficiaries went
unmonitored. In 1992, the SSA issued a Request for Proposals
with the intention of placing an RMA in all 50 states and the
District of Columbia. Ironically, it would not be until the last
year of the program, after its fate had been determined, that
the SSA would have an RMA in every state (Hunt, 2000).
Representative Payee Mandate
Problems of implementation related to the representative
payee mandate were less related to compliance than to propriety. Representative payees of DA&A beneficiaries were
responsible for managing the recipients' cash benefits so that
funds were spent appropriately (e.g., housing, food, and clothing). Representative payees could be "a nonprofit social service
agency, a governmental social service agency or public guardian, another organization, a family member or other interested
person" approved by the SSA to act in the best interest of the
beneficiary (SSA, 1996, p. 1). However, many representative
payees were neither related, nor organizationally connected,
to the beneficiary (OIG, 1994a). Some, rather, were bartenders,
liquor store owners, and fellow DA&A recipients (Gresenz, et
al., 1998). Political opponents of the DA&A program grasped
on to this information using it to full advantage.
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Another problem related to the representative payee
system had to do with large lump-sum retroactive payments.
Retroactive benefit payments to DA&A beneficiaries were the
result of back funds accumulating during an applicant's claim
or appeal process. As a result, low-income substance abusers
with substantiated disability claims would receive "back pay,"
a disbursement that could range from a few hundred to a few
thousand dollars (Satel, Reuter, Hartley, Rosenheck, & Mintz,
1997). Drug addicts and alcoholics that were able to acquire all
of their retroactive benefit payment from inappropriate or irresponsible representative payees were placed in a very vulnerable position. Surplus cash often translated into prolonged episodes of drug use and the occasional drug overdose. Instances
of misuse of public assistance funds to purchase alcohol and
drugs by DA&A recipients received much attention from the
media and conservative political opponents (Satel, et al., 1997).
In one 1992 case, a heroin addict arrested for possession in
Bakersfield, California, was found to have thousands of dollars
in cash from retroactive SSI payments. A more damaging case,
occurring at the same time and in the same city, concerned a
man found dead from a drug overdose in a motel room following the purchase of a large amount of drugs with retroactive
funds (Hunt, 2000). Such highly publicized, albeit rare, horror
stories proved very damaging to the entire DA&A program.
Program Growth
A major problem affecting the implementation of DA&A
program provisions was the unexpected and unprecedented
growth the program experienced in the early 1990s. In 1990,
there were approximately 24,000 SSI DA&A beneficiaries on
the rolls; by 1996, that number had increased to nearly 170,000
(Gresenz, et al., 1998). This sudden explosion in the number of
program participants compounded already existing SSA staffing, communication, and resource issues. Not only were SSA
employees inexperienced and inadequately trained to deal
with low-income drug addicts and alcoholics, now they were
overwhelmed by the growing magnitude of the problem.
The sudden expansion of the DA&A program can be attributed to a combination of factors. The creation of more
RMAs, the broadened interpretation of substance abuse as a
disabling disorder resulting from a number of federal court
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cases, the shifting of GA recipients to SSI by some states and
counties, and a moratorium on continuing disability reviews
by disability reviewers in the mid 1980s for political reasons
all contributed to the sudden growth of the program (Hunt &
Baumohl, 2003). The placement of RMAs in more states across
the country during the early 1990s increased the number of SSI
applicants determined to have a drug addiction and alcoholism disability. SSA regional staffs were less hesitant about designating DA&A claimants as drug- or alcohol-disabled if they
did not have to deal with the responsibility of referring and
monitoring applicants. Hunt and Baumohl (2003) speculate
that in states without RMAs, "disability-determination teams
were less inclined to approve drug addicts and alcoholics in the
absence of a way to ensure treatment compliance" (p. 28). This
possibility indicates the significance having an RMA played
on the number of applicants determined to have a DA&A disability in a particular region.
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, there were
a number of federal court cases that challenged the government's competence in determining drug addiction and alcoholism disability claims. A 1990 class action suit (Wilkerson v.
Sullivan) brought against the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services asserted that disability claims
based exclusively on severe alcoholism had been mishandled
by the SSA resulting in a high rate of error in determining
DA&A disability cases. The suit claimed "the Secretary had
willfully violated the regulations by never allowing severe alcoholism alone to be a disabling impairment" (Hunt, 2000, pp.
57-58). The federal district court found for the plaintiffs but the
decision was overturned by the 3 d Circuit Court of Appeals
with the advice that the Secretary impart on SSA and DDS
staffs the importance of accurately identifying DA&A claimants (Hunt & Baumohl, 2003). The full impact this court decision had and the resulting pressures it put on Administration
officials is unclear; however, over the following two years the
number of DA&A beneficiaries doubled.
Motivated by the placement of more RMAs and the liberalizing of DA&A disability eligibility interpretations, many
states and counties, along with advocates for low-income substance abusers, saw an opportunity to transfer their most severely affected clients from the state and county welfare rolls
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to the federal government's (Schmidt, 1990). Moving clients
from General Assistance (GA) to SSI was seen as a win-win
proposition by state and county social service agencies. The
state or county would no longer be financially responsible for
the client, and the client would receive increased cash benefits, access to substance abuse treatment, health care coverage,
and a representative payee to help manage the resources of
the drug- or alcohol-disabled beneficiary. A newly burgeoning
"troubled persons" industry also benefited as recovery homes
and therapeutic communities gained access to a steady stream
of federal dollars.
Due to a political controversy created by the Reagan administration's attempt to reduce the number of individuals
collecting disability benefits in the 1980s, for a period of approximately two years the SSA ceased all continuing disability reviews (CDRs) and denials of mental impairment claims
(Berkowitz, 1987). A change in CDR criteria (i.e., the removal
of a "medical improvement" provision requiring beneficiaries to have improved medically before they could be denied
benefits) made termination of disability benefits easier. The
Reagan administration utilized this change in review criteria
to questionably terminate many disabled individuals, a large
number of whom had severe mental impairments. Outraged
disability reviewers refused to conduct CDRs. The resulting
moratorium created a backlog of CDRs. Once the moratorium
was lifted, the SSA was faced with an exorbitant number of
overdue reviews. This created a negative exit to entry ratio that
the Administration had a very difficult time resolving. DA&A
beneficiaries that successfully completed treatment were often
not re-evaluated, and continued to collect disability benefits.
In an 18-month period between 1994 and 1995, RMAs referred
2182 cases to the SSA for a CDR following successful completion of a substance abuse treatment program. Only 32 cases
were terminated (OIG, 1997).
Summary
Many factors contributed to the elimination of the DA&A
program. Socially and politically,the program was an easy target
for conservatives. Throughout the lifetime of the SSI DA&A
program (1972-1996), the federal government was predominantly lead by conservative politicians intent on reducing the
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scope and magnitude of social welfare in this country. During
the Clinton administration, conservative ideology attributing
social ailments such as poverty, unemployment, and substance
abuse to individual factors, and a campaign of welfare reform
predicated on moral themes of personal responsibility, selfsufficiency, and hard work, defined a sociopolitical environment that was not conducive to providing public assistance to
low-income drug addicts and alcoholics. Negative perceptions
of the program provided by media horror stories and a lack
of support from the substance abuse treatment community reinforced the conservative perspective that cash assistance to
drug addicts and alcoholics only promoted and encouraged
substance abuse. The division among political constituencies
became more damaging when it became evident that the SSA
had little enthusiasm to administer the program. The few proponents the program did have were overwhelmed by the opposition. Beneficiaries had no power, and many progressives
did not want to appear "soft" on drugs in an election year.
Besides the social and political factors conspiring against
the DA&A program, problems related to poor implementation
were equally overwhelming. Much of this can be attributed
to a lack of resources in the face of unprecedented program
growth. However, even before the program started to grow so
rapidly in the early 1990s, the SSA failed to effectively manage
the treatment and representative payee mandates. The referral
and monitoring system was severely inadequate. Few beneficiaries ever went to treatment, treatment effectiveness was not
monitored, and continued disability reviews were not always
conducted. Negative attitudes toward the DA&A program and
its beneficiaries among service providers and SSA employees
made implementation that much more difficult. With these
social, political, and programmatic problems contributing to
the instability of the DA&A program, its demise should not be
surprising. The effects eliminating this program had on lowincome substance abusers are important for understanding the
implications of this policy change.

The Impact of Welfare Reform Legislation
The impact of welfare reform legislation on marginalized
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and disadvantaged populations requires special attention by
policy researchers and analysts. Previous research on 1996
welfare reform outcomes has indicated that, while the number
of welfare recipients has significantly declined, the quality of
life of former public assistance (i.e., Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income) beneficiaries
has not necessarily improved. Many former public assistance
beneficiaries that have been forced to leave the social welfare
system as a result of newly-mandated time limits or reformed
eligibility criteria have reported either sustained or increased
economic and material hardship (Acs & Loprest, 2007; Norris,
Scott, Speiglman, & Green, 2003). Welfare reforms that result in
abrupt changes to established mechanisms of income maintenance and health care security among low-income individuals,
such as the elimination of the SSI DA&A program, are expected to have an even greater effect on what must be considered a
vulnerable population.
In the following study, income levels for a panel of 412
former SSI DA&A beneficiaries from Northern California
were examined following elimination of the SSI DA&A category. Self-reported income data (i.e., amount and source of
income) were gathered at baseline, as well as 6-, 12-, 18-, 24-,
and 42-month follow-up interviews. These interviews began
just prior to the policy change in December, 1996, and were
concluded in November, 2000. Longitudinal income data were
analyzed using mixed model techniques to determine changes
in levels of economic support over time. A primary interest of
the researchers was to compare longitudinal income outcomes
of former SSI DA&A beneficiaries that were able to retain SSI
income benefits under another disability category with those
that lost benefits. The ultimate goal of this research was to determine the effects eliminating formal income maintenance
benefits (i.e., SSI) had on the subsequent economic security of
low-income substance abusers.
Methods
Study Sam ple
The study sample was selected from a population of SSI
DA&A recipients residing in and around the San Francisco
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Bay Area as of December 1996. A sampling frame consisting of
SSI DA&A beneficiaries from four Northern California counties (Alameda, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara)
was developed by Maximus, the referral and monitoring
agency responsible for tracking treatment placement and compliance among SSI DA&A beneficiaries in those areas. From
this sampling frame, 775 individuals were randomly selected.
Ultimately, 519 study participants would meet all inclusion
criteria for the study and complete baseline surveys. At the 42month follow-up, a final panel of 412 study participants was
established. Of the potential 2472 interviews available over the
lifetime of the study from this panel (412 study participants X
6 waves of data), only 30 follow-up interviews were missed.
Dropout analysis of the 107 study participants excluded from
the final panel did not differ significantly, with the exception
of ethnicity. Forty-one percent of the study dropouts were
Caucasian compared to 29% of the study's final panel.
Variables
Income. This study was concerned with two types of income
variables: 1) total income for each study participant at each interview, and 2) primary income source following termination
of the DA&A category. Total income was calculated by adding
all reported income sources in the 30 days prior to an interview. Income sources ranged from legitimate employment to
formal mechanisms of income support (i.e., public assistance
and social insurance) to informal sources, such as monies from
friends and family, panhandling, gambling, prostitution, and
other illegal activities. Primary income source reflected a study
participant's primary source of income over the 3.5 years following the policy change. In order to assess differences in the
economic security of study participants that requalified for SSI
benefits under another disability and study participants that
lost SSI benefits, three primary income groups were constructed. The first primary income group was SSI retainers. These
study participants reported receiving SSI benefits in more
than half of the months leading up to a follow-up interview;
they also needed to be "on SSI" for a majority of their followup interviews. This group accounted for 47% (n = 193) of the
study sample. The second primary income group consisted
of study participants that reported some other type of public
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assistance (i.e., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or
General Assistance) as their primary source of income following termination of the DA&A category. This comparison group
was characterized as having lost SSI benefits, but still relying
primarily on public assistance. This primary income group accounted for 21% (n = 87; 31 TANF, 56 GA) of the study sample.
The final primary income group, a residual group, was labeled
the "no public assistance" group. These study participants
were characterized as having lost SSI benefits and relying
on informal resources and/or employment as their primary
income source. These individuals accounted for 32% (n = 132)
of the study sample.
Clinical characteristics.Issues related to mental health and
substance abuse were a concern for this population. In order
to assess the impact mental illness and alcohol and drug use
had on study participants' ability to recoup or obtain income,
variables related to these clinical characteristics were included
in the study. The mental health variable was quite liberal-a
dichotomous variable indicating the self-reporting of any
serious mental health symptomatology (e.g., serious depression, serious anxiety, hallucinations, and suicidal ideation) at
each follow-up interview. The indicators for substance abuse
were any illicit drug use or any heavy alcohol use (i.e., five or
more drinks on five or more occasions in the past 30 days for
men, four or more drinks on five or more occasions in the past
30 days for women) at any point following the policy change.
Demnographics. Demographic variables included age (in
years), gender, ethnicity, education, county of residence, employment, and time (in days) since first interview. Ethnicity
was categorized as Caucasian (reference), African American,
Hispanic, and Other; education was dichotomized to indicate high school graduate or equivalent. Dummy variables
were constructed for the four Northern California counties
(Alameda, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara); and
employment was categorized as 1) no employment, 2) worked
20 hours or less per week, and 3) worked more than 20 hours
per week. Variables for the interaction between income determinants (i.e., primary income source and employment) and
clinical characteristics (i.e., any mental health symptom, any
illicit drug use, and heavy alcohol use), and time since first
interview were also constructed.

Loaw-Income SubstanceAbusers

235

StatisticalAnalysis
Multivariate mixed random and fixed effects growth curve
models were used to estimate changes in the total income of
former SSI DA&A beneficiaries following the policy change.
Several models of increasing complexity were estimated to understand the relationship between primary income source, employment, time, and post-policy-change income while controlling for demographic and clinical characteristics of the study
sample. Mixed effects models can be conceptualized as twolevel models. The first level is the individual or person level.
This level models the expected change in income over time for
each study participant. The second level is the population or
group level. It is used to model the expected change in income
over time between study participants. Mixed effects growth
curve models have been shown to effectively estimate longitudinal outcomes (i.e., labor force participation and criminal
behavior) for this population (Orwin, Campbell, Campbell, &
Krupski, 2004). Since this study was interested in modeling
income trajectories following termination of the DA&A category, baseline measures of income taken just prior to the policy
change were adjusted for in most models.
Model 1, the unrestricted mean model, is the simplest model
and estimated the grand mean total income along with level-i
and level-2 random effects. Model 2 included the time variable,
days since the initial interview, both as a fixed effect for the
mean rate of change in total income over time, and a random
effect expressing between-person-level differences in the fixed
effect time slope. The next two models added fixed effects for
baseline income, primary income groups, demographic variables, and clinical characteristics in a stepwise fashion. Model
3 added fixed effect parameters for membership in one of three
primary income groups: retained SSI (reference), other public
assistance, and no public assistance, as well as a control for
baseline income. Model 4 added demographic characteristics,
such as age, gender, ethnicity, county of residence, and education, and fixed effects for clinical characteristics, such as the
presence of any serious mental health symptoms, the use of an
illicit drug, and the heavy use of alcohol. Model 5 added indicators of level of employment: no work (reference), worked 20
hours or less per week, and worked more than 20 hours per
week. Covariates for cross-level interactions between the effect
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of work and time on income were also included. Stata 9.2 was
used for all analyses (StataCorp, 2005).
Like most income data, the distribution of income for this
study sample was positively skewed. Using a log transformation failed to address the distributional problems associated
with skewed data. To address the positively skewed data, we
used a bootstrap approach to empirically estimate the standard
errors for the fixed and random effects. Simulation studies
have demonstrated that bootstrapping effectively reduces the
bias in standard errors associated with skewed income data
and allows the coefficients to be displayed in their original
dollar units (Afifi, Kotlerman, Ettner, & Cowan, 2007; Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993).
Another issue with the self-reported income data was the
presence of outliers. We assumed there were two potential
sources of error leading to outliers. Outliers may have resulted
from misreported or misrecorded data, or they may have occurred when study participants received a large one-time cash
allotment, such as a retroactive SSI benefit or an inheritance.
If income reported was more than four standard deviations
above the mean, then the observation was considered eligible
for winsorizing. This applied to 13 income data. Winsorizing
the outliers was done by replacing the outlier with the next adjacent order statistic (Huber, 2002). For example, if a study participant reported $10,000 of monthly income from SSI and the
next highest reported monthly SSI income value for that study
participant was $850, $850 was substituted for $10,000. Study
participants that indicated receiving a specific source of income
but either refused to provide an amount or did not know how
much they had received were assigned mean values.
Results
Differentiating study participants by primary income
group revealed some demographic differences within the
study sample (see Table 1). Study participants that requalified
for SSI benefits under another disability category were significantly older than the rest of the study sample. Study participants that lost SSI benefits and relied on some other type of
public assistance tended to be female and African American.
Former SSI DA&A beneficiaries residing in Alameda County
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and San Francisco County were more likely have received
public assistance (i.e., SSI, TANF, or GA) following the policy
change, while study participants from San Joaquin County
were more likely to have fallen into the no public assistance
group. In comparison to the other three counties, San Joaquin
County would be considered less urban and more agricultural.
There was no difference in educational level between the three
groups.
Table 1. Baseline Demographic Information by Primary Income
Group.
Retained
SSpublic

n =193
Male (585
Age (years) (SD)***
Ethnicity (0)
African American**
Caucasian
Hispanic
Other
County of residence (%)
Alameda***
San Francisco***
San Joaquin***
Santa Clara
High school graduate (%)

Other

No public
assistance

assistance
n- 87

45.1 (8.42)

43,7
41.3 (7.67)

621
41.5 (8.08)

43.8
32.8
17.2
6.3

52.9
195
17.2
10.3

32.6
28.8
20.2
12.1

32.1
37.8
18.1
11.9
53.4

39.1
24.1
27.6
9.2
54.0

17.4
15.2
53.8
13.6
60.6

Comparisons made using one-way ANOVA and Pearson's chi-square tests.
p < 0,05; **p < 0,01: ***p < 0,001.

Table 2 displays the results of five multilevel growth curve
models for estimating total income following termination of
the DA&A category. The first model indicates that the mean
income for all study participants up to 3.5 years following the
policy change was $652.62, over $100 less than the average
income prior to losing SSI DA&A benefits ($766.54; data not
shown). The second model adds a fixed effect for time and a
random effect for individual differences in the change of total
income over time. From this model, the estimated increase of a
study participant's income was approximately $0.11/day over
the course of the study, when not controlling for any other variables. After 3.5 years, this would equate into an average total
income of approximately $724 for this study sample. When
a study participant's baseline income and primary source of
income following the policy change are added to the model
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(Model 3), we find a significant decrease in the total income
of former DA&A beneficiaries that were unable to retain or
requalify for SSI benefits. When compared to SSI retainers,
study participants that lost SSI benefits averaged over $236
less in total income following the policy change, adjusting
for baseline income and the number of days since the initial
interview.
Model 4 adds demographic, mental health, and substance
abuse covariates to the model. Not surprisingly, having a
high school degree or its equivalent was positively related to
income; however, increases in age and being male were associated with lower income. Residents of Alameda County and
San Joaquin County experienced significantly less income than
residents of San Francisco. This model also indicates that study
participants from the Other ethnicity category earned significantly less income, as well as study participants reporting any
serious mental health symptomatology, when adjusting for
other covariates.
The final model adds employment and a cross-level interaction examining the effect of employment on individual differences in the time slope. This full model includes interaction
coefficients for working 20 hours or less, working more than 20
hours per week, and time since initial interview. Other models
(not shown here) tested the other interactions between employment, primary income group, any mental health symptom,
any illicit drug use, heavy alcohol use, and time since initial
interview; only the interaction representing working more
than 20 hours per week and time since initial interview had a
significant effect on the time slope. These results indicate that
study participants who worked more than 20 hours per week
had a significantly higher rate of income change over time,
while study participants that were unable to achieve substantial rates of hourly employment experienced no change in their
total monthly income over time.
Discussion
The primary function of any welfare state is to ensure the
economic security and basic material sufficiency of its citizens
(Gilbert & Terrell, 2006). Findings from this study indicate that
reforms to the Supplemental Security Income program
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Table 2.

.§

income Growth
Models.

8_

Fixed Effects (SE)
652.62
(8.04).

Intercept
Time since initial
interview (days)

583.85
(12.60)-.
0.11
(0.02)***

Baseline income
Other public
assistance group
No public assistance
group

443.57
(3240)-.
0.11
(0.02)***
0.35
(0.05)"
-236.55
(18.63)***
-236.08
(2812)*

Age (years)
Male
High school graduate
Arican American
Hispanic
Other ethnicitx

756.49
(72.85)".
0,03
(0.02)
0.26
(0.04).
-278.32
(16.77) *
-355.86
(22.05)*
-3.75
(0.98).
-47.40
(14.73)**
40.59
(14.59)**

-8.96
(21.72)
-24.29
(27.81)

0.53
(19.82)
-24.35
(23.56)

-76.31

-36.18
(28.61)
-52.54
(17.43)**

Otethiiy(30.17)*
-66.90

Alameda (ountv AlaedaCouty(21.63)**
San Joaquin Count
anta Clara Co

unta

-53.02
anoaunCut(20.84)*
-4.02
araounty(32.46)

Any mental health

-85.34
(29.96)**
35.55
(26.92)
-12.88
(29.03)

svmptom
Any illicit drug use
Heav

852.38
(78.57)***
0.12
(0.02)***
0.31
(0.04)***
-246.74
(15.89)***
-240.25
(24 83)*
-6.27
(1.24)***
-60.79
(17.59)***
64.76
(14.96)***

alcohol rse

Worked <20 hours

-43.18
(24.22)
-24.04
(29.03)
-39.12
(23.62)
35.51
(24.76)
0.99
(20.45)
193.33
(48.01)***

370.28

Worked > 20 hours

(10747)***
0.02
(0.10)
0.41
(0.12) .

Worked < 20 hours b
time interaction
Worked > 20 hours by
time interaction
Random Effects (SE)

265.15
260.90
225.86
(27,75)***
(24,17)***
(23.28)***
0.22
0.31
0.31
0
Random time slope
Radoteslpe(0.04)***
(0.04)***
(0.03)***
(0.02).
-0.29
-0.30
-0.37
-0.56
(0.09)-(0.10)-(0.09)-(0.11)"
340.30
306.03
306.16
305.56
291.80
Within-person
(13.17)***
(28.34)***
(18.77)***
(26.04)***
(22.87)
p< 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p< 0.001. Reference groups: Retained SSI (primary income group),
San Francisco (county), and Caucasian (ethnicity), and No work (employment).
Between-person

314.92
(14.98)***

317.10
(29.01)***
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that eliminated income and health care benefits to low-income
substance abusers actually compromised the economic security of some of America's most vulnerable and disadvantaged
citizens. While some former SSI DA&A beneficiaries were able
to attain substantial gainful employment (36.5% of our study
sample that failed to requalify for SSI benefits reported working
20 hours or more per week at some point following the policy
change; the average income for these study participants was
approximately $1145 per month at the 42-month follow-up),
many study participants (49.3%) reported never experiencing
any employment following their loss of federal income maintenance benefits. The average total monthly income of study
participants that lost their formal cash assistance and did not
experience any employment up to 3.5 years following the policy
change was only $379 (42-month follow-up; data not shown).
Expectations by policymakers that former SSI DA&A beneficiaries that did not requalify for SSI benefits under another disability category would find employment and achieve a subsistent level of self-sufficiency were only partially realized. For
a significant proportion of this population, the policy change
was associated with reduced income and increased economic
hardship.
Study participants that did requalify for SSI benefits under
another disability category were able to recoup over 93% of
their baseline income 3.5 years following the policy change,
adjusting for inflation. For study participants that lost benefits
and could not requalify for SSI benefits, income recuperation
following elimination of the DA&A category was significantly
more difficult. The group of study participants that relied on
some other type of public assistance was the most severely affected, losing nearly 22% of their immediate economic security.
The rationale that most former SSI DA&A beneficiaries would
requalify for SSI benefits under another disability and carry
on with their lives uninterrupted was neither prudent nor realistic. In the current study, nearly 40% of study participants
that did not requalify for SSI benefits ended up relying on
some other form of public assistance as their primary source of
income following the policy change. Policymakers should be
concerned that eliminating an eligibility category in a federal
public assistance program simply resulted in a significant proportion of former beneficiaries shifting to less economically
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substantial forms of state and local public assistance (i.e.,
TANF and GA). This also led to increased involvement among
informal mechanisms of care, such as family, friends, and communities, requiring these groups to absorb much of the responsibility and burden of providing economic support to former
public assistance recipients. From this perspective, the policy
change fell short of meeting many of its original goals.
Speculation that substance abuse among former SSI DA&A
beneficiaries would have a negative effect on their ability to
achieve self-sufficiency following the policy change was not
supported by statistical evidence. For this study sample,
alcohol and drug use did not have a significant effect on level of
post-policy-change income. Surprisingly, this was also true for
individuals reporting serious mental health symptoms. From
previous research, we know a substantial proportion of former
SSI DA&A beneficiaries that did not requalify for SSI benefits
continued to suffer serious mental health issues following the
policy change (Hogan, Speiglman, & Norris, 2007; Watkins, et
al., 2001). It is interesting that in the current study our mental
health indicator was not a significant predictor of income following the policy change. The fact that individual characteristics, such as alcohol and drug use and mental illness, did not
have a significant effect on post-policy-change levels of income
may alert researchers to examine more systemic or structural influences on the income maintenance of former welfare
recipients, such as access to transportation and available child
care services. This is an area for future research.
There were limitations to this study. The initial quasi-experimental research design limits our confidence to state that
the policy change was the cause of the reduction in income
for study participants that lost SSI benefits. Another important limitation of this study relates to measurement reliability and validity. Measures of income and employment were
based on self-reports. The inaccurate reporting of these variables by study participants could have critical implications for
this study. There were also limitations to the study's sampling
method and external validity. The study sample was limited
by the sampling frame provided by Maximus, the referral and
monitoring agency responsible for tracking SSI DA&A beneficiaries in Northern California. SSI DA&A recipients not known
to Maximus were unavailable for selection. This undoubtedly
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resulted in selection bias. Finally, results from this study cannot
be generalized to all former SSI DA&A beneficiaries. Northern
California has regional variations that may have affected outcomes for this population. For example, during the time of this
study, the economy in Northern California was very good, possibly allowing for better income and employment outcomes
among study participants.
Conclusion
Social welfare policy reforms of the mid 1990s were intended
to reduce the number of Americans receiving public assistance
by promoting personal responsibility and self-sufficiency.
During this movement, politicians attempted to cleanse the
welfare rolls of "undeserving" recipients and replace assumed
welfare dependence with work. By eliminating the SSI DA&A
category, politicians theorized that low-income individuals
with a legitimate physical or mental health disability would
retain their public assistance benefits through the SSI requalification process, and low-income substance abusers would be
expelled from the public dole and forced to find alternative
sources of income, ideally employment. Whether you philosophically agree with this method of welfare reform is not the
current issue; what is important is to understand the effect such
policymaking decisions have on social welfare beneficiaries.
Proponents of the policy change estimated that 75% of
former SSI DA&A beneficiaries would requalify for SSI benefits under another disability category. When only 35% of this
population retained their SSI benefits, policymakers should
have realized that the social welfare of some of our society's
most vulnerable members had been compromised-a result
that is antithetical to the goals and objectives of a progressive
welfare state and a healthy society.
Some former SSI DA&A beneficiaries were able to find
employment and achieve self-sufficiency; however, a substantial proportion was left to suffer increased hardship. When
making policy changes that affect marginalized and disadvantaged populations, policymakers should expect some negative
consequences. If policymakers are purposefully going to cut a
hole in the "safety net" of this country's social welfare system,
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they must have contingencies for the poor and disabled that
fall through it.
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We trace key policy changes that affected use of the Medicare home
health benefit from the 1980s through the prospective payment
system implemented in 2000, analyzing the impact on three measures of home care use: expenditures, users and visits. We demonstrate the impact of policies generated in the legislative, the judicial, and the executive branches of government and the gaming
behavior of home health agencies in response to policy changes.
Our analysis suggests that the policy itself and the implementation process are critical to understanding benefit use. The incentives in the policies and agency reactions had the potential to generatefraud in two directions, either over or underuse. Throughout
this history, use of the benefit was driven less by patient need than
by arbitrary interpretations of eligibility. These interpretations
were in turn influenced by opposing ideologies favoring redistribution based on market principles versus those based on need.
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Introduction

Medicare, created in 1965 as an amendment to the Social
Security Act (P.L. 89-97), established the first system of public
health insurance for the elderly in this country. The original
statute focused on covering older adults' acute health care
needs, since this was perceived as the area in which the elderly
were most financially vulnerable to catastrophic losses. It did
not, however, rule out post-acute care as an appropriate option
to meet the healthcare needs of older adults. Both home health
care and nursing facility care were part of the original law.
However, home health care benefits were restricted. Under
Part A (the hospital insurance trust fund), home health services were limited to 100 days per benefit period for patients who
had spent at least three days in the hospital immediately prior
to receiving home care. Part B (the supplementary medical insurance trust fund) covered up to 100 days per year for patients with or without a hospital stay with both a deductible
($60 in the beginning) and a 20% copay.
All patients under the original law and currently have to
meet certain eligibility criteria in order to have Medicare pay
for home health care. They have to be homebound, in need of
intermittent skilled care, have a physician certify and review
the care plan, and the agency delivering the service has to be
Medicare certified. The services rendered by the agency have
to be medically reasonable and necessary in order for Medicare
to reimburse the agency. Specific services covered by Medicare
include: skilled nursing, physical therapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, home health aide services, and medical
social work.
Actual eligibility criteria have changed little since the
program's inception. However, interpretation of those criteria has varied historically, at times enhancing benefit access
and at other times restricting access. In this paper, we analyze
the major policy changes in the program and their impact
on utilization of the home care benefit, mainly in the fee-forservice program. We give a brief summary of policy debates
and changes in the 1970s to set the stage for dramatic changes
which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. We highlight changes
in program use measured by actual figures (e.g. costs, users,
and visits) as well as growth in use over time. Our rationale
for discussing actual use and program growth is related to the
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assumptions made by analysts at various historical points and
the use of growth rates to argue for program cuts. Finally, we
offer a critical analysis of the policy incentives, their impact on
agency practice and on benefit use.
Major Policy Shifts and Impact on the Program
The 1970s
The political atmosphere of the 1970s was one of Medicare
expansion. Medicare was viewed by many policy makers as
a "first step toward universal [health] coverage" (Ball, 1996,
p. 13). For example, in 1972, amendments to Social Security
(PL.92-603) expanded Medicare eligibility to those receiving
Social Security Disability and, in 1978, to those with End Stage
Renal Disease, thus enhancing Medicare access for chronically ill individuals. In home health care, specifically, the 1972
amendments eliminated the Part B coinsurance requirement
(Benjamin, 1993). Waiver of liability was established for denied
claims when the provider or beneficiary was not at fault (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1978). Also, homemaker service
delivery demonstrations were established (Benjamin, 1993).
Interestingly, the number of Medicare certified home health
agencies declined between 1970 and 1975 (Estes & Swan, 1993).
However, the number of persons served and total visits gradually increased through the 1970s while the number of visits per
user remained the same (Table 1). These increases make sense
in light of the expanding categories of Medicare enrollees and
elimination of the coinsurance barrier (Benjamin, 1993).
Supporters of home health care advocated for expansion of
the benefit to cover chronic health care needs in the late 1970s.
The rationale for expansion rested on three main points. First,
home health care was seen as a less costly alternative to hospital and nursing home care (Congressional Budget Office [CBO],
1977; General Accounting Office [GAO], 1977). Second, home
health care was considered a more humane way to provide
treatment, as it was older adults' preference to receive care
at home. Finally, Medicare needed to better cover the major
health care problems of the elderly, that is, chronic medical
conditions that did not require hospitalization (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1977, 1978; U.S. Senate, 1979).
Medicare is oriented to the coverage of acute episodic
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illness, and yet the illnesses of the elderly tend to be
chronic.... Certainly outpatient drugs, preventive
medical services, and more flexibility in the delivery
of home health care would serve to delay the need
for other more costly types of services. (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1977, p. 2)

Although there was ample pressure for expansion of the
benefit, there were also concerns related to inconsistent standards within the system, which could result in inappropriate service denials (underuse) or unnecessary service use
(overuse) [Benjamin, 1993]. Issues were also raised regarding
the variation in unit costs for similar services across agencies,
and interpretations of reasonable costs and allowable administrative expenses. These inconsistencies made it impossible to
predict total program costs from year to year and thus difficult to project the financial impact of expansionary program
changes (GAO, 1978a; GAO, 1978b). These issues were raised
repeatedly by the GAO over time, but little was done to eradicate these flaws.
The 1980s: Expansion vs. Retrenchinent
OBRA 1980: Expanding the Home Health Care Benefit. Several benefit changes were made by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980 (OBRA). The Act removed the Part A
visit limit, 3-day hospital stay and the Part B deductible. Now
the benefit could be available to eligible enrollees without a
prior hospital stay and on an unlimited basis not subject to
out-of-pocket expenditures. Congressional intent was clearly
to expand services. The law, however, did not provide additional clarity on the intermittent care or homebound criteria
nor did it require the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to establish consistent standards for intermediaries (Keenan, Fanale, Ripsin, & Billows, 1990).
OBRA opened the Medicare home health door to for-profit
providers by eliminating the state licensure requirement for
proprietary agencies. In fact, between 1983 and 1986 the rate of
growth of proprietary agencies was 90% while non-profits grew
by 21%. In 1982 there were 471 for-profit agencies in the U.S. In
1983 this number increased to 997 (Estes & Swan, 1993). Early
studies and audits were demonstrating a tendency among proprietary providers to participate in fraudulent practices, such
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as illegal subcontracting and referral kickbacks (Benjamin,
1993; Estes & Swan, 1993; U.S. House of Representatives, 1978).
Yet, this change complemented the Reagan administration's
emphasis on market-based alternatives for health and human
services.
After enactment of the changes, use of Medicare home care
increased, but not at an alarming rate (see Table 1 and Figures
1-3). Although total users and users per 1,000 enrollees increased, the rate of growth in users actually declined between
1978 and 1984. Also, total visits and visits per user increased,
but the rate of growth in visits slowed dramatically. Fears that
expanded home care would not generate savings for the overall
Medicare program encouraged CMS to continue their strict interpretation of the homebound and intermittent care criteria,
thereby continuing the high claims denial rate (Benjamin, 1993;
Keenan at al., 1990). Although some client outcomes, including longevity and satisfaction with life, were improved with
the receipt of expanded home care, CMS feared that increased
longevity among patients with chronic conditions could increase need for services. Second, expanding eligibility criteria
would make the benefit available to people who would otherwise not be in the system, as home health care might substitute for nursing home and/or informal care. In fact, research
showed that even if hospital and nursing home use decreased
in a given study, generally total health costs increased (GAO,
1983). Furthermore, GAO suggested that inefficiencies in the
home health cost system might contribute to increased costs.
The rhetorical battle between expansion and retrenchment
continued through the 1980s.
Expansion or revision in the present system is being
considered because of: changes in health care demands
stemming from growth in the size of the disabled
elderly population; the need to reduce high government
expenditures for nursing home and hospital care; and a
desire to improve the physical and mental health status
of the elderly. (GAO, 1983, p. i)
Congress intended to expand the benefit. However, the executive branch was controlled in the 1980s by fiscally conservative republican presidents focused on reducing the size of
the federal budget and devolution of social and health care to
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state and informal sectors. Medicare was not immune to these
reduction initiatives.
Inpatient Prospective Payment System and
Controlling Benefit Access (1983-1987)
In fact, the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS)
was established in 1983 to control Medicare hospital costs.
Implementation of the IPPS led to earlier patient discharges, with sicker patients released from the hospital in greater
need of transitional support (Benjamin, 1993; Estes & Swan,
1993; Feder & Lambrew, 1996; Komisar & Feder, 1998). The assumption was that post-acute services, including home health,
would increase dramatically due to this policy. However, there
were only minor increases in the number of home health users
through 1986, while total visits and visits per user decreased
between 1985 and 1987 (see Table 1). Even actual expenditures
decreased after 1984. Between 1983 and 1987 the growth rates
for home health use hit negative numbers (see Figures 1-3),
with the biggest declines in visits and visits per user.
Decreases in home care use were attributed to two CMS
transmittals to Fiscal Intermediaries (FI) issued in 1984 and
1986. The first transmittal clarified the type of care that would
be covered, "daily.. .care of an indefinite duration will not be
considered to meet the intermittent requirement and such services are not covered under the Medicare home health benefit"
(Duggan, 1988, p. 1495). The second transmittal, responding
to questions from the FIs seeking further clarification on the
term daily, defined daily as "five days per week.. .therefore
care which is ordered five, six, or seven days per week would
be considered daily care" (Duggan, 1988, p. 1495) and would
disqualify a beneficiary from the benefit.
These transmittals in essence forced the intermediaries
to use a new standard for eligibility. This standard indicated
that patients had to meet both the part-time and intermittent
criteria in order to be eligible, since prior to these transmittals, the part-time category would pick up daily care as long
as it was not for an indefinite period of time. Furthermore,
intermediaries denied the claims in full, rather than denying
the excess days. Therefore, beneficiaries with such needs were
losing complete access to the benefit.
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In the wake of these transmittals claims reviews increased,
with concurrent demand for more detailed documentation,
and an increase in claims denial rates from 3.1% in 1985 to
9.0% in 1987 (GAO, 1990). Likewise, agencies reacted to these
changes by doing less home care under the Medicare benefit.
The number of claims filed decreased by 5% between 1985 and

1986 (Estes & Swan, 1993). Given the retrospective reimbursement procedure, "home health agencies were financially liable
for uncovered claims, [and] the availability of services tended
to closely reflect coverage rules" (Feder & Lambrew, 1996, p.
105). Unless the provider had a low pattern of denials, and
thus benefited from the waiver of liability, they would have
to eat the cost of denied claims. In less than one year, from
February to November 1986, the percentage of agencies that
lost this waiver went from 16% to 32% (GAO, 1990).
This new policy created by the transmittals could have been
an attempt to respond to GAO's recommendations to improve
overall system monitoring and administration. However, the
actual impact of these changes did little in the way of establishing consistent and uniform guidelines on reasonable and necessary costs, on patient care costs vs. administrative costs and
on upper limits for reimbursements. CMS failed to address the
identified weaknesses in the system and instead created an arbitrary rule to attempt to curb utilization. Although Congress
was in favor of expanding the program, the Executive branch
at this time was keen on reducing federal government outlays
for domestic programs (Benjamin, 1993) and likely influenced
the reaction of the administrative department responsible for
issuing these transmittals.
Duggan v. Bowen (1987): The Push for Expansion
Pressure from increased demand for post-acute care due to
the IPPS and tightening of eligibility limits by CMS generated
ripe conditions for court challenges. Of specific importance
was the charge that CMS, through its intermediaries, was using
arbitrary mechanisms to constrain expenditure growth (Feder
& Lambre-, 1996). This culminated in a class action lawsuit
filed in 1987 (Duggan, 1988). The Duggan court ruled that CMS
had violated the letter of the law and the intent of Congress
that only full-time care be excluded from the benefit by
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creating a stricter definition of daily care and requiring that beneficiaries meet both criteria, "part-time and intermittent" to be
eligible. The court also looked at the history of the benefit and
interpretations of the statute up to 1984 and found the new
transmittals to be antithema to previous practice. Likewise,
the court found the changes to be arbitrary and capricious.
Someone could get up to eight hours of care per day on four
days per week for 32 hours per week, while a person needing
one hour of care per day for five or more days (five-seven
hours per week) would be ineligible. CMS also violated the
Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. 553) by not issuing a
notice for public comment prior to distributing the transmittal. "Defendant's conversion of the 'part-time or intermittent'
requirement to a 'part-time and intermittent' requirement effected material changes. As such, these changes constitute a
new rule" (Duggan, 1988, p. 1514).
CMS was forced to revise the Medicare home health
manual. The new manual stated:
the determination of whether abeneficiary needs skilled
nursing care should be based upon the beneficiary's
unique condition and individual needs, without
regard to whether the illness or injury is acute, chronic,
terminal or expected to extend over a long period of
time. (Medicare Manual, 1989, as cited in Keenan et al.,
1990, p.1043)
The manual, issued in 1989, included several key changes
in terms of the interpretation of coverage. First, CMS redefined eligibility criteria from part-time and intermittent to
part-time or intermittent need for skilled care. This allowed
those who needed care on greater than four days per week
to still receive it. Second, observations by a skilled professional and maintenance therapy were added as medically
reasonable and necessary services which could establish eligibility. Patients could be given therapy in order to maintain
functional levels. Likewise, nursing visits pre-Duggan had to
be for active treatment, whereas post-Duggan, care management services could be included under skilled care. Finally,
each visit had to be reviewed separately before denying the
entire claim. This added tremendous burden and cost to the
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intermediary process, leading to a reduction in claims denied
(Feder & Lambrew, 1996; GAO, 1996; Komisar & Feder, 1998).
The net effect of these changes was that Medicare home
care became available to more beneficiaries for less acute
conditions and longer periods of time (GAO, 1996; Feder &
Lambrew, 1996). The changes may have prevented or reduced
nursing home placement as well. Not only did the proportion of elderly residing in nursing homes decline (from 4.6
to 4.1%), but the average stay decreased by 18% from 1985 to

1995 (Komisar & Feder, 1998). Furthermore, had it not been
for the transmittals in the mid-80s, expansion of home health
care probably would have increased gradually over this time,
due to the natural effects of changes in the health care delivery
system, technology and demographic patterns.
The 1990s: Rising Health Care Costs and Cost Control Measures
The patterns of increased use reflect both the trend of expanding categories of eligibility and increasing use at the beneficiary level. Post-Duggan growth in utilization spiked dramatically in the first two years after the revised manual was issued
in 1989, but declined steadily thereafter (Table 1 and Figures
1-3). For instance, the rate of growth between 1989 and 1990 in
total expenditures was 48% and between 1990 and 1991 it was
40%. However, expenditure growth declined to 34% in 1992
and to 5% in 1996. Likewise, growth in charges per user rose
dramatically in the first two years after the revised manual,
but declined each year from 1991. The number of users per
1,000 enrollees grew by 12% between 1989 and 1990, compared to 4% between 1988 and 1989, but by 1996 the growth
rate was back down to 4.9%. Likewise, total visits and visits
per user grew dramatically between 1988 and 1990. Growth in
total visits peaked in 1990 at 48% but was down to 6% in 1996.
Growth in visits per user crested in the first year after issuance
of the revised manual at 33% and then declined to a rate of
only 2.78% in 1996.
However, concerns grew around whether incentives
created by the payment system and benefit structure and lack
of administrative oversight were resulting in more home care
being provided than was needed for appropriate care. The
service-specific per-visit limits under which agencies were
paid offered little incentive for providers to control volume
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per person. At this time, each service's per-visit limit was
based on 112% of the national average for freestanding home
health agencies adjusted for wage and regional differences.
If the agency kept its costs below the national visit limits for
each service, they could simply increase profit by providing
more visits. Thus, agencies had little incentive to deliver an efficient amount or mix of services. Also, copays and deductibles
for home health care had been eliminated; beneficiaries had
little incentive to refuse services. During this period, average
payment per visit only increased by 2.2%, indicating that agencies were using lower cost visit types (Komisar & Feder, 1998).
Tremendous growth in the number of proprietary providers,
increasing their market share from 36% (5,647) in 1990 to 64%
(10,524) in 1997, generated suspicion that the benefit was too
generous (GAO, 1998).
Simultaneously, Congress began cutting Medicare's administrative funds. Thus, when claims began to increase,
funds to review the claims and to monitor the process were cut
between 1989 and 1991 (GAO, 1991). Finally, CMS still had not
developed a uniform claims processing system. Even though
the number of intermediaries was reduced to nine in 1989
from 47 in 1987 (GAO, 1990), each intermediary had its own
system, which made it almost impossible to gain accurate data
on spending patterns and potential abuse.
Broader concerns in the 1990s over rising health care costs,
their increasing share of GDP and potential depletion of the
Hospital Insurance Trust fund, generated much activity in relation to controlling overall Medicare program costs. In addition, as described above, the increase in home health use and
oversight problems made the home health benefit ripe for
more careful scrutiny by policy makers attempting to control
spending and reduce the deficit. Home health care was one
of the few health care markets that had not yet been fiscally
regulated.
Congress began looking for methods to control expenditures and in 1990 enacted the National Home Health
Prospective Payment Demonstration (NHHPPD). This law
resurrected the original authorization to study alternative reimbursement methods generated in 1983 as part of the Orphan
Drug Act (P.L. 97-414). However, it was not until 1990 that
CMS began to study alternative reimbursement strategies
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(Leon, Davitt, & Marainen, 2002). The NHHPPD attempted to
determine whether program expenditures could be reduced
by enhancing program efficiency in terms of service delivery.
The program tested "a predetermined per-visit payment rate"
(1990-1993) and a per-episode payment system (1995-1998)
(Cheh, 2001, p.1).
Even though utilization had already begun to decline
within two years of the revised manual, the first direct attempt
at controlling costs under this program consisted of a two-year
freeze on the inflation (market-basket) updates for home health
care beginning in 1994 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993). The rate of growth in users decreased steadily after the
freeze. However, total visits and visits per user growth jumped
between 1993 and 1994. This suggests that agencies may have
countered the freeze on their cost limits by providing more
visits to eligible enrollees. Thus, although the freeze reduced
expenditures overall, it did little to make the program more
adequate or efficient, because the incentives encouraged agencies to simply provide more visits to recoup their losses. It did
not, unfortunately, encourage agencies to gear service to actual
patient need and reimburse accordingly.
The 1990s: The Pursuitof FraudulentPractice
Concerns about the program also centered on whether the
program was being turned into a long-term care benefit. Leon,
Parente, and Neuman (1997) found that only 10 percent of
beneficiaries received over 200 visits, yet these 10 percent accounted for over 42 percent of expenditures for Medicare home
health care in 1994. However, such patients tend to have more
complex care needs, to use greater amounts of hospital care, to
need multiple episodes of home care and to have severe functional impairments (Leon, et al., 1997; Lewin Group, 1998).
The other problem, the tremendous degree of variation
in payments and visits across geographic regions and agency
types, was generated by a lack of consistent standards and
procedures for claims review across the fiscal intermediaries.
For example, two of the nine intermediaries served the vast
majority of agencies with higher than normal utilization patterns (GAO, 1996), suggesting that lack of oversight and consistent standards might have played a role in any inappropriate benefit use. This problem had been clearly identified in
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numerous government reports as early as the 1970s (Benjamin
1993; GAO, 1978a, 1978b). Studies by the Office of Inspector
General (OIG), using 1993 data, found that "the average reimbursement per beneficiary for the four [types of agencies
studied] ranged from $1,534 to $7,978" (OIG, 1995a, p. 7; 1995b).
They also found wide variation in the average number of visits
with a range of 27 visits for the low utilization agencies and
141 visits for the highest agencies. The fact that proprietary
agencies provided significantly more visits than non-profit or
public agencies (GAO, 1996) increased suspicions regarding
fraudulent practice.
The highest regional average was found in Region IV, including Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North and South Carolina and Tennessee (OIG, 1995b; GAO,
1996). Some of this regional variation may have been attributable to lack of alternative services (Mauser & Miller, 1994).
Other research found that patient characteristics could partially explain such variation (Schore, 1994). For example, beneficiaries in the East South Central region (Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) with the second highest
use rates in 1993, "were more likely to be frail, chronically ill
and in poorer health" and from non-metropolitan counties
with high proportions of impoverished elderly (GAO, 1996,
p.13).
From the mid-1990s Congress pushed for additional
programs focused on uncovering fraud and abuse within
the Medicare system, including the Medicare Home Health
Initiative, Operation Restore Trust and the Health Insurance
Portability Act (P.L. 104-191). Using the high use figures from
the early years after the Duggan decision, a picture was painted
of a benefit running rampant and eating ever larger amounts
of the GDP. Clearly, however, utilization had begun to level
off, and growth rates were declining for the most part after
1991. Interestingly, early findings from OIG reported 219 cases
(in five states studied) of potential fraud and abuse in 1995.
Only 20% of these fraud cases were home health agencies,
and of those cases, only one conviction and one settlement
concerned home health providers (OIG, 1995c). As with other
social welfare programs, the argument regarding abuse of the
system may have been based more on a desire to curb costs
than on reality.
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The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997
Although expenditure growth had declined dramatically
through the 90s from a high of almost 40% in 1991 to only 5%
in 1996, the Republican-controlled Congress established the
rhetoric and defined the argument for additional program cuts
in the mid to late 1990s. Their argument rested on the premise
that home health spending was increasing disproportionately
compared to overall Medicare spending. For example, analysts began citing that while the average annual growth rate
for total Medicare spending was only 11% (1989-1996) the
average annual growth rate for home health care was 29% in
that same time period (Komisar & Feder, 1998). They stressed
two assumptions to define the problem causing the so-called
rampant growth in the benefit: 1) home health care was being
turned into a long-term care benefit, which was not part of the
original legislative intent; and 2) fraud and abuse were driving
much of this inappropriate utilization. Congressional activity
culminated in the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
which made major changes to the Medicare program overall
and specifically to the home health care benefit.
The key provisions relevant to home health care included
creation of a new, short-term reimbursement structure-the
interim payment system (IPS), elimination of venipuncture as
a qualifying benefit, creation of a surety bond procedure for
providers, establishment of a prospective payment system
(PPS) and an additional 15% cut when the PPS went into effect
(budget neutrality clause). Also, the Act redefined the term intermittent for eligibility purposes to include:
skilled nursing care that is either provided or needed
on fewer than seven days each week or less than eight
hours of each day for periods of 21 days or less [with
extensions in exceptional circumstances when the need
for additional care is finite and predictable]. (Balanced
Budget Act, 1997, p. 224)
The Interim Payment System (1997)
The most substantial change in terms of cost-cutting potential and home care practice was the IPS. There were two main
goals behind the creation of the IPS. First, this would immediately restrain expenditures within the home health program
by controlling volume per person. Second, it would allow
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time for CMS to ready a prospective payment system. In fact,
implementation of the PPS was delayed and the IPS extended
until October of 2000 (see Table 2 for Post-BBA legislation.) The
IPS set new cost limits for Medicare-certified home health care
agencies. Under the IPS, agencies would be reimbursed based
on "the lowest of: (1) actual costs; (2) new per-visit limits; or (3)
a blended, agency-specific per-beneficiary annual limit" (BBA,
1997, p.87-88). Visit limits were set at 105% of the median national visit limits, down from 112% of the mean national costs.
This was increased to 106% after October 1998 (see Table 2).
Early projections indicated that the per-visit limits alone could
have reduced expenditures by 15-22% (Berke, 1998; Forster,
1998).
However, most agencies would fall under the per-beneficiary limit. The per-beneficiary limit was the first time that
Medicare established a cap on home health reimbursement at
the beneficiary level. This limit was calculated using a blended
formula incorporating 75% of the agency's average per-beneficiary payment and 25% of the regional average from 1994,
which, due to the market basket freeze, meant 1993 costs (Berke,
1998; Forster, 1998; GAO, 1998). This limit was also increased
slightly for some agencies after October, 1998 (see Table 2).
As can be seen in Table 1, utilization plummeted after
implementation of the IPS. Dramatic decreases in users, visits
and expenditures occurred. In fact, utilization decreased much
more than originally projected by the Congressional Budget
Office (Leon, Davitt, & Marainen, 2002). Growth in the program
hit negative numbers; growth in total charges and total visits
declined by almost 40%, while charges and visits per user declined by almost 30% from 1997 to 1998. Negative growth in
the program continued through 2001.
There were several problems with the IPS. First, agency
reimbursements were reduced to 1993 levels, representing a
dramatic reduction. Second, the per-beneficiary limit introduced capitation in the traditional home care benefit for the
first time, forcing agencies into a risk-sharing arrangement,
thus requiring drastic changes in how agencies delivered services. Although the per-beneficiary limit was an aggregate
agency limit, it was not case-mix adjusted for the varying care
needs of individual patients (Berke, 1998; GAO, 1998; Komisar
& Feder, 1998). Many agency directors did not understand the
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aggregate nature of the limit and thus slashed services to each
patient (Davitt & Choi, 2007). Also, agencies were not given
their per-beneficiary limits until March of 1998, requiring
them to operate for several months without knowing their cap
(Leon, Davitt, & Marainen, 2002). This encouraged agencies to
cut services more drastically than necessary to ensure financial
stability. These problems and the agencies' reactions explain
the dramatic drop in use and costs at the beginning of the IPS.
Lacking case-mix adjustment, agencies were encouraged
to discriminate in admissions against higher-cost patients,
either those needing more care, those further from the agency,
or those with expensive care needs (Kaye & Davitt, 1999). "The
adjuster would not only protect access to care but would also
help ensure that Medicare was paying agencies appropriately,"
that is, based on patient acuity (Dummit, 1998, p.10). Although
the rhetoric focused on fraud and abuse, the actual changes
did not focus on inappropriate use as the target for reduction.
Rather, the reductions were applied across the board and did
not attempt to provide a way for agencies to continue serving
legitimate, high-cost or high-use patients.
Also, the incentives in the capitated rates did not factor
in previous efficiency patterns of the agency, even though the
assumption was that those agencies with higher use and expenditure rates pre-BBA '97 were providing inappropriate, if
not fraudulent services to patients (Lewin, 1997). Because the
per-beneficiary limits were based on a blended formula, using
75 percent of the agency's average costs and 25 percent of the
region's average costs in 1994, agencies with higher reimbursements in 1994 received a higher reimbursement under the IPS.
Thus, those agencies that were operating in a fiscally conservative manner prior to the BBA '97, were penalized more severely under the IPS. Again, the design of the policy did not create
incentives to eliminate inappropriate use of the benefit.
Changes in Home Health CareAfter the IPS
Dramatic shifts in the system of care and the use of the
home health benefit occurred immediately after implementation of the IPS. Between 1997 and 1999, over 3,800 agencies
left the Medicare program (Davitt & Choi, 2006). Some studies
also documented increases in skilled nursing facility (SNF)
use during the IPS (Davitt & Marcus, 2008; Lin, Kane, Mehr,
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Madsen, & Petroski, 2006; McCall et.al., 2002). Also, agencies
altered their admissions practices in order to limit the number
of high-cost patients admitted, provided fewer services to individual patients than previously, and established stricter discharge procedures, especially for perceived high-cost patients
(Davitt & Choi, 2007; Markham-Smith, Maloy, & Hawkins,
1999; MedPAC, 1999). Directors used various strategies to
sustain the agency financially during these dramatic cuts in
Table 2: Legislative Changes to Medicare Home Health Care Post-BBA
Legislation

Changes to Home Health Care

Omnibus
Consolidated
and Emergency
Appropriations
Act of 1998
(Pub. L. 105-277)

Increased the per-visit reimbursement to 1 0 6 % of the
national median after October 1, 1998. Per-beneficiary limits
for established agencies (those that had full year
participation in Medicare before FY 1994) were increased
by 1/3 of the difference between their amount (lesser) and
the national median; agencies created between 94-98 were
increased to 100% of FY 94 costs; agencies created after
Oct. 1 1998 decreased to 75% of national median based on
98% of FY 1994 costs. Reduced home health market basket
updates for FY2002 and 2003. Changed effective date of PPS
implementation and 15% contingency reduction to October
1, 2000.

Medicare,
Medicaid
and SCHIP
Balanced Budget
Refinement Act
of 1999
(Pub. L. 106-113)

Delayed the 1500 reduction in payments until 1 year after
PPS implementation. Excluded durable medical equipment
from consolidated billing requirements.

Medicare,
Medicaid and
SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and
Protection Act of
2000
(Pub. L. 106-554)

Delayed the mandated 15% reduction in the PPS until
October 1, 2002. Reduced the rural add-on to 10' for 2 years
beginning April 1, 2001.

Medicare
Prescription Drug
Improvement and
Modernization
Act of 2003
(Pub. L. 108-173)

Eliminated OASIS assessments on non-Medicare patients.
Modified the rural add-on, 5% for 1 year begrining April
1, 2004. Established a 2-year demonstration study on the
homebound definition and a MedPAC study on payment
margins for home health agencies. Altered the market basket
(inflation) updates from fiscal to calendar year beginning
Jan. 1, 2005 and .8% reductions in updates from April 2004Dec.2006.

The Deficit
Reduction Act of
2005
(Pub. L. 109-171)

Restored the 5% rural add-on for one year. Established a
requirement for submission of health care quality data and
financial penalties beginning in 2007 for failure to report
quality data to CMS. Provided a 2.3% market basket update
in 2005 but 0% update for 2006. Lowered the fixed dollar
limit used to calculate outlier payments for 2005.
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reimbursements, including eliminating staff, shifting staff
roles, staff training on reimbursement methods, increased
use of telephone monitoring, increasing patient-family education and self-care, and cutting services to patients (Davitt,
2003; Davitt & Choi, 2007; Markham-Smith Maloy, & Hawkins,
1999).
Agencies cut staff and visits more dramatically for nonskilled services (home health aide and medical social work)
during the IPS. Skilled nursing and therapy services increased the most (Davitt & Choi, 2007; Komisar, 2002; McCall,
Petersons, Moore, & Korb, 2003; MedPAC, 1999; McCall et al.,
2001). Other studies showed that agencies were shifting dually
eligible patients from Medicare to Medicaid because they
could get more services under the Medicaid program (Davitt &
Choi, 2007; Spector, Cohen, & Pesis-Katz, 2004). Agencies also
reported greater referrals to aging network providers, and increased use of informal caregivers to supplement the agency's
service (Davitt & Choi, 2007). Again, such shifting of care from
one system to another does not necessarily mean savings in
overall expenditures-it simply shifts which component of the
health system is paying for care. Responsibility for care was
devolving from the federal to state and local levels, as well as
being informalized (Estes & Swan, 1993).
Studies demonstrated greater decreases in services for vulnerable subgroups of patients. Fitzgerald et al. (2006) found
larger decreases in use for elderly and female patients. McCall
et al. (2003) found higher-than-average decreases in home
health care use and the likelihood of any use during the IPS
period for beneficiaries over age 85, and a greater decrease
in visits for patients over 85 and with diabetes, heart failure,
cerebrovascular disease, and skin ulcers. While controlling
for predisposing and enabling characteristics, studies showed
that users with greater functional impairment saw a greater
decrease in visits than those with fewer impairments (Davitt
& Marcus, 2008; Liu et al., 2003). Other studies also found reductions in use of the benefit for less healthy users (Davitt &
Marcus, 2008; McKnight, 2006). Furthermore, studies found
greater decreases in access to or use of home health care for
minority beneficiaries (Davitt & Kaye, 2007; McCall et al., 2001;
McCall et al., 2003) and for lower-income beneficiaries after the
IPS (Davitt, 2003; Fitzgerald et al., 2006; McKnight, 2006).

Medicare Home Health Care

265

Such across-the-board cuts could not discriminate legitimate from illegitimate use. The goal of the IPS was to quickly
reduce costs. Thus, incentives in this policy were not tied directly to the provision of appropriate and adequate care. In
fact, the cuts may have generated additional problems related
to fraud when truly needy patients were discharged too
soon or denied access to the benefit. Retrospective research
studies provide evidence that vulnerable patients were more
dramatically affected by these changes. However, there are
mixed results regarding whether reduced access to this benefit
led to poorer health outcomes for home health users (McCall
2002; McKnight, 2006).
2000 and Beyond: Focus on the ProspectivePayment System (2000)
With implementation of the Prospective Payment System
(PPS) in October 2000, CMS began to deal with the chronic
oversight problems by establishing a structure which reimbursed agencies based on patient need rather than on arbitrary
criteria or agency cost history. The PPS continues the prospective payment arrangement but with case mix adjustment.
Agencies now receive a fixed payment for a 60-day episode of
care for each patient which is based on their acuity, originally
measured via 80 home health resource groups. Acuity is established through a comprehensive assessment, Outcomes and
Assessment Information Set (OASIS), conducted by the home
care agency, which measures client's clinical severity, functional status and service needs. Thus, agencies are paid based on
the expected service needs for different categories of patients,
rather than on actual cost to deliver the service (pre-BBA) or on
an arbitrarily derived per-beneficiary limit (IPS). Under PPS,
however, the agency continues to shoulder the financial risk of
serving the patient.
The main concern with the PPS was that its base rate was
established using cost figures from the drastically reduced IPS.
Thus, researchers continue to evaluate the impact on patients
and agencies. Studies show a slight decline in the likelihood
of home care use after the PPS was implemented (Murtaugh,
McCall, Moore, & Meadow, 2003), but this was much less
than under the IPS (Fitzgerald et al., 2006). After 2001, use of
the home health benefit gradually increased. While growth
rates moved onto the positive side, they remain well below

266
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
the average growth rate for the overall Medicare program
(see Table I and Figures 1-3). Also, over 1,200 agencies left
the Medicare program from 2000-2002 (Davitt &Choi, 2006).
Cuts in staff and visits were greater under the IPS than the
PPS. Agencies continued to cut non-skilled services more
than skilled services under the PPS (Davitt & Choi, 2007).
One study showed that patients with orthopedic and neurologic diagnoses experienced increases in access to home health
care during the first year of the PPS relative to other diagnosis
groupings (Murtaugh et al., 2003). Again, incentives under the
PPS (namely increased payment for therapy needs) encouraged agencies to target certain types of patients for whom they
could get higher reimbursements.
Figure 1: Expenditure Growth, Total and Per User
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Post-PPS Changes (2000-2008)
Early changes after the PPS focused mainly on adjustments
to agency reimbursements to achieve the mandated level of
savings [budget neutrality component of the BBA] (GAO,
2002). Research conducted by the GAO and MedPAC demonstrated higher payments than costs, on average, for agencies,
and MedPAC recommended decreases in or freezes on the
market basket updates (GAO, 2002; 2004; MedPAC, 2006; 2007).
Figure 3: Growth in Total and Per Person Visits
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Likewise, monitoring systems were established which require
agencies to report certain quality indicator data to CMS for the
Home Health Quality Initiative. Agency submission of quality
data was mandated beginning in calendar year 2007, with financial penalties for failure to submit (CMS, 2007). The focus
is on providing consumers with information on the practice
effectiveness of home health agencies. In addition, some analysts have recommended incorporating Medicare-agency risk
sharing in relation to profit-loss margins and/or tying agency
payment to outcome indicators (GAO, 2004; MedPAC, 2006).
The most substantial changes, scheduled to be implemented on January 1, 2008, will dramatically alter the case-mix
adjustment formula, resulting in 153 Home Health Resource
Groups. These revisions are the result of extensive research
which showed that the original case-mix model was no
longer accurate in predicting service needs and that therapy
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thresholds were inadequate (CMS, 2007b). In 2008 a new,
four-equation case-mix formula will be used, which expands
the number of therapy thresholds, the number of diagnosis
groups, and adds scores for certain conditions and certain secondary diagnoses. This model also "recognizes and differentiates payment for episodes of care based on whether a patient
is in.. .an early (1s' or 2 nd episode...) or later (the 3 d episode
and beyond...) episode of care as well as recognizing whether
a patient was a high therapy (14 or more therapy visits) or
low therapy (13 or fewer therapy visits) case" (CMS, 2007,
p. 49764). The expressed goal of these changes is to "ensure
that the payment system continues to produce appropriate
compensation for providers while retaining opportunities to
manage home health care efficiently" (CMS, 2007b, p. 25358).
Analysis
Assumptions regarding the goal of the Medicare home
health care benefit (acute care vs. long-term care) and the appropriate target population for service (post-acute vs. chronically ill) have been at the heart of this policy debate over time.
Fluctuations in these assumptions have dramatically altered
eligibility, at times expanding and at times restricting access. In
the early history, Congressional intent was focused on expansion. This was controlled by a conservative executive branch
focused on reducing the size of the federal government.
Likewise, CMS' inability to develop consistent standards for
review of practice was both influenced by this tug-of-war
(mixed messages and a desire to control costs by maintaining
vague guidelines) while also providing fuel for the debate (the
argument that variation in use patterns were indicative of the
need for cost control measures). Throughout the program's
history, policy interventions focused on controlling costs rather
than responding to legitimate need by improving quality and
efficient delivery. Likewise, policy changes generated reactions at the practice level. Agencies gamed the system, that is,
they strategically altered their admissions and service delivery practices in response to these changes, in order to continue
to provide services while maintaining fiscal stability (Dowd,
2004; Ford, Wells, & Bailey, 2004). Thus, both policy and implementation were critical to benefit use throughout this history
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(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).
Home health care trends are embedded in a larger socio-political-economic context that is influenced by and influences the
social construction of categories of redistribution (Calasanti &
Zajicek, 1993; Stone, 1984). In a capitalist economy, production
and surplus value are necessary to establish any system of redistribution. Thus entitlement programs are, by nature, limited
(Offe, 1984; Stone, 1984). The management of category creation
and expansion, therefore, becomes central to the program and
the welfare state in general (Stone), and assumptions must be
made about who should be recognized as deserving of social
aid, and how much or what type of aid they deserve. In order
to prevent complete breakdown of the economic system, categories of entitlement must be highly restrictive, defined so
that the number of people who can possibly belong to them
is very small relative to those who can not (Stone). In home
health care, the market-based assumption would limit use to
those requiring short-term post-acute care. The needs-based
assumption would expand access to those needing care on a
longer-term basis for chronic conditions. The battle is waged
between forces supporting distribution based on market principles (restrictive) and those based on need (expansionary), the
fundamental assumptions in this debate (Estes & Swan, 1993;
Higgins, 1988).
Furthermore, categories of redistribution require a validating device to determine who is actually eligible. The validating device must either be restrictive or intentionally vague to
manage distribution and maintain the status quo (Stone, 1984).
In home health care, there is a two-tier process of eligibility.
First, there is an administrative category which establishes
broad-based eligibility for Medicare. This includes either being
age 65 or older, having a long-term disability or a diagnosis of
End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD). However, eligibility for the
home health benefit can only be established based on specific
clinical criteria, that is, whether the person is homebound and
has a need for intermittent skilled care. This system of eligibility determination has an inherent flaw in that the validating
device can be manipulated by the beneficiary, the provider or
the system (Stone). There is also a great deal of uncertainty and
subjective judgment on the part of the physician in determining eligibility and the agency in deciding how much service
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the person should receive. Thus, providers become mediators
between the patient and the system and a central player in the
implementation process and the battle for control over benefit
use.
The restrictive and unclear nature of the categories of redistribution in home health care can be seen in the early days
of the program and especially in the definition of part-time
and intermittent care. Agencies responded to these restrictions
by limiting access to the benefit. After Congress eliminated
specific restrictions on the benefit (e.g. visit limits, hospitalization rule), agencies began offering services to additional beneficiaries. This required even greater tightening of the validating device to control redistribution. Thus, CMS, an arm of the
executive branch of government which was then controlled
by a Republican administration keen on reducing the size of
the federal government, issued transmittals further restricting
access to the benefit by changing the validating device from
part-time or intermittent care to part-time and intermittent
care. Agencies hoping to avoid financial liability for non-reimbursed care responded by reducing the number of patients
and the amount of care provided. Pressure from increased
demand due to the IPPS resulted in a lawsuit, which focused
on redefining the validating device in an expansionary direction. Agencies again reacted to this by providing services to
additional beneficiaries and by providing more service per
beneficiary. Post-Duggan agencies had nothing to lose, and in
fact, much to gain, if a patient was certified as eligible. The lack
of patient cost-sharing at that time also eliminated any financial incentive for the beneficiary to refuse service.
The focus historically was not on meeting older adults'
needs but on manipulating the categories of redistribution in
order to control expenditures. The policy incentives were not
geared to encourage appropriate, adequate and efficient care
delivery. The focus in the 1970s and 1980s was on directly controlling the validating device (part-time-intermittent). When
that effort was derailed by the Duggan decision, the focus in
the 1990s turned to controlling the mediator or agency behavior, thus indirectly controlling the validating device (e.g.,
anti-fraud measures, inflation freezes, IPS). Of course, each
change generated a reaction from agencies which also influenced benefit use. The interests of the agency were reversed
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over time, shifting back and forth between being aligned with
the beneficiary to being aligned with the program.
The combination of incentives in the policy and gaming behaviors at the practice level had the potential to generate fraud
in two directions-either over or under use (Dowd, 2004; Ford,
Wells, & Bailey, 2004). Our health care system encourages agencies to be invested in providing health care services, rather than
invested in health. For most of this history, the policy was to
reward (through reimbursements) agencies, not for improving
or maintaining health, but for providing health care (Dowd,
2004). As reimbursement incentives change, agency practices
adjust to continue the provision of health care and organization maintenance (Dowd, 2004). For example, post-Duggan incentives discouraged agencies from eliminating overuse and
may have encouraged many agencies to provide too much
service relative to need. On the other hand, the IPS encouraged agencies to serve fewer patients and to offer fewer visits,
regardless of patient need or health status. It may be more accurate to say that the goal of the IPS and the 1984-86 transmittals was not to reduce inappropriate utilization but simply to
reduce utilization-to shift the balance between the marketbased system of redistribution and the needs-based system.
The Duggan decision also did not force CMS to devise a reimbursement structure directly responsive to need. Throughout
this history, use of the benefit, therefore, was driven less by
patient need or health status than by arbitrary interpretations
of the validating device and perverse incentives which encouraged agencies to adjust the amount of service, based not on
patient need but on specific reimbursement procedures. These
interpretations were influenced by opposing political ideologies-on one side the market-based model and on the other
the needs-based-equity model (Andersen, 1995; Estes & Swan,
1993; Higgins, 1988).
Conclusion
The home health care policy history demonstrates the
importance of all three branches of government in creating
policy, as well as the influence of both the policy mandate
and policy implementation in shaping benefit use (Pressman
& Wildavsky, 1984). The legislative branch enacted the
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original Medicare program and changes intended to expand
access to the home health benefit. The executive branch, through
its administrative arm (CMS), tightened eligibility via its oversight and implementation function through the creation of a
new program rule. This arbitrary rule was overturned by the
judicial branch (Duggan decision), dramatically expanding eligibility and altering oversight procedures. Finally, in the 1990s
the Republican-controlled Congress used the BBA to reign in
costs by encouraging agencies to cut services to patients. Every
change in the policy generated reactions from agency providers focused on sustaining their role in the health care system
(Dowd, 2004). Benefit use was thus affected, not only by the
policy sanction, but by program implementation at the administrative as well as the agency level (Pressman & Wildavsky,
1984).
It took decades for CMS to create appropriate limits on use
of the benefit and consistent standards for providing home
health care based on need. The bad news is that the base rate
for the PPS was derived from dramatically slashed IPS costs,
thus to some degree continuing a market-based approach.
Likewise, incentives around therapy thresholds in the original
case-mix formula may have encouraged agencies to provide
more therapy services than needed to increase their reimbursement. The good news is that under the home health PPS, we
now have consistent rules for determining eligibility (albeit still
subject to some degree of manipulation at the practice end) and
service need based on a comprehensive and empirically tested
set of patient factors. These factors are currently being revised
to promote efficient but quality care. The OASIS assessment
allows care to be geared to each patient's need or health status
and allows an opportunity to assess the quality of care provided by generating data on patient outcomes, thus shifting from
a focus on health care delivery to health status. This will enable
us to more accurately monitor quality and efficiency patterns
in the future and determine whether the market-based foundation (IPS) and future revisions to the case-mix model are adequate to meet patient need.
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